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Abstract
Despite the great empirical success of adversarial training to defend deep learning models
against adversarial perturbations, so far, it still remains rather unclear what the principles are
behind the existence of adversarial perturbations, and what adversarial training does to the
neural network to remove them.
In this paper, we present a principle that we call “feature purification”, where we show the
existence of adversarial examples are due to the accumulation of certain “dense mixtures” in the
hidden weights during the training process of a neural network; and more importantly, one of the
goals of adversarial training is to remove such mixtures to “purify” hidden weights. We present
both experiments on the CIFAR-10 dataset to illustrate this principle, and a theoretical result
proving that for certain natural classification tasks, training a two-layer neural network with
ReLU activation using randomly initialized gradient descent indeed satisfies this principle.
Technically, we give, to the best of our knowledge, the first result proving that the following
two can hold simultaneously for training a neural network with ReLU activation. (1) Training
over the original data is indeed non-robust to small adversarial perturbations of some radius.
(2) Adversarial training, even with an empirical perturbation algorithm such as FGM, can in
fact be provably robust against any perturbations of the same radius. Finally, we also prove
a complexity lower bound, showing that low complexity models such as linear classifiers, low-
degree polynomials, or even the neural tangent kernel for this network, cannot defend against
perturbations of this same radius, no matter what algorithms are used to train them.
∗V1 of this paper was presented at IAS on this date, and can be viewed online: https://video.ias.edu/csdm/
2020/0316-YuanzhiLi. We added more experiments in V1.5.
We would like to thank Sanjeev Arora for many useful feedbacks.
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1 Introduction
Large scale neural networks have shown great power to learn from a training data set, and generalize
to unseen data sampled from similar distributions for applications across different domains [39,
43, 50, 83]. However, recent study has discovered that these trained large models are extremely
vulnerable to small “adversarial attacks” [17, 91]: It has been discovered that small perturbations to
the input– often small enough to be invisible to humans– can create numerous errors in prediction.
Such slightly perturbed inputs are often referred to as “adversarial examples”.
Since the original discovery of “adversarial examples”, a large body of works have been done
emphasizing how to improve the robustness of the deep learning models against such perturba-
tions [41, 59, 60, 79, 85]. One seminal approach is called the adversarial training [61], where one
iteratively compute the adversarial perturbations for the training examples and retrain the model
with these adversarial examples. This approach was also reported in [13] as the only approach that
can defend carefully designed adversarial attacks.
However, despite the great empirical success on improving the robustness of neural networks
over various data sets, the theory of the adversarial examples is much less developed. In particular,
we found that the following fundamental questions remain largely unaddressed:
Questions
Why do adversarial examples exist when we train the neural networks using the original training
data set? How can adversarial training further “robustify” the trained neural networks against
these adversarial attacks?
To answer these questions, one sequence of theoretical works try to explain the existence of
adversarial examples using the high dimensional nature of the input space and the over-fitting
behavior due to the sample size and sample noise [29, 30, 36, 37, 63, 82, 92], and treat adversarial
training from the broader view of min-max optimization [21, 61, 88, 89, 98]. However, recent
observations [45] indicate that these adversarial examples can also, and arguably often, arise from
features (those that do generalize) rather bugs (those that do not generalize due to effect of poor
statistical concentration). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, all of the existing works study
adversarial examples either (1) applying to the case of an unstructured function f , or (2) under
a structured setting involving only linear learners. These theoretical works, while shedding great
lights to the study of adversarial examples, do not yet give concrete mathematical answers to the
following questions regarding the specific hidden-layer structure of neural networks, which we
refer to as “features”:
1. What are the features (i.e. the hidden weights) learned by the neural network via clean training
(i.e., over the original data set)? Why are those features “non-robust”?
2. What are differences between the features learned by clean training vs adversarial training
(i.e., over a perturbed data set consisting of adversarial examples)?
3. Why do adversarial examples for one neural network transfer to other independently trained
networks?
To answer these questions, it is inevitable to study what are the features (i.e. the hidden
weights) learned by a neural network during clean training. We point out theoretical studies are
rather limited in this direction: Most of the works only focus on the case when the training data
is spherical Gaussian or require heavy initialization using tensor decomposition [14, 18, 20, 33,
49, 52, 55, 57, 84, 86, 93, 95, 99, 105, 107], which might fail to capture the specific structure
of the input; or only consider the neural tangent kernel regime, where the neural networks are
linearized so the features are not learned (they stay at random initialization) [4, 6–8, 11, 12, 23, 23–
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Figure 1: Feature purification in adversarial training (for the first layer of AlexNet on CIFAR-10). Another visual-
ization of some deeper layer of ResNet can be found in Figure 5.
26, 35, 42, 47, 54, 58, 100, 108, 109].
In this paper, we present a new routine that enables us to formally study the learned features
(i.e. the hidden weights) of a neural network, when the inputs are more naturally structured than
being spherical Gaussians. Using this tool, we give, to the best of our knowledge, the first theoretical
result towards answering the aforementioned fundamental questions of adversarial examples, for
neural networks with ReLU activation functions. We summarize our contributions as follows:
Our theoretical results. One way to interpret our result is as follows. We prove, for certain
binary classification data set, when we train a two-layer ReLU neural network using gradient descent
(GD), starting from random initialization,
1. As long as polynomially manly training examples are used, and in polynomially number of
iterations, the learned neural network will learn well-generalizing features, and the learned
network will have close-to-perfect prediction accuracy for the unseen data sampled from the
same distribution.
2. However, even with a weight decay regularizer to avoid over-fitting, even with infinitely many
training data, and even when super-polynomially many iterations are used to train the neural
network to convergence, the learned network still has near-zero robust accuracy against small
norm-bounded adversarial perturbations to the data. In other words, those provably well-
generalizing features are also provably non-robust.
3. Adversarial training, using perturbation algorithms such as fast gradient method (FGM) [37],
can provably and efficiently make the learned neural network nearly-perfectly robust against
even the worst-case norm-bounded adversarial perturbations, using a principle we refer to as
“feature purification”. See Figure 1 for an illustration in experiment.
Feature purification: How adversarial training can perform robust deep learning. In
this work, we also give precise, mathematical characterizations on the difference between learned
features by clean training versus adversarial training, leading to (to our best knowledge) the first
explanation of how, the provably non-robust features after clean training can be provably “robusti-
fied” via adversarial training. We emphasize in prior theoretical works [32, 48, 80, 106], they study
2
Histogram of 𝜃 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖
′
Histogram of 𝜃 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑤𝑗
Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
Figure 2: Measure of feature purifications, AlexNet on CIFAR-10 data set
adversarial examples in the context of linear models (such as linear regression, linear regression
over prescribed feature mappings, or the neural tangent kernels). In those models, the features are
not trained, so adversarial training only changes the weights associated with the linear combination
of these features, but not the actual features themselves.
In our work, we have developed, to the best of knowledge, the first theory on how adversarial
training can actually change the features of a neural network to improve its robustness. We
call this principle feature purification. Let us describe the high-level idea of this principle as follows.
The Principle of Feature Purification
During adversarial training, the neural network will neither learn new, robust features nor remove
existing, non-robust features learned over the original data set. Most of the works of adversarial
training is done by purifying a small part of each learned features after clean training.
Mathematically, as a provisional step to measure of change of features in a network, let us
use w
(0)
i to denote the weight of the i-th neuron at initialization, use wi to denote its weight
after clean training (using w
(0)
i as initialization), and use w
′
i to denote its weight after adversarial
training (using wi as initialization). The “feature purification” principle, in math, says if we use
θ(z, z′) := 〈z,z
′〉
‖z‖2‖z′‖2 as a provisional measure of the correlation between “features”, then (see also
Figure 2)
1. for most neurons: θ(w
(0)
i , wi), θ(w
(0)
i , w
′
i) = o(1);
2. for most neurons: θ(wi, w
′
i) ≥ C for a large constant C; and
3. for most pairs of different neurons: θ(wi, wj) = o(1).
Thus, this principle implies that both clean training and adversarial training discover hidden
weights w,w′ fundamentally different from the prescribed initialization w(0). However, in fact clean
training has already discovered a big portion of the “robust features”, and adversarial training
merely needs to “purify” some small part of each original feature. Our theory provides a proof to
this phenomenon, and more importantly, we also give a characterization on what are the “non-
robust” part of each feature that needs to be purified during adversarial training. We summarize
it as follows.
Why clean training learns non-robust features? Our work gives mathematical charac-
terizations of where the “non-robust” part of each feature comes from during clean training. As
we shall discuss in more detail in Section 6.2, training algorithms such as gradient descent will, at
every step, add to the current parameters a direction that is maximally correlated with the label-
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ing function on average. Our main observation is that such simple correlations will accumulate,
in each neuron, a “dense mixture” which is also maximumly correlated with the average of the
training data. However, due to a natural structure of the training examples we refer to as the
sparse coding model, such “dense mixture” does not have high correlation with any individual
natural training example. Thus, even with these “dense mixtures” in the features, the network can
still generalize well on the original data set due to the low correlation of “dense mixtures” with
any natural training examples. However, we observe and prove that these portions of the features
are extremely vulnerable to small, adversarial perturbations to perturb the original input along the
“dense mixture” directions. Therefore, one of the main goals of adversarial training, as we show, is
to purify the neurons by removing such “dense mixtures”. This is one of the main principal behind
feature purification.
Moreover, our theoretical work implies that these “dense mixtures” come from the “sparse
coding” structure of the data and the gradient descent training algorithm. It is rather independent
of the random initialization of the neural network at the beginning. Thus, we prove that, at least
in our scenario, adversarial examples for one network do transfer to other independently trained
ones. This is given in more details in Theorem 5.2 and Section 6.2.
Our contribution to computation complexity. We also prove a lower bound that, in special
case of the main theorem for neural networks, even when the original data is linearly-separable,
any linear classifier, any low-degree polynomial, or even the corresponding neural tangent kernel
(NTK) of this two-layer neural network, cannot achieve meaningful robust accuracy (although
they can easily achieve high clean accuracy). Together with our upper bound, we have shown
that using a higher-complexity model (such as a two-layer neural network with ReLU activation,
comparing to NTK) can in fact achieve better robustness against adversarial perturbations. Thus,
our theory strongly supports the experimental finding in [37, 61], where experts have noticed
that robustness against adversarial examples requires a model with higher complexity. The main
intuition is that low complexity models, including the neural tangent kernel, lacks the power to zero
out low magnitude signals to improve model robustness, as illustrated in Figure 3 and Section 3.
Our experimental contributions. We also present quite a few experimental results supporting
our theory. (1) Our sparse coding model can indeed capture real-world data to certain degree. (2)
Our principle of feature purification also holds for architectures such as AlexNet and ResNet. (3)
Adversarial training using adversarial examples indeed purify some “dense mixtures” in practice.
(4) During clean training, how the features can emerge from random initialization by wining the
“lottery tickets”, as predicted by our theory. We present our experiments following each of the
theorem statements accordingly. We also include a whole Section 8 for more detailed experiments.
1.1 Related works
Adversarial examples: Empirical study. Since the seminal paper [91] shows the existence of
small adversarial perturbations to change the prediction of the neural networks, many empirical
studies have been done to make the trained neural networks robust against perturbations [41, 59,
60, 79, 85] (and we refer to the citations therein). The recent study [13] shows that the seminal
approach [61] of adversarial training is the most effective way to make the neural networks robust
against adversarial perturbations.
Adversarial examples: Theoretical study. Existing theories mostly explain the existence of
adversarial examples as the result of finite-sample data set over-fitting to high-dimensional learning
problems [29, 30, 36, 37, 63, 82, 92]. Later, it is discovered by Ilyas et al. [45] that well-generalizing
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features can also be non-robust. Other theories focus on the Fourier perspective of the robust-
ness [97, 103], showing that adversarial training might be preventing the network from learning the
high frequency signals of the input image. Our theoretical work is fundamentally different from
the aspect of poor statistical concentration over finite-sample data set, and our Theorem 5.1 and
Theorem 5.3 strongly upports [45] that a well-trained, well-generalizing neural network can still
be non-robust to adversarial attacks.
Other theories about adversarial examples focus on how adversarial training might require more
training data comparing to clean training [80], and might decrease clean training accuracy [76].
The works by [32, 106] focus on how adversarial training can be performed efficiently in the neural
tangent kernel regime. The purpose of these results are also fundamentally different than ours.
Sparse coding. We use a data model called sparse coding, which is a popular model to model
image, text and speech data [65, 73, 74, 96, 101, 102]. There are many existing theoretical works
studying algorithm for sparse coding [9, 15, 40, 44, 51, 64, 81, 87, 90], however, these algorithms
share little similarity to training a neural network.
The seminal work by Arora et al. [10] provides a neurally-plausible algorithm for learning sparse
coding along with other works using alternative minimization [1, 2, 34, 53, 56]. However, all of these
results require a (carefully picking) warm start, while our theory is for training a neural network
starting from random initialization.
Threshold degree and kernel lower bound. We also provide, to the best of our knowledge, the
first example when the original classification problem is learnable using a linear classifier but no low-
degree polynomial can learn the problem robustly against small adversarial perturbations. Yet, the
high-complexity neural networks can provably, efficiently and robustly learn the concept class. The
lower bound for the classification accuracy using low-degree polynomials has been widely studied as
the (approximate) threshold degree of a function or the sign-rank of a matrix [16, 19, 22, 38, 71, 77].
Our paper give the first example of a function with high (approximate) robust threshold degree,
yet efficiently and robustly learnable by training a ReLU neural network using gradient descent.
Other related works prove lower bounds for kernel method in the regression case [3, 5]. Generally
speaking, such lower bounds are about the actual (approximate) degree of the function, instead
of the (approximate) threshold degree. It is well know that for general functions, the the actual
degree can be arbitrary larger than the threshold degree.
2 Preliminaries
We use ‖x‖ or ‖x‖2 to denote `2 norm of a vector x, and ‖x‖p to denote the `p. For a matrix M ∈
Rd×d, we use Mi to denote the i-th column of M, and we use ‖M‖∞ to denote maxi∈[d]
∑
j∈[d] Mi,j
and ‖M‖1 to denote maxj∈[d]
∑
i∈[d] Mi,j . We use poly(d) to denote Θ(d
C) when the degree C is
some not-specified constant. We use the term clean training to refer to the neural network found
by training over the original data set, and the term robust training to refer to the neural network
found by adversarial training. We let sign(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0 and sign(x) = −1 for x < 0.
Sparse coding model. We consider the training data x ∈ Rd generated from
x = Mz + ξ
for a dictionary M ∈ Rd×D, where the hidden vector z ∈ RD and ξ is the noise. For simplicity,
we focus on D = d and M is a unitary matrix, although our results extend trivially to the case of
D < d or when M is incoherent.
We assume the hidden vector z is “sparse”, in the following sense: for k ≤ d0.499, we have:
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Assumption 2.1 (distribution of hidden vector z). The coordinates of z are independent, sym-
metric random variables, such that |zi| ∈ {0} ∪ [ 1√k , 1]. Moreover,
E[z2i ] = Θ
(
1
d
)
, Pr[|zi| = 1] = Ω
(
1
d
)
, Pr
[
|zi| = Θ
(
1√
k
)]
= Ω
(
k
d
)
The first condition is a regularity condition, which says that E[‖z‖22] = Θ(1). The second and
third condition says that there is a non-trivial probability where zi attains the maximum value,
and a (much) larger probability that z is non-zero but has a small value (Remark: It could be the
case that zi is neither maximum nor too small, for example, |zi| can also be k−0.314 with probability
k0.628
d as well, or k
−0.123 with probability k
0.0888
d ). The main observation is that
Fact 2.2. Under Assumption 2.1, w.h.p., ‖z‖0 = Θ(k) is a sparse vector.
Our model of x is known as the sparse coding model, which is widely use to model image, text
and speech data [65, 73, 74, 96, 101, 102].
We study the simplest binary-classification problem, where the labeling function is linear over
the hidden vector z:
y(x) = sign (〈w?, z〉)
For simplicity, we assume ∀i ∈ [D], |w?i | = Θ(1), so all the coordinates of z have relatively equal
contributions. Our theorems extend to other w? at the expense of complicating notations.
Noise model. We have allowed the inputs x = Mz+ ξ to incorporate a noise vector ξ. Our lower
bounds hold even when there is no noise (ξ = 0). Our upper bound theorems not only apply to
ξ = 0, but more generally to a general noise model where ξ is a gaussian noise plus a “spike noise”:
ξ = ξ′ + Mξ′′
Here, the gaussian noise ξ′ ∼ N (0, σ2xd I) with σ2x ≤ O(1). The spike noise ξ′′ is any coordinate-
wise independent, mean-zero random variable satisfying E[ξ′′2i ] ≤ O
(
σ2x
d
)
for every i ∈ [d] and
‖ξ′′‖∞ ≤ 1k0.501 , slightly smaller than the 1k0.5 of the signal. Our upper bound theorems show
that neural network can learn the concept class efficiently even when the “spike” noise is nearly
theoretically the largest, and can even learn so robustly.
We point out that there are also essentially no dependencies among the constants in those O,Θ
and Ω notations of this section, except for those obvious ones (for example Pr[|zi| = 1] ≤ E[|zi|2]).
In particular, σx can be an arbitrarily large constant and Pr[|zi| = 1] can be an arbitrary small
constant times 1/d.1
Clean and robust error. The goal of clean training is to learn a model f so that sign(f(x)) is
as close to y as possible. We define the error on the original data set (a.k.a. the clean error) as:
Ec(f) = Pr
x,y=y(x)
[sign(f(x)) 6= y] (2.1)
Next, we consider robust error against `p adversarial perturbations. For a value τ > 0 and a norm
‖ · ‖p, we define the robust error of the model f (against `p perturbation of radius τ) as:
Er(f) = Pr
x,y=y(x)
[∃δ : ‖δ‖p ≤ τ : sign(f(x+ δ) 6= y)] (2.2)
1Actually, our theorem extends trivially to the case even when Pr[|zi|] = 1d1+o(1) .
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(a) linear, non-robust (b) ReLU, robust
Figure 3: Higher-complexity models using a ReLU activation is more robust than a linear classifier due to the power
to “zero-out” low-magnitude signals. (Our theorem is in symmetric ReLU for the sake of proof simplicity.)
3 Warmup Intuitions
Linear learners are not robust. One direct approach is to use (the sign of) a linear classifier
f(x) = 〈w?,M>x〉 to predict the label of x. There are two issues of using such a classifier:
1. When σx is as large as Θ(1), such classifier can not even classify x in good clean accuracy.
Recall f(x) = 〈w?,M>x〉 = 〈w?, z〉+ 〈Mw?, ξ〉. By our assumption, typically |〈w?, z〉| = O(1)
and 〈Mw?, ξ′〉 ∼ N (0,Θ(σ2x)). Thus, when σx ≥ Θ(1), noise could be much larger than signal,
and this linear classifier cannot be used to classify x correctly. In this case, actually no linear
classifier (or even constant-degree polynomials2) can give meaningful clean accuracy.
2. Even when σx = 0 so the original data is perfectly linearly-classifiable, linear classifier is also
not robust to small perturbations. Since typically |〈w?, z〉| = O(1) and ‖w?‖2 = Θ(
√
d), one
can design an adversarial perturbation δ = −CyMw
?
‖w?‖22
for a large constant C, that can change
the sign of the linear classifier f(x) = 〈w?,M>x〉 for most inputs. Thus, this linear classifier
is not even robust to adversarial perturbations of `2 norm Θ
(
1√
d
)
. In fact, no linear classifier
can be robust to such small adversarial perturbations.
High-complexity models are more robust. Another choice to learn the labeling function is
to use a higher-complexity model f(x) =
∑
i∈[d]w
?
i 〈Mi, x〉1|〈Mi,x〉|≥ 1
2
√
k
. Here, the “complexity” of
f is much higher because an indicator function is used.3 Since 〈Mi, x〉 = zi + 〈Mi, ξ〉, by our noise
model, we can show that as long as zi 6= 0, |〈Mi, x〉| ≥ 12√k with high probability. Thus, f(x) is
equal to the true labeling function 〈w?, z〉 w.h.p. over the original data set, which is (much) more
robust to noise comparing to a linear model 〈w?,M>x〉.
Moreover, this f is also more robust to `2 adversarial perturbations. By Fact 2.2, w.h.p. there
are at most O(k) non-zero coordinates in z, and thus there are at most O(k) many i ∈ [d] with
1|〈Mi,x〉|≥ 1
2
√
k
= 1. Using this, one can derive that this high complexity model f has 1− o(1) robust
accuracy, against any adversarial perturbation of `2 radius o
(
1/
√
k
)
. This is much larger than that
of o
(
1/
√
d
)
for a linear classifier, and it is actually information theoretically optimal.
To sum up, higher-complexity models (such as those using ReLU) have the power to zero out
low-magnitude signals to improve adversarial robustness, as illustrated in Figure 3.
2One may think that using for example degree-3 polynomial
∑
i w
?
i 〈Mi, x〉3 can reduce the level of noise, but
notice due to the diversity in the value of zi when zi 6= 0, one must use something close to linear when |zi| is large.
Applying Markov brothers’ inequality, one can show the low-degree polynomial must be close to a linear function.
3One concrete measure of “higher complexity” is that f cannot be well-approximated by any low (constant) degree
polynomial.
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original images
sparse reconstruction using learned features from the first layer of AlexNet
sparsity 4.05%
sparsity 2.89%
sparsity 1.90%
sparsity 1.10%
sparsity 0.44%
Figure 4: Reconstruct the original image using sparse linear combinations of the AlexNet’s features (adversarially
trained). The average sparsity is only 4.05% or less. More experiments in Section 8.3.
Learning robust classifier using neural network. Motivated by the above discussions between
linear vs. high-complexity models, our goal is to show that a two-layer neural networks can (after
adversarial training) learn a robust function such as
f(x) ≈
∑
i∈[d]
w?i [ReLU(〈Mi, x〉 − b)− ReLU(−〈Mi, x〉 − b)]
Here, ReLU is the ReLU activation function, and b ≈ 1
2
√
k
. In this paper, we present a theorem
stating that adversarial training of a (wlog. symmetric) two-layer neural network can indeed recover
a neural network of this form. In other words, after adversarial training, the features learned by
the hidden layer of a neural network can indeed form a basis of the input x where coefficients are
sparse. We also present a theorem showing exactly why, clean training will not learn this robust
function. We also verify experimentally that the features learned by the first layer of AlexNet (after
adversarial training) indeed form a sparse basis of the images. See Figure 4.
4 Learner Network and Adversarial Training
In this paper we consider a simple, two layer (symmetric)4 neural network with ReLU activation.
f(x) =
m∑
i=1
ai[ReLU(〈wi, x〉 − bi + ρi)− ReLU(−〈wi, x〉 − bi + ρi)]
In this way we have f(x) = −f(−x). We refer to wi ∈ Rd as the hidden weights (or features) for this
network. Each ρi ∼ N (0, σ2ρ) is a smoothing of the original ReLU, also known as the pre-activation
noise. Equivalently, one can use the smoothed ReLU activation R˜eLU(x) = Eρ ReLU(x+ ρ). In our
paper, σρ is smaller than bi and much smaller than the typical value of 〈wi, x〉. The main role of the
pre-activation noise is simply to make the gradient of ReLU smooth, which simplifies our analysis
for the sample complexity (to avoid over-fitting), as well as using certain algorithms to find the
adversarial examples. In this paper, unless specially specified, we will use ρ to denote (ρi)i∈[m].
To simplify analysis, we fix ai = 1 throughout the training. At initialization, we let w
(0)
i ∼
4We assume the neurons are symmetric (i.e., with (wi,−wi) pairs) to simplify proofs.
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N (0, σ20I) for σ0 = 1poly(d) and all bi = b(0). We use w(t)i to denote the hidden weights at time t,
and use ft(w;x, ρ) to denote the network at iteration t
ft(w;x, ρ) =
m∑
i=1
(
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t)i )− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t)i )
)
Given a training set Z = {xj , yj}j∈[N ] together with one sample of pre-activation noise ρ(j) for each
(xj , yj), we define
Losst(w;x, y, ρ)
def
= log(1 + e−yft(w;x,ρ))
Losst(w)
def
= E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[Losst(w;x, y, ρ)] L˜osst(w)
def
=
1
N
∑
j∈[N ]
[Losst(w;xj , yj , ρ
(j))]
Objt(w)
def
= Losst(w) + λ
∑
i∈[m]
Reg(wi) O˜bjt(w)
def
= L˜osst(w) + λ
∑
i∈[m]
Reg(wi)
Above, Losst(w;x, y, ρ) is the standard logistic loss, Losst(w) is the population risk and L˜osst(w)
is the empirical risk. We consider a strong, but quite natural regularizer to further avoid over-
fitting, given as Reg(wi)
def
=
(‖wi‖22
2 +
‖wi‖32
3
)
. 5 We consider a fixed λ = log log log dd for simplicity,
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although our result trivially extends to other (lager) values of λ.
Similar to Eq. (2.1), we defined the (clean, population) classification error at iteration t as
Ect def= Pr
x,y=y(x),ρ
[y 6= sign(ft(w(t);x, ρ))] .
We denote
`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
def
=
d
ds
[log(1 + es)] |s=−yft(w(t);x,ρ)
and observe E[`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)] ≥ Ω(Ect ).
We consider gradient descent training algorithm with step length η > 0, see Algorithm 1. (Our
result extends to stochastic gradient descent at the expense of complicating notations.) We assume
for simplicity the bias terms b
(t)
1 = · · · = b(t)m and they grow together:7 when near initialization,
we manually increase the (negative) bias b(t+1) = b(t) + ηB where B = cbd for some small constant
cb > 0— this corresponds to the “lottery ticket winning” phase to be discussed later in Section 6.1;
and whenever b(t) reaches 1
k0.5001
we set B = 0. We also choose pre-activation noise σ
(t)
ρ =
b(t)√
log d
·
Θ((log log log d)3) for t ≤ Ta = 1poly(d)η , and σ
(t)
ρ =
b(t)
log d ·Θ((log log log d)3) for t > Ta.
4.1 Adversarial training
Let us consider an arbitrary (norm-bounded) adversarial perturbation algorithm A.
Definition 4.1. A perturbation algorithm A (a.k.a. attacker) maps the current network f (which
includes hidden weights {wi}, output weights {ai}, bias {bi} and smoothing parameter σρ), an input
5Of course,
‖wi‖22
2
is known as the weight decay regularizer, used practically everywhere for neural network training.
The additional
‖wi‖32
3
is an analog of the weight decay regularizer when combined with batch normalization [46].
6Throughout this paper, the purpose of anylog log log d factor is to cancel out arbitrarily large constants so that
we can present theorems and lemmas with simpler notations.
7More generally, if one also wants to train bi then they have different values. Our analysis does extend to that
case when the spike noise is large (σx = Ω(1)), at the expense of complicating the proofs.
9
Algorithm 1 Clean Training using Gradient Descent
1: b(0) ← 0 for every i ∈ [m].
2: for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , Tf − 1} do
3: For each (xj , yj) ∈ Z, sample pre-activation noise ρ(j) i.i.d. ∼ N (0, (σ(t)ρ )2Im×m).
4: Define empirical objective O˜bjt(w) at this iteration using {ρ(j)}j∈[N ].
5: For each i ∈ [m], update w(t+1)i ← w(t)i − η∇wiO˜bjt(w(t))
6: Update b(t+1) ← b(t) + ηB
7: end for
x, a label y, and some internal random string r, to Rd satisfying
‖A(f, x, y, r)‖p ≤ τ .
for some `p norm. We say A is an `2 perturbation algorithm with radius τ if p = 2, and `∞
perturbation algorithm if p =∞.
For simplicity, we assume A satisfies for fixed f, y, r, either ‖A(f, x, y, r)‖p ≤ 1poly(d) , or A(f, x, y, r)
is a poly(d)-Lipschitz continuous function in x.
One can verify that for our network, the fast gradient method (FGM) [37] satisfies the above
properties. We formally state the adversarial training algorithm in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Adversarial Training Algorithm
1: Begin with a network fTf learned through clean training in Algorithm 1.
2: for t ∈ {Tf , Tf + 1, · · · , Tf + Tg − 1} do
3: For every (xj , yj) ∈ Z, perturb x(adv)j ← xj +A(f, xj , yj , rj).
4: For each (xj , yj) ∈ Z, sample pre-activation noise ρ(j) i.i.d. ∼ N (0, (σ(t)ρ )2Im×m).
5: Define empirical objective O˜bjt(w) at this iteration using {x(adv)j , yj , ρ(j)}j∈[N ].
6: For each i ∈ [m], update w(t+1)i ← w(t)i − η∇wiO˜bjt(w(t))
7: end for
The (true) robust classification error at iteration t, against arbitrary `p norm perturbation of
radius τ , is given as (c.f. (2.2))
Ert def= Pr
x,y=y(x),ρ
[∃δ ∈ Rd, ‖δ‖p ≤ τ : sign(ft(x+ δ)) 6= y]
In contrast, the (empirical) robust classification error against algorithm A is
Êrt def= Pr
x,y=y(x),ρ,r
[sign(ft(x+A(ft, x, y, r))) 6= y]
Our main upper bound theorems apply to all adversarial training algorithms under Definition 4.1,
via minimizing Êr. To obtain true provable robustness for Er, as we shall see, one can for instance
let A be the fast gradient method (FGM) [37], a widely used algorithm to find adversarial examples.
In our language, FGM is simply given by:8
A(f, x, y) =
{
arg minδ:‖δ‖p≤τ 〈y∇xf(x), δ〉 if ‖∇xf(x)‖q ≥ 1poly(d) ;
0 otherwise.
8Here, ‖‖q is the dual norm of ‖‖p. In our case, due to the pre-activation noise, we define ∇xf(x) =
∇x Eρ f(x;w, ρ). Also, we have zeroed out A(f, x, y) when ‖∇xf(x)‖q is extremely small for the convenience of
analysis, because otherwise A(f, x, y) is not Lipscthiz continuous at those points.
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5 Statements of Main Results
5.1 Clean Training, Adversarial Training and `2 Robustness
For simplicity, in this subsection we sketch our main results for a special case k = d0.36, although
our theorems hold for a wide range of k in the full appendix.
Theorem 5.1 (clean training, sketched). There exists an absolute constants C, c > 0 such that for
every constant c0 ∈ (0, c], every d and m with m = d1+c0, given N ≥ Ω(dC) many training data, for
every learning rate η ∈ (0, 1
Ω(dC)
]
, the following holds with high probability: Define Tcc := Θ(
d1.01
η ).
1. Global feature learning: for every t ≥ Tcc, (full version see Theorem C.2)∑
i∈[m]
〈
w
(t)
i , w
(0)
i
〉2
= o(1)×∑i∈[m] ‖w(t)i ‖22 · ‖w(0)i ‖22 and∑
i,j∈[m]
〈
w
(t)
i , w
(t)
j
〉2
= o(1)× (∑i∈[m] ‖w(t)i ‖22)2 .
2. Clean accuracy: for every t ∈ [Tcc, dlog d/η], (full version see Theorem D.1)
Ect = Pr
x,y=y(x),ρ
[y 6= sign(ft(w(t);x, ρ))] ≤ o(1) .
3. Clean training is not robust: for every t ∈ [Tcc, dlog d/η], every τ ≥ 1k0.5+10c , using perturbation
δ = −τ yMw?‖Mw?‖2 (which does not depend on ft), (full version see Theorem E.1)
Ert ≥ Prx,y,ρ[ft(w
(t);x+ δ, ρ) 6= y] = 1− o(1) .
Why clean training is non-robust? Theorem 5.1 indicates that clean training has good clean
accuracy but terrible robust accuracy. Such terrible robust accuracy holds even when a super-
polynomially many iterations and infinitely many training examples are used to train the neural
network. In the next theorem, we give a precise characterization of what are hidden weights {wi} are
after clean training, and why they are not robust. More intuitions regarding how the “non-robust
portions” of these features are actually formed during clean training can be found in Section 6.2.
Theorem 5.2 (clean training features, sketched). For every neuron i ∈ [m], there is a subset Ni
of size |Ni| = O(1) such that, for every t ∈ [Tcc, dlog d/η),
w
(t)
i =
∑
j∈Ni
αi,jw
?
jMj +
∑
j /∈Ni
βi,jw
?
jMj (full statement see Theorem C.2)
where each αi,j ∈
[
1
dc , d
c
]
and each |βi,j | ≤ kd1−c for some small constant c ∈ [0, 0.001]. Moreover,
1
md
∑
i∈[m],j∈[d]
βi,j ∈
[
1
dc
× k
d
, dc × k
d
]
. (full statement see Lemma E.2)
Hence, Theorem 5.2 shows that instead of learning the “robust features” {Mj}j∈[d], intuitively,
ignoring the small dc factors, imagining as if |Ni| = 1, and assuming for simplicity all the βi,j ’s are
of similar (positive) magnitude, then, clean training will learn for each neuron:
w
(t)
i ≈ Θ(1)Mj +
∑
j′ 6=j
[
Θ
(
k
d
)
w?j′Mj′
]
(5.1)
Feature purification: mathematical reasoning. Eq. (5.1) says that, after clean training, the
neural network will be able to learn a big portion of the robust feature: Θ(1)Mj . But, on the
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other hand, it will also learn a small “dense mixture” v =
∑
j′ 6=j
[
Θ
(
k
d
)
w?j′Mj′
]
. In our sparse
coding model, each x is of form x = Mz + ξ, where z is a sparse vector. Thus, such “dense
mixture” v has low correlation with almost all inputs x from the original distribution. Therefore,
these “dense mixtures” will have negligible effect for clean training accuracy. However, as shown
in the proof of Theorem 5.1, such dense mixture is extremely vulnerable to small but dense
adversarial perturbations of the input, making the model non-robust. We point out that, such
“dense adversarial perturbation” directions do not exist in the original (clean) data.9 Thus, one
has to rely on adversarial training to remove such “dense mixtures” to make the model robust.
This is the main spirit of the principle of feature purification. We illustrate this in Figure 5.
adversarial 
training
“horse + mixtures” become “pure horse”
“car + mixtures” become “pure car”
Figure 5: Experiments support our theory that adversarial training do purify “dense mixtures”, through for instance
visualizing some deep layer features of ResNet on CIFAR-10 data. More experiments in Section 8.2.
Where does “dense mixture” come from? We also provide intuitions on how these “dense
mixtures” are generated during clean training, see Section 6.2. At a high level, at each iteration, the
gradient∇Obj will bias towards the direction that is positively correlated with the labeling function
y = sign(〈w?, z〉), and since x = Mz + ξ in our model, such direction should be Mw? = ∑j w?jMj .
Recall we have argued in Section 3, when the noise level σx ≥ Ω(1) is large, this dense direction
can not be used to classify y directly. Yet, our critical observation is that, especially for well-trained
neural network which can “de-noise” ξ, this dense direction is actually locally positively correlated
with the labeling function y, and thus can be accumulated in the hidden weights during the course
of a local training algorithm such as gradient descent.10
Theorem 5.3 (adversarial training, sketched). In the same setting as Theorem 5.1, suppose A is
an `2 perturbation algorithm with radius τ ≤ 1k0.5+c . Suppose we run clean training for Tf ≥ Tcc
iterations followed with adversarial training for Tg = Θ(
k2+c
η ) iterations. The following holds with
high probability.
1. Empirical robust accuracy: ÊrT = o(1) for T = Tf + Tg. (full statement see Theorem F.1)
9One can try to add these “dense mixtures” directly to the training data set, which we conjecture to be similar
to the approach in [45]
10In contrast, if a linear classifier is used, it cannot de-noise ξ and thus such dense direction shall not be accumulated;
however, no linear classifier can achieve good clean accuracy when σx ≥ Ω(1) is large.
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2. Provable robust accuracy: when A is the fast gradient method (FGM), we also have ErT = o(1).
(full statement see Corollary F.2)
3. Feature purification (local): for every t ∈ [Tf , Tf + Tg − 1],∑
i∈[m] ‖w
(Tf )
i − w(t)i ‖22 = o(1)×
∑
i∈[m] ‖w
(Tf )
i ‖22
(see (F.12) in the proof of Theorem F.1)
As we illustrate in Figure 6, one of the main goals of adversarial training is to remove “dense
mixtures” to make the network more robust. Before adversarial training, the adversarial perturba-
tions are “dense” in the basis of {Mj}j∈[d]. After adversarial training the adversarial perturbation
becomes “sparse” and more aligned with inputs from the original data set.
original images
adversarial perturbations for clean-trained models (scaled by x5)
adversarial perturbations for robust-trained models (scaled by x5)
Figure 6: Adversarial examples before and after adversarial training; ResNet-32, CIFAR-10 data set. For clean-
trained models, adversarial perturbations are “dense.” After robust training, the “dense mixtures” are re-
moved and adversarial perturbations are more aligned with actual images. More experiments in Section 8.3.
5.2 `∞ Robustness and Lower Bound for Low-Complexity Models
We also have the following theorem (stated in special case for simplicity) for `∞ robustness.
Theorem 5.4 (`∞ adversarial training, sketched). Suppose ‖M‖∞, ‖M‖1 = do(1). There exists
constant c1 ∈ (0, c0) such that, in the same setting as Theorem 5.3, except now for any k ∈
[dc1 , d0.399], and A is an `∞-perturbation algorithm with radius τ = 1k1.75+2c0 . Then, the same
Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 5.1 still hold and imply
• clean training is not robust again `∞ perturbation with radius 1k2−c1 ;
• adversarial training is robust against any `∞-perturbation of radius τ = 1k1.75+2c0 .
This gives a gap because c0, c1 can be made arbitrarily small.
(full statements see Theorem E.1 and Theorem F.4)
We also show a lower bound that no low-degree polynomial, nor even the corresponding neural
tangent kernel (NTK), can robustly learn the concept class. Recall
Definition 5.5. The feature mapping of the neural tangent kernel for our two-layer network f is
Φ(x) =
(
xE
ρi
(
1〈wi,x〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x〉+ρi≥bi
))m
i=1
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Therefore, given weights {vi}i∈[m], the NTK function p(x) is given as
p(x) =
∑
i∈[m]
〈x, vi〉 E
ρi∼N (0,σ2ρ)
(
1〈wi,x〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x〉+ρi≥bi
)
In this paper we consider a wide range of NTK parameters: wlog. each wi ∼ N (0, I), ρi ∼
N (0, σ2ρi) for arbitrary σρi ∈ [0, do(1)] and |bi| = do(1).
Our lower bound holds even for a most simple case when M = I and σx = 0, so the original
concept class is linearly separable. We prove the following:
Theorem 5.6 (lower bound). For every constant C > 1, suppose m ≤ dC , then there is a constant
c > 0 such that when k = 1dc , considering `∞ perturbation with radius τ =
1
k100
, we have w.h.p.
over the choice of wi, for every p(x) in the above definition,
Er(p) ≥ 1− o(1)
2
. (full statement see Theorem G.1)
(In contrast, Theorem 5.4 says adversarial training of neural network gives robust radius τ = 1
k1.76
.)
Since a poly-sized NTK kernel is known to be powerful enough to incorporate any low complexity
functions (such as constant-degree polynomials) [6], we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.7 (lower bound). In the same setting as Theorem 5.6, if q(x) is a constant degree
polynomial, then we also have Er(q) ≥ 1−o(1)2 .
6 Overview of the Training Process
In this section, we present an overview of the proof for the training process, using gradient descent
starting from random initialization. The complete proof is deferred to Appendix.
6.1 Wining Lottery Tickets Near Random Initialization
Our proof begins by showing how the features in the neural network are emerged from the random
initialization. In this phase, the loss function is not sufficiently minimized yet, so the classification
accuracy remains around 50%. However, we observe that in this phase, the gradient descent process
will already drive the neural network to learn a rich set of interesting features out of the random
initialization. We call this process “lottery ticket winning” near random initialization, which is
related to the study of [31].
Remark. This “lottery ticket winning” process is fundamentally different from the neural
tangent kernel analysis (e.g. [4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 23–26, 35, 42, 47, 54, 58, 100, 109]). In this
phase, although the loss is not sufficiently minimized, the activation patterns of the ReLU’s will
change dramatically, so that they can have little correlations with the random initialization.
Yet, we develop a new theoretical technique that allows us to control the change of the weights
of the neurons, as we summarize below.
We derive the following property at random initialization. At iteration t = 0, the hidden weights are
initialized as w
(0)
i ∼ N
(
0, σ20Id×d
)
. Using standard properties of Gaussians, we show the following
critical property: as long as m ≥ d1.01, there exists small constants c3 > c4 > 0 such that
(i) For most of the neurons i ∈ [m], maxj∈[d]{〈Mj , w(0)i 〉2} ≤ 2σ20 log d.
(ii) For at most 1dc4 fraction of of the neurons i ∈ [m], there is a dimension j ∈ [d] with
〈Mj , w(0)i 〉2 ≥ 2.01σ20 log d.
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(iii) For at least 1dc3 fraction of of the neurons i ∈ [m], there is one and only one j ∈ [d] such that
〈Mj , w(0)i 〉2 ≥ 2.02σ20 log d, and all the other j′ ∈ [d] satisfies 〈Mj′ , w(0)i 〉2 ≤ 2.01σ20 log d.
In other words, even with very mild over-parameterization m ≥ d1.01, by the property of random
gaussian initialization, there will be some “potentially lucky neurons” in (ii), where the maximum
correlation to one of the features Mj is slightly higher than usual. Moreover, there will be some
“lucky neurons” in (iii), where such “slightly higher correlation” only appears with one and only
one of the target features Mj .
In our proof, we denote the set of the neurons in (iii) whose correlation with Mj is slightly
higher than usual as the set S(0)j,sure, and denote those in (ii) as S(0)j,pot. We will identify the following
process during the training, as given in Theorem C.1:
Lottery tickets winning process
For every j ∈ [d], at every iteration t, if i ∈ S(0)j,sure, then 〈Mj , w(t)i 〉2 will grow faster than
〈Mj′ , w(t)i 〉2 for every t, until 〈Mj , w(t)i 〉2 becomes sufficiently larger than all the other 〈Mj′ , w(t)i 〉2.
In other words, if neuron i wins the lottery ticket at random initialization, then eventually, it
will deviate from random initialization and grow to a feature that is more close to (a scaling of) Mj .
Our other main observation is that if we slightly over-parameterize the network with m ≥ d1.001,
then for each j ∈ [d], |S(0)j,sure| ≥ 1 and |S(0)j,pot| ≤ d0.01. Or in words, each “lottery ticket” Mj will
be won at least once, but at most d0.01 times. We also illustrate the lottery ticket winning process
experimentally in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Lottery tickets winning process, AlexNet, CIFAR-10 data set.
6.2 The Formation of “Dense Mixtures” During Training
The next phase of our analysis begins when all the neurons already won their lottery tickets near
random initialization. After that, the loss starts to decrease significantly, so the (clean) classification
error starts to drop. We shall prove that in this phase, gradient descent will also accumulate, in each
neuron, a small “dense mixture” that is extremely vulnerable to small but adversarial perturbations.
To show this, we maintain the following critical property as given in Theorem C.2:
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If a neuron i wins the lottery ticket for feature Mj near random initialization,
then it will keep this “lottery ticket” throughout the training.
Or in math words, for each neuron i, after 〈Mj , w(t)i 〉2 becomes sufficiently larger than all the
other 〈Mj′ , w(t)i 〉2 at the first stage, it will stay much larger than other 〈Mj′ , w(t)i 〉2 for the remaining
of the training process. To prove this, we introduce a careful coupling between the (directional)
gradient of the neuron, and the (directional) Lipschitz continuity of the network ft, this is given in
Section C.4.2.
The vulnerable “dense mixtures”. The most critical observation in this phase is the formation
of “dense mixtures”, where we show that even for the “lucky neuron” that wins the lottery ticket,
the hidden weight of this neuron will look like (see Lemma E.2)
wi ≈ αt
Mj + Θ(k
d
)∑
j′ 6=j
w?j′Mj′
 (6.1)
In other words, up to scaling, these neurons will look like wi ≈ Mj + vi, where vi is a “dense
mixture” vi = Θ
(
k
d
)∑
j′ 6=j w
?
j′Mj′ .
The key observation is that vi is small and “dense”, in the sense that it is a mixture of all the
other features {Mj′}j′∈[d], but each of the feature has a much smaller contribution comparing to
the leading term Mj . Recall each input x = Mz + ξ so with high probability :
|〈vi, x〉| ≤ O˜
(
k
d
‖x‖2
)
(6.2)
In the “sparse coding” regime, this value is even smaller than 1k when k ≤
√
d. Thus, this “dense
mixture” will not be correlated with any particular natural input data, and thus the existence of
these mixtures will have negligible contribution to the output of ft.
However, if we perturb input x along the “dense directions” δ ∝ ∑j′∈[d] Mj′ , we can observe
that:
|〈vi, δ〉| = Ω
(
k√
d
‖δ‖2
)
Comparing this with Eq (6.2), such “dense perturbation” can change the output of the neural
network ft by a lot, using a small δ whose norm is much smaller than that of x. Thus, at this
phase, even when the network has a good clean accuracy, it is still non-robust to all these small yet
dense adversarial perturbations. Moreover, this perturbation direction is “universal”, in the sense
that it does not depend on the randomness of the model at initialization, or the randomness we use
during the training. This explains transfer attacks in practice: that is, the adversarial perturbation
found in one model can also attack other models that are independently trained.
Feature purification. Since Eq. (6.2) suggests most of the original inputs have negligible cor-
relations with each dense mixture, during clean training, gradient descent will have no incentive
to remove those mixtures. Thus, we have to rely on adversarial training to purify those “dense
mixtures” by introducing “adversarial examples”. Those examples have correlation with vi’s that
are higher than usual. As we prove in Theorem 5.1 and illustrate in Figure 1: such “purifications”,
albeit imposing only a small change to each neuron, will greatly improve the robustness of the
neural network.
The formation of the “dense mixtures”. To further help the readers understand how those
“dense mixtures” are formed, we sketch the proof of Theorem E.1 (which shows why clean training
is provably non-robust). The main observation is that when the “dense mixtures” are small, the
16
negative gradient of the (say, population) loss with respect to each neuron wi is approximately
given by:
−∇wiLoss(w(t)) ≈ E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
Mz
]
As a result,
−〈∇wiLoss(w(t)),Mw?〉 ≈ E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)〈w?, z〉]
Since y = sign(〈w?, z〉), we have y〈w?, z〉 ≥ 0, `′ ≥ 0 and the indicators are always non-negative.
Therefore, −〈∇wi ,Mw?〉 is quite positive, and during clean training, it will naturally accumulate
in each neuron and thus result in non-trivial correlation with Mw?.
We notice that this is indeed a special property of gradient descent. Consider the case when
σ2x = Ω(1), so x = Mz + ξ with ‖ξ‖2 = Ω(1) = Ω(‖Mz‖2). With high probability, a linear
classifier using direction Mw? can not be used to classify x correctly. Yet, this direction Mw?
is still locally positively correlated with the labeling function y, especially for well-trained,
well-generalizing neural networks when the ξ can be “de-noised”. (Stochastic) gradient
descent, as a local update algorithm, only exams the local correlation between the update direction
and the labeling function, and it does not exam whether this direction can be used in the final result.
Thus, this “dense direction” Mw? will be accumulated step by step, leading to a “non-robust” part
of the each of the features during clean training. In fact, even if we use wi = Mi as initialization
as opposed to random initialization, continuing clean training will still accumulate these small but
dense mixtures. See Figure 8.
dense mixtures
pure features
pure features 
+ dense mixtures
(random init)
(linear model)
clean training adversarial training
Clean training has the incentive to 
accumulate dense mixtures 
associated with the linear model
adversarial training blocks 
this incentive by introducing 
dense adv-perturbation
Figure 8: Overall summary of clean training, adversarial training, in the language of pure vs dense features. (Exper-
iment based on AlexNet on CIFAR-10 dataset.)
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we made a first step towards understanding how, in principle, the features in a
neural network are learned during the training process, and why after clean training, these provably
well-generalizing features are still provably non-robust. Our main conclusion is that during the
clean training process using (stochastic) gradient descent, the neural network will accumulate, in
all features, some “dense mixture directions” that have low correlations with any natural input,
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but are extremely vulnerable to (dense) adversarial perturbations. During adversarial training,
such “dense mixtures” are purified to make the model more robust. Our results suggest that the
non-robustness of clean training is mainly due to two reasons:
1. the inductive bias of gradient descent, and
2. the “sparse coding” structure of the data.
Both reasons are necessary in some sense. First, a robust model is also a global minimizer of
the clean training objective; our theorem shows that even with proper regularization and infinite
training examples to avoid over-fitting, gradient descent still has inductive bias towards finding a
non-robust model instead of the robust one. Second, it is easy to come up with data sets— such
as linear-classifier labels over well-conditioned “mixture of Gaussians” like inputs— where clean
training using gradient descent directly achieves the best robust accuracy. Thus, to understand the
non-robustness of neural networks, we more or less have to take into account the gradient descent
algorithm and the structure of the inputs.
Indeed, our step is still very provisional. We immediately see a plethora of extensions from
our work. First of all, natural images have much richer structures than sparsity; hence, those
“non-robust mixtures” accumulated by clean training might also carry structural properties other
than density. Moreover, we would like to extend our work to the clean and robust training of
multi-layer neural networks, possibly with “hierarchical feature purification” processes. Indeed,
understanding the whole picture of adversarial examples and adversarial training might require a
complete understanding of deep learning.
8 Experiment Details
We perform experiments using three standard architectures, AlexNet, ResNet-14, and ResNet-32
with basic blocks, and tested on the CIFAR-10 dataset.11
We discover that learning rate 0.1 for good for ResNet and 0.05 is good for AlexNet; while
weight decay 0.0001 is good for ResNet and 0.0005 is good for AlexNet (this was also recommended
by the git repo authors). We use standard SGD with 0.9 momentum as the training algorithm.
During adversarial training, we have implemented:
• The empirical `2 perturbation algorithm (i.e., attacker) suggested by [78]. We choose two sets
of parameters so that the adversarial training task is somewhat non-trivial, where the testing
(empirical) accuracy is 40 ∼ 50%. We denote the attackers by `2(4.6, 0.25) and `2(2.3, 0.12).12
• The empirical `∞ perturbation algorithm (i.e., attacker) [61], with `∞ radius 4/255 and 8/255,
together with 7 steps of PGD attack. We call them `∞(4/255) and `∞(8/255) respectively.
We mostly focus on the `2(4.6, 0.25) attacker in this paper, but shall compare them in Section 8.4.
8.1 Feature Visualization of Deeper Layers
Visualizing the first layer of any trained architecture is trivial: for instance, for AlexNet, the weight
tensor of the first layer is 3× 11× 11 which gives the RGB color of 11× 11 patches (and this was
11We used the implementations from https://github.com/bearpaw/pytorch-classification. We used their
default random crop and random flip as data augmentation.
12We use their SmoothAdvPGD attacker with following parameters. We use σ = 0.25 which is the random Gaussian
perturbation added to the input; use mtrain = 2 which is the number of Gaussian noise samples used per training
sample, use TPGD = 4 which is the number of PGD attack steps, and use ε = 4.6 which is the `2 radius for the PGD
attacker. We also follow their instruction to perform 10 warmup epochs to gradually increase ε from zero to 4.6. We
call this `2(4.6, 0.25). We have also implemented `2(2.3, 0.12).
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(a) AlexNet, layer 2 visualization, clean vs robust (b) AlexNet, layer 4 visualization, clean vs robust
(c) ResNet-14, layer 7 visualization, clean vs robust (d) ResNet-32, layer 13 visualization, clean vs robust
(e) ResNet-14, layer 11 visualization, clean vs robust (f) ResNet-32, layer 23 visualization, clean vs robust
(g) ResNet-14, layer 13 visualization, clean vs robust (h) ResNet-32, layer 27 visualization, clean vs robust
Figure 9: Visualization of deep features on cleanly-trained vs. robustly-trained models.
Take-away message: features from robustly-trained models are more “pure” and closer to the the real
image space. We hope that our work can be extended to a “hierarchical feature purification” for multi-layer
neural networks, using the recent advance in the theory of training deep neural networks efficiently and
beyond NTKs [3, 5]
precisely what we presented in Figure 1). However, such visualization can be less meaningful for
ResNet because the tensors are of dimension 3× 3× 3.
Visualizing the features presented by deeper convolutional layers is an active research area,
dating back at least to [28]. Perhaps the most naive approach is to start from a randomly initialize
image (of size 3 × 32 × 32), then take a specific neuron n at some layer, and repeatedly take its
gradient with respect to the image. If we keep adding this gradient to the input image, then ideally
this gives us the image which “excites” n the most. Unfortunately, it is a common knowledge in
this area that this naive approach does not lead to “visually meaningful” images as we go (even
slightly) deeper into a network (see e.g. the left column of Figure 9).
In existing literature, researchers have tried to various ways to resolve this issue (see e.g. an
extensive survey by Olah et al. [72] and the references therein). At a high level, some penalizes the
image to remove high-frequency noise [62, 66, 68, 75, 94]; some searches for images that can still
excite the given neuron after jittering [66, 67, 75, 94]; and some searches only in the space of “real
data” by building a model (e.g. using GAN) to capture the prior [66, 69, 70].
We observe that, if the model is robustly trained, then one can directly apply the naive approach
to visualize features of the deep layers, and the resulting images can be “visually very meaningful.”
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See Figure 9.13 Our theory in fact explains this phenomenon: the “dense mixtures” accumulated
during clean training is extremely harmful to the visualization effect, since they are “visually
meaningless.” After robust training, such “dense mixtures” are removed so the visualization starts
to align with human concepts.
Throughout this section we stick to this naive approach for visualizing features of deep layers.14
8.2 Feature Purification at Deeper Layers
Since our theoretical result shows the “feature purification” principle of a single layer, we perform
the following experiment to verify this in practice, to study the effect of “feature purification”
in each layer individually. For each of architecture A ∈ {ResNet-14, ResNet-32}, we select some
convolutional layer `. For each pair (A, `), we
• perform T epochs of adversarial training;
• freeze the weights of layers 1, 2, . . . , `− 1 and re-randomize weights of layers `, `+ 1, . . . ;
• perform T epochs of clean training (by training weights of layers `, `+ 1, . . . );
• perform T epochs of adversarial training (by training weights of layers `, `+ 1, . . . ).
Then, we visualize the features on layer `
• at the end of epoch T (indicating layer ` is random),
• at the end of epoch 2T (indicating layer ` is clean trained), and
• at the end of epoch 3T (indicating layer ` is adversarially trained).
We present our findings in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively for ResNet-14 and ResNet-32.
We also point out that with this training schedule, even when the first (` − 1)-layers are fixed
to “robust features” and only the `, ` + 1, · · · layers are trained, after clean training, the robust
accuracy is still 0%.
13This should not be surprising given that the “jittering” technique is known to work in practice on visualizing
clean models.
14Specifically, starting from a random input image, we take 2000 gradient steps to update the image so that
the given neuron at a specific layer is excited the most. To make the result image even prettier, we have slightly
regularized this process by: (1) adding a weight decay factor to incentivize the image to go to RGB (128,128,128);
(2) using the sign of the gradient instead of the gradient itself (similar to the `∞ attacker [61]).
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(a) layer 5 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust) (b) layer 7 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust)
(c) layer 11 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust) (d) layer 13 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust)
Figure 10: Visualization of the `-th layer features from ResNet-14 for ` ∈ {5, 7, 11, 13}.
Take-away message: feature purification happens even at deep layers of a neural network.
(a) layer 13 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust) (b) layer 23 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust)
(c) layer 25 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust) (d) layer 27 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust)
(e) layer 29 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust) (f) layer 31 feature visualization (rand vs clean vs robust)
Figure 11: Visualization of the `-th layer features from ResNet-32 for ` ∈ {13, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31}.
For each case of `, the first ` − 1 layers are frozen at some pre-trained robust weights, and only layers
deeper than or equal to ` are trained. “rand” refers to layers ≥ ` are randomly initialized, “clean” refers
to layers ≥ ` are cleanly trained, and “robust” refers to layers ≥ ` are adversarially trained.
Take-away message: feature purification happens even at deep layers of a neural network.
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8.3 Sparse Reconstruction of Input Data and of Adversarial Perturbation
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(a) AlexNet, fit input images
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(b) ResNet-14, fit input images
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(c) ResNet-32, fit input images
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(d) AlexNet, fit adv. perturbations
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(e) ResNet-14, fit adv. perturbations
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(f) ResNet-32, fit adv. perturbations
Figure 12: Sparse reconstruction of input mages and of adversarial perturbations.
Take-away message for the first row: robust features can be used to reconstruct input images with
better sparsity, suggesting that robust features are more pure.
Take-away message for the second row: adversarial perturbations from a clean model are more
“dense” comparing to those from a robust model (and in fact robust model’s adversarial perturbations
are (much) closer to real input images, see Figure 6).
Recall in Figure 4, we have shown that the input images can be sparsely reconstructed from the
robust features. To better quantify this observation, we compare how sparse the input images can
be reconstructed from (1) random features, (2) clean features, and (3) robust features. For each
of the tasks, we use Lasso to reconstruct the 100 images, and sweep over all possible weights of
the `1 regularizer (which controls how sparse the reconstruction is).
15 The results are presented in
the first row of Figure 12. As one can see, using clean features one can also sparsely reconstruct
the input, but using robust features the reconstruction can be even sparser. This, to some extent,
supports our theory that robust features are more “pure” than clean features.
Perhaps more importantly, our theory suggests that for clean-trained models, adversarial per-
turbations (we refer to as clean delta) have “dense mixtures”; while for robust-trained models,
adversarial perturbations (we refer to as robust delta) are “more pure.” This was visually illus-
trated in Figure 6. Now, to better quantify this observation, we compare how sparse clean delta
and robust delta can be reconstructed from robust features. See the second row of Figure 12.16
From this experiment, we confirm that in practice, adversarial perturbations on robust models are
more “pure” and closer to real input images.
15Recall the Lasso objective is miny ‖Wy − x‖22 + λ‖y‖1, where it uses Wy to reconstruct given input x, and λ
is the weight of the regularizer to control how sparse y is. The convolutional version of Lasso is analogous: the
matrix W becomes the “transpose” of the weight of the convolutional layer, which is for instance implemented as
nn.ConvTranspose2d in PyTorch. In our implementation, we have shifted each input image so that it has zero mean
in each of the three color channels. We have selected the first 100 images where the (trained) robust classifier gives
correct labels; the plots are similar if one simply selects the first 100 training images.
16In fact, we have also re-scaled the perturbations so that they have similar mean and standard deviations comparing
to real input images. This allows one to also compare the two rows of Figure 12.
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Remark 8.1. We point out when comparing how sparse clean delta and robust delta can be recon-
structed from robust features, we did not cheat. For instance, in principle clean delta may not lie
in the span of robust features and if so, it cannot be (sparsely) reconstructed from them. In our
experiments (namely, the second row of Figure 12), we noticed that clean delta almost lies in the
span of robust features (with regression error < 0.00005 for AlexNet and < 10−9 for ResNet).
8.4 Comparing Different Attackers
In this subsection, we demonstrate that feature purification occurs against several different attack-
ers.
(a) `2(4.6, 0.25) attacker (rand vs clean vs robust) (b) `2(2.3, 0.12) attacker (rand vs clean vs robust)
(c) `∞(8/255) attacker (rand vs clean vs robust) (d) `∞(4/255) attacker (rand vs clean vs robust)
Figure 13: Visualization of the 11-th layer of ResNet-14 against different attackers.
Take-away message: feature purification happens against different attackers.
(a) `2(4.6, 0.25) attacker (rand vs clean vs robust) (b) `2(2.3, 0.12) attacker (rand vs clean vs robust)
(c) `∞(8/255) attacker (rand vs clean vs robust) (d) `∞(4/255) attacker (rand vs clean vs robust)
Figure 14: Visualization of the 27-th layer of ResNet-32 against different attackers.
Take-away message: feature purification happens against different attackers.
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Appendix: Complete Proofs
We give a quick overview of the structure of our appendix sections.
In Section A, we warm up the readers by calculating the gradient of the objective, and demon-
strating that polynomially many samples are sufficient for the training.
In Section B, we formally introduce S(t)j,pot, the set of “potentially lucky neurons” and S(t)j,sure,
the set of “surely lucky neurons” at iteration t. In particular, we shall emphasize on how those
notions evolve as t increases.
In Section C, we formally prove how “lucky neurons” continue to be lucky, and more impor-
tantly, for every neuron i that is lucky in direction j, why it grows faster than other unlucky
directions j′, and how much faster. Specifically, Theorem C.1 corresponds to the initial “lottery-
winning” phase where the accuracy remains around 50%; and Theorem C.2 corresponds to the later
phase where large signals become even larger and eventually most neurons become “pure + dense
mix” of the form (6.1). This is the most difficult section of this paper.
In Section D, we prove that why clean training gives good clean (testing) accuracy. It is based on
the structural theorem given by Theorem C.2, and requires some non-trivial manipulations of prob-
ability theory results (such as introducing a high-probability, Bernstein form of the McDiarmid’s
inequality).
In Section E, we prove that why the model obtained from clean training is non-robust. It
formally shows how the “dense mixtures” become accumulated step by step during clean training.
In Section F, we prove our theorems for both `2 and `∞ adversarial training. In particular,
in this section we demonstrate why practical perturbation algorithms, such as the fast gradient
method (FGM), can help the (adversarial) training process “kill” those “dense mixtures.”
In Section G, we prove lower bounds for the neural tangent kernel model given by two-layer
networks.
In Section H, we give missing details of some probability theory lemmas.
A Notations and Warmups
We find it perhaps a good exercise to do some simple calculations to warmup the readers with our
notations, before going into the proofs.
Global Assumptions. Throughout the proof,
• We choose m = d1+c0 for a very small constant c0 ∈ (0, 1).
(One should think of c0 = 0.0001 for a simple reading. Our proof generalizers to larger
m = poly(d) since having more neurons does not hurt performance, but we ignore the analysis
so as to provide the simplest notations.)
• We assume k < d(1−c0)/2.
• We choose λ = log log log dd for simplicity.
(The purpose of log log log d factor is to simplify notations, and it can be tightened to constant.)
• Whenever we write “for random x”, “for random z” or “for random ξ”, we mean that the
come from the distributions introduced in Section 2 with x = Mz + ξ.
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Network Gradient. In every iteration t, the weights of the neurons are w
(t)
1 , . . . , w
(t)
m ∈ Rd.
Recall the output of the neural network on input x ∈ Rd is
ft(w
(t);x, ρ) =
m∑
i=1
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t))− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t)) .
Fact A.1. If we denote by `′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)
def
= dds [log(1 + e
s)] |s=−yft(w(t);x,ρ)= e
−yft(w(t);x,ρ)
1+e−yft(w(t);x,ρ)
, then
∇wiLosst(w(t);x, y, ρ) = −y`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)∇wift(w(t);x, ρ)
= −y`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
· x
Let us also note that
∇Reg(wi) = (‖wi‖2 + 1) · wi
Lemma A.2. Suppose Z = {x(1), . . . , x(N)} are i.i.d. samples from D and y(i) = y(x(i)), and
suppose N ≥ poly(d) for some sufficiently large polynomial. Let f = ft and suppose b(t) ≤ poly(d)
and σρ ≥ 1poly(d) . Then, for every w1, . . . , wN that may depend on the randomness of Z and satisfies
‖wi‖ ≤ poly(d), it satisfies∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
∑
i∈[N ]
E
ρ
[
Loss(w;x(i), y(i), ρ)
]− E
x∼D,y=y(x),ρ
[
Loss(w;x, y, ρ)
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1poly(d)∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
∑
i∈[N ]
E
ρ
[∇wLoss(w;x(i), y(i), ρ)]− E
x∼D,y=y(x),ρ
[∇wLoss(w;x, y, ρ)]
∥∥∥∥∥∥
F
≤ 1
poly(d)
In addition, suppose for every i ∈ [N ], we have an i.i.d. random sample ρ(i) ∼ N (0, σ2ρI) that is
independent of Z and w. Then, with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over ρ, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
∑
i∈[N ]
E
ρ
[
Loss(w;x(i), y(i), ρ)
]− 1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
Loss(w;x(i), y(i), ρ(i))
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1poly(d)∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
∑
i∈[N ]
E
ρ
[∇wLoss(w;x(i), y(i), ρ)]− 1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
∇wLoss(w;x(i), y(i), ρ(i))
]∥∥∥∥∥∥
F
≤ 1
poly(d)
Proof. The proof of the first part can be done by trivial VC dimension or Rademacher complexity
arguments. For instance, the function Eρ[∇Loss(w;x, y, ρ)] is Lipschitz continuous in w with
Lipschitz parameter at most poly(d) (note that this relies on the fact that we take an expectation
in ρ), and thus one can take an epsilon-net over all possible choices of w, and then apply a union
bound over them.
The proof of the second part can be done by trivial Hoeffding bounds. 
B Neuron Structure and Initialization Properties
We consider m = d1+c0 for a very small constant c0 ∈ (0, 1), and consider constants c1 > c2 to be
chosen shortly. Let us define a few notations to characterize each neuron’s behavior.
Definition B.1 (neuron characterization). Recall w
(t)
i is the weight for the i-th neuron at iteration
t. We shall choose a parameter σ
(t)
w at each iteration t ≥ 0 and define the following notions.
Consider any dimension j ∈ [d].
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1. Let S(t)j,sure ⊆ [m] be those neurons i ∈ [m] satisfying
• 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ (c1 + c2)(σ(t)w )2 log d,
• 〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉2 < (c1 − c2)(σ(t)w )2 log d for every j′ 6= j,
• sign(〈w(t)i ,Mj〉) = sign(w?j ).
2. Let S(t)j,pot ⊆ [m] be those neurons i ∈ [m] satisfying
• 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ (c1 − c2)(σ(t)w )2 log d
3. Let S(t)ept ⊆ [m] be the set of neurons i ∈ [m] satisfying
• ‖w(t)i ‖22 ≤ 2(σ(t)w )2d
• 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ (c1 − c2)(σ(t)w )2 log d for at most O(1) many j ∈ [d].
• 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ 2(σ(t)w )2
√
log d for at most 2−
√
log dd many j ∈ [d].
• |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ σ
(t)
w
log d for at least Ω(
d
log d) many j ∈ [d].
Lemma B.2 (geometry at initialization). Suppose each w
(0)
i ∼ N (0, σ20I) and suppose σ(0)w = σ0.
For every constants c0 ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 0.1), by choosing c1 = 2 + 2(1 − γ)c0 and c2 = γc0, we
have with probability ≥ 1− o(1/d3) over the random initialization, for all j ∈ [d]:
|S(0)j,sure| = Ω
(
d
γ
4
c0
)
=: Ξ1 |S(0)j,pot| ≤ O
(
d2γc0
)
=: Ξ2 S(0)ept = [m]
Remark. In the rest of the paper, we shall assume Lemma B.2 holds in all upper-bound related
theorems/lemmas, and for simplicity, we assume γ > 0 is some small constant so that (Ξ2)
100 ≤
dc0 . The notations Ξ1 and Ξ2 shall be used throughout the paper.
Definition B.3 (neuron characterization, continued). Recall b(t) is the bias at iteration t, and let
us introduce more notions.
1. Let S(t)ept+ ⊆ [m] be the set of neurons i ∈ [m] satisfying
• ‖w(t)i ‖22 ≤ (σ
(t)
w )
2d
log2 d
,
•
∣∣∣〈w(t)i ,Mj〉∣∣∣ ≥ σ(t)wlog d for at most O(1) many j ∈ [d].
2. Let S(t)ept++ ⊆ [m] be the set of neurons i ∈ [m] satisfying
• ‖w(t)i ‖22 ≤ (σ
(t)
w )
2
β2
for β
def
= 1√
kΞ102
.
3. Let S(t)j,pot+ ⊆ [m] be the set of neurons i ∈ [m] satisfying
• |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ kdβ b(t).
4. Let S(t)j,sure+ ⊆ [m] be the set of neurons i ∈ [m] satisfying
• 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ 4k(b(t))2,
• sign(〈w(t)i ,Mj〉) = sign(w?j ).
Note that we do not have good properties on S(t)ept+, S(t)ept++, S(t)j,pot+ or S(t)j,sure+ at initialization
t = 0; however, they will gradually begin to satisfy certain properties as the training process goes.
See Section C for details.
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B.1 Proof of Lemma B.2
Proof of Lemma B.2. Recall if g is standard Gaussian, then for every t > 0,
1√
2pi
t
t2 + 1
e−t
2/2 < Pr
g∼N (0,1)
[g > t] <
1√
2pi
1
t
e−t
2/2
Therefore, for every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [d],
• p1 = Pr[〈w(0)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ (c1 + c2)σ20 log d] = Θ( 1log d) · 1d(c1+c2)/2 = Θ( 1log d) · 1d·d(1−γ/2)c0
• p2 = Pr[〈w(0)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ (c1 − c2)σ20 log d] = Θ( 1log d) · 1d(c1−c2)/2 = Θ( 1log d) · 1d·d(1−3γ/2)c0
1. We first lower bound |S(0)j,sure|. For every i ∈ [m], with probability at least p1/2 · (1− p2)d−1 ≥
Ω( 1log d) · d
γ
2 c0
m it satisfies
〈w(0)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ (c1 + c2)σ20 log d, sign(〈w(0)i ,Mj〉)sign(w?j ) ≥ 0
∀j′ 6= j, 〈w(0)i ,Mj′〉2 ≤ (c1 − c2)σ20 log d
By concentration with respect to all m choices of i ∈ [m], we know with probability at least
1− o( 1
d3
) it satisfies |S(0)j,sure| = Ω
(
d
γ
4
c0
)
.
2. We next upper bound |S(0)j,pot|. For every i ∈ [m], with probability at most p2 < O( 1log d) · d
3γ
2 c0
m
it satisfies
〈w(0)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ (c1 − c2)σ20 log d
By concentration with respect to all m choices of i, we know with probability at least 1−o( 1
d3
)
it satisfies |S(0)j,pot| = O(d2γc0).
3. As for S(0)ept, we first note that for every i ∈ [m], by chi-square distribution’s tail bound, with
probability at least 1− o(1/d3) it satisfies ‖w(0)i ‖22 ∈
[
σ20d
2 , 2σ
2
0d
]
.
For every i ∈ [m], the probability of existing q = 20/c0 different
j1, · · · , jq ∈ [d] : s.t.∀r ∈ [q] : 〈w(0)i ,Mjr〉2 ≥ (c1 − c2)σ20 log d
is at most dq · (p2)q ≤ d−q·
c0
2 ≤ 1
d4m
. Union bounding over all possible i ∈ [m] gives the proof
that, with probability at least 1 − 1/d4, for all but at most q = O(1) values of j ∈ [d], it
satisfies 〈w(0)i ,Mj〉2 < (c1 − c2)(σ(t)w )2 log d.
For every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [d], with probability at least 1 − e−
√
log d it satisfies 〈w(0)i ,Mj〉2 ≤
σ20
√
log d. Therefore, with probability at least 1 − o(1/d3), there are d(1 − 2−
√
log d) indices
j ∈ [d] satisfying 〈w(0)i ,Mj〉2 ≤ σ20
√
log d.
For every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [d], with probability at least 1
40000
√
log d
it satisfies |〈w(0)i ,Mj〉| ≤
σ0
10000
√
log d
. Therefore, with probability at least 1−o(1/d3), there are 1
100000
√
log d
indices j ∈ [d]
satisfying |〈w(0)i ,Mj〉| ≤ σ010000√log d . 
C Neuron Structure Change During Training
For analysis purpose, we consider two phases during training. In Phase I, the neurons have moved
so little so that the accuracy remains 50% for binary classification; however, some neurons shall
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start to win lottery and form “singleton” structures. We summarize this as the following theorem.
Theorem C.1 (phase I). Suppose the high-probability initialization event in Lemma B.2 holds.
Suppose η, σ0 ∈ (0, 1poly(d)) and N ≥ poly(d). With probability at least 1− e−Ω(log
2 d), the following
holds for all t ≤ Tb def= Θ
(
d2σ0
kη
)
1. S(0)j,sure ⊆ S(t)j,sure for every j ∈ [d].
2. S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t)j,pot for every j ∈ [d].
3. S(t)ept = [m]
4. S(t)ept+ = [m] for every t ≥ Ta def= Θ
(
dσ0 log
2.5 d
η
)
.
5. S(t)ept++ = [m] and S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t)j,pot+ for every j ∈ [d] at this iteration t = Tb.
In Phase II, the neurons start to move much more so that the network output becomes more
meaningful; in phase II, the “singleton” neurons become even more singleton.
Theorem C.2 (phase II). In the same setting as Theorem C.1, with probability at least 1 −
e−Ω(log
2 d), the following holds for all t ∈ [Tb, dO(log d)/η].
1. S(t)ept++ = S(t)ept+ = [m].
2. S(0)j,sure ⊆ S(t)j,sure for every j ∈ [d].
3. S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t)j,pot+ ⊇ S(t)j,pot for every j ∈ [d].
4. S(0)j,sure ⊆ S(t)j,sure+ for every j ∈ [d], as long as t ≥ Te def= Θ
(
d
ηΞ2 log d
)
.
C.1 Auxiliary Lemma 1: Geometry of Crossing Boundary
We present a lemma to bound the size of the pre-activation signal.
Lemma C.3 (pre-activation signal size). For every t ≥ 0, every i ∈ [m], every λ ≥ 0, every j ∈ [d]:
(a) If i ∈ S(t)ept then
Prz,ξ
[〈
w
(t)
i ,
∑
j′ 6=j Mj′zj′ + ξ
〉2 ≥ λ2(σ(t)w )2] ≤ e−Ω( λlog1/4 d ) + e− log1/4 d
(b) If i ∈ S(t)ept+ then
Prz,ξ
[〈
w
(t)
i ,
∑
j′ 6=j Mj′zj′ + ξ
〉2 ≥ λ2(σ(t)w )2] ≤ e−Ω(λ log d) + e−Ω(λ2 log d) +O (kd)
Proof of Lemma C.3a. Let E be the event where there exists j′ ∈ [d] with |zj′ | ≥ 1log2 d and
〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉2 ≥ 2(σ(t)w )2
√
log d. Since E[z2j′ ] = O
(
1
d
)
, we know that Pr
[
|zj′ | ≥ 1log2 d
]
≤ O
(
log4 d
d
)
.
By the definition of S(t)ept and union bound, we know
Pr[E ] ≤ O
(
log4 d
d
)
× 2−
√
log dd ≤ e− log1/4 d
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Let F be the event where there exists j′ ∈ [d] with zj′ 6= 0 and 〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉2 ≥ Ω((σ(t)w )2 log d).
Again, by the definition of S(t)ept, we know that
Pr[F ] ≤ O
(
k
d
)
≤ e− log1/4 d
Thus, when neither E or F happens, we have for every j′ ∈ [d]:
〈w(t)i ,Mj′zj′〉2 ≤ min
{
2(σ(t)w )
2
√
log d · 1, O((σ(t)w )2 log d) ·
1
log4 d
}
≤ 2(σ(t)w )2
√
log d
At the same time, we also have∑
j′∈[d]
E
zj′
〈w(t)i ,Mj′zj′〉2 ≤
∑
j′∈[d]
O(
1
d
)〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉2 ≤ O((σ(t)w )2)
Apply Bernstein concentration bound we complete the proof that
Prz,ξ
[〈
w
(t)
i ,
∑
j′ 6=j Mj′zj′
〉2 ≥ λ22 (σ(t)w )2] ≤ e−Ω( λlog1/4 d ) + e− log1/4 d
Finally, for the ξ part, let us recall 〈w(t)i , ξ〉 variable with variance at most O(‖w
(t)
i ‖2σ2x
d ) ≤ O((σ
(t)
w )2)
and each |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉〈Mj , ξ〉| ≤ σ
(t)
w
log2 d
w.h.p. Using Bernstein concentration of random variables, we
finish the proof. 
Proof of Lemma C.3b. Let F be the event where there exists j′ ∈ [d] with zj′ 6= 0 and |〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉| ≥
Ω( σ
(t)
w
log d). By the definition of S
(t)
ept+, we know that
Pr[F ] ≤ O
(
k
d
)
When F does not happen, we have for every j′ ∈ [d]: |〈w(t)i ,Mj′zj′〉| ≤ O( σ
(t)
w
log d) and at the same
time ∑
j′∈[d]
E
zj′
〈w(t)i ,Mj′zj′〉2 ≤
∑
j′∈[d]
O(
1
d
)〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉2 ≤ O(
(σ
(t)
w )2
log d
)
Apply Bernstein concentration bound we complete the proof that
Prz,ξ
[〈
w
(t)
i ,
∑
j′ 6=j Mj′zj′
〉2 ≥ λ22 (σ(t)w )2] ≤ e−Ω(λ log d) + e−Ω(λ2 log d) +O (kd)
Finally, for the ξ part, let us recall 〈w(t)i , ξ〉 is a random variable with variance at mostO(‖w
(t)
i ‖2σ2x
d ) ≤
O( (σ
(t)
w )
2
log2 d
). Using the Bernstein concentration bound, we finish the proof. 
C.2 Auxiliary Lemma 2: A Critical Lemma for Gradient Bound
In this section we present a critical lemma that shall be used multiple times to bound the gradient
in many of the following sections. Recall c2c1 ∈ (0, 0.1) is a constant from Lemma B.2.
Lemma C.4 (critical). Let Y (z, S1) : R × Rp → [−1, 1] be a center symmetric function, meaning
Y (z, S1) = Y (−z,−S1). Let S1 ∈ Rp and S2 ∈ R be random variables, where (S1, S2) is symmetri-
cally distributed, meaning (S1, S2) distributes the same as (−S1,−S2).
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For every α > 0, suppose ρ ∼ N (0, σ2ρ), define quantity
∆ := E
S1,S2,ρ
[
Y (1, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b − Y (−1, S1)1−α+S2+ρ≥b
]
and define parameters V := E[(S2)2] and L := ES1 [|Y (1, S1)− Y (0, S1)|]. Then,
(a) it always satisfies |∆| ≤ O
(√
V
σρ
+ L
)
(b) if Y (z, S1) is a monotonically non-decreasing in z ∈ R for every S1 ∈ Rp, then ∆ ≥ −Ω
(√
V
σρ
)
Furthermore, suppose we can write S1 = (S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) and S2 = S
′
2 + S
′′
2 for (S
′
1, S
′
2) and (S
′′
1 , S
′′
2 ) being
independent (although S′1, S′2 may be dependent, and S′′1 , S′′2 may be dependent). Then, we have
(c) if α ≤ b(1− c22c1 ), then |∆| ≤
(
e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ) + Γ
)(
min{1, O( ασρ )}+ Ly
)
+ Γy
where the parameters
• Γ := Pr
[
|S2| ≥ c210c1 · b
]
and Γy := Pr
[
|S′′2 | ≥ c210c1 · b
]
• Ly := maxS′1
{
ES′′1 [|Y (1, S′1, S′′1 )− Y (0, S′1, S′′1 )|]
} ≤ 1
Proof of Lemma C.4. We first focus on Y (1, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b, and write
Y (1, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b = Y (0, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b +
(
Y (1, S1)− Y (0, S1)
)
1α+S2+ρ≥b (C.1)
= Y (0, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b ±
∣∣Y (1, S1)− Y (0, S1)∣∣1α+S2+ρ≥b (C.2)
Focusing on the term Y (0, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b, by the symmetric properties of Y and (S1, S2), we have
|E[Y (0, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b]| =
1
2
|E [Y (0, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b + Y (0,−S1)1α−S2+ρ≥b]|
=
1
2
|E [Y (0, S1) (1α+S2+ρ≥b − 1α−S2+ρ≥b)]|
≤ Pr[1α+S2+ρ≥b 6= 1α−S2+ρ≥b]
≤ Pr[ρ ∈ [b− α− S2, b− α+ S2]]
= O
(
E[|S2|]
σρ
)
= O
(√
E[S22 ]
σρ
)
= O
(√
V
σρ
)
(C.3)
Putting (C.3) into (C.2), applying the bound L = ES1 [|Y (1, S1) − Y (0, S1)|], and repeating the
same analysis for Y (−1, S1)1−α+S2+ρ≥b gives
|∆| ≤ O
(√
V
σρ
+ L
)
.
This proves Lemma C.4a. When Y (z, S1) is a monotone non-decreasing in z ∈ R, we have
Y (1, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b ≥ Y (0, S1)1α+S2+ρ≥b
Y (−1, S1)1−α+S2+ρ≥b ≤ Y (0, S1)1−α+S2+ρ≥b
so we can go back to (C.1) (and repeating for Y (−1, S1)) to derive that
∆ ≥ −Ω
(√
V
σρ
)
This proves Lemma C.4b. Finally, when α ≤ b(1− c22c1 ), we can bound ∆ differently
|∆| ≤ 2 Pr[1α+S2+ρ≥b 6= 1−α+S2+ρ≥b] + E [|Y (1, S1)− Y (−1, S1)| · 1α+S2+ρ≥b]
= 2 Pr[ρ ∈ [b− S2 − α, b− S2 + α]] + E [|Y (1, S1)− Y (−1, S1)| · 1α+S2+ρ≥b] (C.4)
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To bound the first term in (C.4) we consider two cases.:
• when |S2| ≤ b4 , we have Prρ[ρ ∈ [b− S2 − α, b− S2 + α]] ≤ min{1, ασρ }e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ);
• when |S2| ≥ b4 (happening w.p. ≤ Γ), we have Prρ[ρ ∈ [b−S2−α, b−S2+α]] ≤ min{1, O
(
α
σρ
)}.
Putting together, we know that
Pr[ρ ∈ [b− S2 − α, b− S2 + α]] ≤ min{1, α
σρ
} · (e−Ω(b2/σ2ρ) + Γ) (C.5)
To bound the second term in (C.4), first recall S1 = (S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) and S2 = S
′
2 + S
′′
2 , so we can write
E
[
|Y (1, S′1, S′′1 )− Y (−1, S′1, S′′1 )| · 1α+S′2+S′′2 +ρ≥b
]
≤ E
[
|Y (1, S′1, S′′1 )− Y (−1, S′1, S′′1 )| ·
(
1|α+S′2+ρ|≥(1− c210c1 )·b
+ 1|S′′2 |≥ c210c1 ·b
)]
≤ E
[
|Y (1, S′1, S′′1 )− Y (−1, S′1, S′′1 )| · 1|α+S′2+ρ|≥(1− c210c1 )·b
]
+ Γy (C.6)
To bound the first term in (C.6), we can take expectation over S′′1 and use the bound Ly to derive
E
[
|Y (1, S′1, S′′1 )− Y (−1, S′1, S′′1 )| · 1|α+S′2+ρ|≥(1− c210c1 )·b
]
≤ Ly Pr
[
|α+ S′2 + ρ| ≥ (1−
c2
10c1
) · b
]
but since α ≤ (1− c22c1 ) · b and S′2 = S2 − S′′2 , we can further bound
Pr
[
|α+ S′2 + ρ| ≥ (1−
c2
10c1
) · b
]
≤ Pr
[
|S′′2 | ≥
c2
10c1
· b
]
+ Pr
[
|S2| ≥ c2
10c1
· b
]
+ Pr
[
ρ ≥ c2
10c1
· b
]
≤ Γy + Γ + e−Ω(b2/σ2ρ)
Putting these back to (C.6), we have
E
[
|Y (1, S′1, S′′1 )− Y (−1, S′1, S′′1 )|1α+S′2+S′′2 +ρ≥b
]
≤
(
e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ) + Γ + Γy
)
Ly + Γy (C.7)
Putting (C.5) and (C.7) back to (C.4), we conclude the when α ≤ b(1− c22c1 ), we have
|∆| ≤
(
e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ) + Γ
)(
O(
α
σρ
) + Ly
)
+ Γy 
C.3 Phase I: Winning lottery tickets near initialization
In Phase I, we have two sub-phases:
• In Phase I.1, we pick b(t) = √c1σ(t)w
√
log d and σ
(t)
ρ = σ
(t)
w (log log log d)3
We grow b(t+1) = b(t) + Cηd for Ta = Θ
(
dσ0 log
2.5 d
η
)
iterations.
• In Phase I.2, we pick b(t) = √c1σ(t)w
√
log d and σ
(t)
ρ = σ
(t)
w · (log log log d)
3√
log d
We grow b(t+1) = b(t) + Cηd for Tb = Θ
(
d2σ0
kη
)
iterations.
C.3.1 Activation Probability
Recall x =
∑
j Mjzj + ξ. Recall also
c2
c1
∈ (0, 0.1) is a constant from Lemma B.2.
Lemma C.5 (activation probability). We define Γt to be any value such that
• Prx
[∣∣〈w(t)i ,∑j′ 6=j Mj′zj′ + ξ〉∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)] ≤ Γt for every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [d];
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• Prx
[∣∣〈w(t)i , x〉∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)] ≤ Γt for every i ∈ [m]
• Prx
[
|ρi| ≥ c210c1 b(t)
]
≤ Γt for every i ∈ [m]
We define Γt,y to be any value such that
• for every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [d], there exists Λ ⊆ [d] \ {j} with |Λ| ≥ Ω( d√
log d
) satisfying
Prx
[∣∣∣〈w(t)i ,∑j′∈Λ Mj′zj′〉∣∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)] ≤ Γt,y
Then,
• If we are in Phase I.1 and S(t)ept = [m], then we can choose Γt = e−Ω(log
1/4 d) and Γt,y =
1
d10
.
• If we are in Phase I.2 and S(t)ept+ = [m], then we can choose Γt = O(kd ) and Γt,y = 1d10 .
Proof. Recall b(t) = Θ(σ
(t)
w
√
log d). Applying Lemma C.3a and Lemma C.3b we immediately have
• If S(t)ept = [m], then Prx
[∣∣∣〈w(t)i ,∑j′ 6=j Mj′zj′ + ξ〉∣∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)] ≤ e−Ω(log1/4 d);
• If S(t)ept+ = [m], then Prx
[∣∣∣〈w(t)i ,∑j′ 6=j Mj′zj′ + ξ〉∣∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)] ≤ O (kd).
Now, recall x =
∑
j′∈[d] Mj′zj′+ξ so it differs from
∑
j′ 6=j Mj′zj′+ξ only by one term. Therefore, we
have the same bound on Prx
[∣∣∣〈w(t)i , x〉∣∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)] by modifying the statements of Lemma C.3a
and Lemma C.3b (without changing the proofs) to include this missing term.
• If S(t)ept = [m], Prx,ρ
[∣∣∣〈w(t)i , x〉∣∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)] ≤ e−Ω(log1/4 d)
• If S(t)ept+ = [m], Prx,ρ
[∣∣∣〈w(t)i , x〉∣∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)] ≤ O (kd)
At the same time, using ρi ∼ N (0, (σ(t)ρ )2), we also have
• In Phase I.1, because σ(t)ρ = Θ(σ
(t)
w (log log log d)
3√
log d
)b(t), we have Prρ
[
|ρi| ≥ c210c1 b(t)
]
 e−Ω(log1/4 d)
• In Phase I.2, because σ(t)ρ = Θ(σ
(t)
w (log log log d)
3
log d )b
(t), we have Prρ
[
|ρi| ≥ c210c1 b(t)
]
 O (kd)
As for the bound on Γt,y, for every i ∈ [m], j ∈ [d], let Λ ⊆ [d] \ {j} be the subset containing
all j′ ∈ [d] \ {j} with |〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉| ≤ q def= σ
(t)
w
log d . By the assumption S
(t)
ept = [m], we know |Λ| ≥
Ω(d/ log d).
Since |〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉| ≤ q, E[z2j ] = Θ(1/d) and |zj | ≤ 1, by Bernstein’s inequality, we have
Pr
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
〈
w
(t)
i ,
∑
j′∈Λ
Mj′zj′
〉∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ c210c1 b(t)
 ≤ e−Ω( (b(t))2q2|Λ|/d+q·b(t) ) ≤ e−Ω(log1.5 d) . 
C.3.2 Growth Lemmas
Our first lemma here shall be used to (lower) bound how 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 (i.e., the weight with respect
to neuron i in direction Mj) grows for those i ∈ Sj,sure.
Lemma C.6 (signal growth). Suppose we (1) either are in Phase I.1 with S(t)ept = [m], (2) or are
in Phase I.2 with S(t)ept+ = [m]. Then, for every j ∈ [d], every i ∈ S(t)j,sure, as long as |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| =
O(b(t) log log log d), the following holds:
E
x,y,ρ
[
y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
]
= Θ
(
1
d
)
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Proof of Lemma C.6. Recall that i ∈ S(t)j,sure means sign(〈w(t)i ,Mj〉) = sign(w?j ). Without loss of
generality, let us assume sign(〈w(t)i ,Mj〉) = sign(w?j ) = 1.
First consider the case when |zj | = 1. Since j ∈ S(t)j,sure, we have 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 ≥ b(t)
√
1 + c2c1 so
applying Lemma C.5,
Pr[〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi ≥ b(t) | zj = 1] ≥ 1− 2Γt = 1− o(1)
Pr[〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi ≥ b(t) | zj = −1] ≤ 2Γt = o(1)
Moreover, a simple calculation using |w?j | = Θ(1) gives us Ex,y [y | zj = 1] = Θ(1) (can be proven
by Lemma H.1) and therefore
E
x,y,ρ
[
y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
∣∣∣ |zj | = 1] = Θ(1)
For all other non-zero value |zj | = s > 0, we have s ≥ 1√k and wish to apply Lemma C.4 to
bound
∆s := E
x,y,ρ
[
y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
sign(zj) | |zj | = s
]
In Phase I.1, to apply Lemma C.4, we choose parameters as follows:
• Y = y, S1 =
∑
j′ 6=j w
?
j′zj′ , S2 =
〈
w
(t)
i ,
∑
j′ 6=j Mj′zj′ + ξ
〉
, α = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 · s > 0, ρ = ρi,
• V = E[S22 ] = O((σ(t)w )2), L = Θ(s) (using Lemma H.1), Γ = Γt (using Lemma C.5),
• let Λ be the subset defined in Lemma C.5, then we can let S′′1 = (zj)j∈Λ and S′′2 =
〈
w
(t)
i ,
∑
j′∈Λ Mj′zj′
〉
• we have Γy = Γt,y = 1d10 (from Lemma C.5) and
Ly = max
zj′ for j
′ ∈ [d] \ {j} \ Λ
{
E
zj′ for j
′ ∈ Λ
[|sign(w?j zj + S1)− sign(S1)
}
≤ max
zj′ for j
′ ∈ [d] \ {j} \ Λ
{
Pr
zj′ for j
′ ∈ Λ
[S′′1 ∈ [−S′1 − |w?j zj |,−S′1 + |w?j zj |]]
}
¬≤ O( s√|Λ|/d + 1√|Λ|k/d) ≤ O((s+ 1√k )√log d) ≤ O(s ·√log d)
where inequality ¬ uses Lemma H.1a and |Λ| ≥ Ω( dlog d) from Lemma C.5.
Hence, invoking Lemma C.4, we have
• ∆s ≥ −σ
(t)
w
σ
(t)
ρ
≥ − O(1)
(log log log d)3
and |∆s| ≤ σ
(t)
w
σ
(t)
ρ
+ s ≤ O(1)
(log log log d)3
+ s when s = Ω
(
1
log log log d
)
• |∆s| ≤
(
e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ) + Γt
)(
O( ασρ ) + Ly
)
+Γt,y ≤ e−Ω(log1/4 d) ·s when s = O
(
1
log log log d
)
(which
implies α < b
(t)
4 )
Notice that E[z2j ] = O (1/d), which implies that
Pr
[
|zj | = Ω
(
1
log log log d
)]
= O
(
(log log log d)2
d
)
This together gives us the bound that
−O( 1
d · log log log d) ≤ Ex,y,ρ
[
y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj | |zj | < 1
]
≤ O(1
d
)
In Phase I.2, the analysis is similar with different parameters: in particular,
• V = E[S22 ] = O( (σ
(t)
w )
2
log d ) which is tighter,
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Therefore, we have
• ∆s ≥ − σ
(t)
w
σ
(t)
ρ
√
log d
≥ − O(1)
(log log log d)3
and |∆s| ≤ σ
(t)
w
σ
(t)
ρ
√
log d
+ s ≤ O(1)
(log log log d)3
+ s when s =
Ω
(
1
log log log d
)
• |∆s| ≤
(
e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ) + Γt
)(
O( ασρ ) + Ly
)
+ Γt,y ≤ O(ks log dd ) when s = O
(
1
log log log d
)
(which
implies α < b
(t)
4 ).
(This uses Γt = O(k/d) and
α
σρ
≤ o(s log d).)
Taking expectation over zj as before, and using k < d
(1−c0)/2 finishes the proof. 
Our next lemma shall be used to upper bound how 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 can grown for every i ∈ [m].
Lemma C.7 (maximum growth). Suppose we (1) either are in Phase I.1 with S(t)ept = [m], (2) or
are in Phase I.2 with S(t)ept+ = [m]. Then, for every j ∈ [d], every i ∈ [m], the following holds:
| E
x,y,ρ
[
y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
]
| = O
(
1
d
)
.
Proof. Proof is analogous to that of Lemma C.6, and the reason we no longer need the requirement
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| = O(b(t) log log log d) is because, when invoking Lemma C.4, it suffices for us to apply
Lemma C.4a for every non-zero values of z (as opposed to only those z = Ω
(
1
log log log d
)
) which no
longer requires α ≤ b. 
Our next lemma shall be used to upper bound how 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 can grown for every i ∈ [m]\S(t)j,pot.
Lemma C.8 (non-signal growth). Suppose we (1) either are in Phase I.1 with S(t)ept = [m], (2) or
are in Phase I.2 with S(t)ept+ = [m]. Then, for every j ∈ [d], every i ∈ [m] \ S(t)j,pot, the following
holds: ∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)zj]
∣∣∣∣ = O(Γt · log dd )
where Γt is given from Lemma C.5.
Proof of Lemma C.8. Suppose |zj | = s and without loss of generality 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 ≥ 0. We choose
α = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 · s as before. Then, we have α ≤
√
c1 − c2σ(t)w )
√
log d = b(t)
√
1− c2c1 ≤ b(t)(1− c22c1 )
always holds.
Therefore, using the same notation as the proof of Lemma C.6, we always have the bound
|∆s| ≤
(
e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ) + Γt
)(
O(
α
σρ
) + Ly
)
+ Γt,y
Plugging in the parameters we finish the proof. 
Our final lemma shall be used to upper bound how 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 can grown with respect to the
noise ξ in the input.
Lemma C.9 (noise growth). For every i ∈ [m], every j ∈ [d], the following holds:∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)〈ξ,Mj〉]
∣∣∣∣ = O
(
Γt
σ2x
dσ
(t)
ρ
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|
)
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Proof of Lemma C.9. We can define α = |〈Mj , ξ〉〉| and study
∆s := E
x,y,ρ
[
y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
sign(〈ξ,Mj〉)
∣∣∣ |〈ξ,Mj〉| = α] (C.8)
This time we have L = Ly = 0, Γy = 0, V = E[S22 ] = O((σ
(t)
w )2), so applying Lemma C.4 we
have,
• when α ≤ b(t)/4, |∆s| ≤ |〈w
(t)
i ,Mj〉|〈Mj ,ξ〉|
‖Mj‖2σ(t)ρ
·
(
e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ) + Γt
)
;
• when α > b(t)/4 (which happens with exponentially small prob.), |∆s| ≤ O(σ
(t)
w
σρ
).
Together, using the fact that E[|∆s|] ≤
√
E[∆2s] we have:∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)〈ξ,Mj〉]
∣∣∣∣ = O
(
Γt
σ2x
dσ
(t)
ρ
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|
)

C.3.3 Proof of Theorem C.1
Suppose in Lemma C.6 the hidden constant is 20C for the lower bound, that is,
E
x,y,ρ
[
y1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
]
≥ 20C
d
Proof of Theorem C.1. Let us prove by induction with respect to t. Suppose the properties all hold
at t = 0. Recall from Fact A.1, for iteration t, for every neuron i ∈ [m],
∇wiLosst(w(t);x, y, ρ) = −y`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
· x .
Using the bound on ‖w(t)i ‖2 (from S(t)ept = [m]) and the fact σ0 ≤ 1poly(d) , we know `′t(w(t);x, y, ρ) =
1
2 ± 1poly(d) . Also, recall also from Lemma A.2 that
E
x∼D,y=y(x),ρ
[∇wiLosst(w(t);x, y, ρ)] = ∇wiL˜osst(w(t))± 1poly(d) .
Together, we have a clean formulation for our gradient update rule:
w
(t+1)
i = w
(t)
i (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖2) + E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
y
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
· x
]
± η
poly(d)
.
and as a result for every j ∈ [d]
〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉 = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉(1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖2)±
η
poly(d)
+ E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
y
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
· (zj + 〈ξ,Mj〉)] . (C.9)
We now prove each statement separately (and note our proofs apply both to Phase I.1 and I.2).
1. For every i 6∈ S(t)j,pot, by substituting Lemma C.8 and Lemma C.9 into (C.9), we have
〈w(t+1)i − w(t)i ,Mj〉 ≤
η · e−Ω(log1/4 d)
d
 √c1 − c2(σ(t+1)w − σ(t)w )
√
log d (C.10)
so we also have 〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉 <
√
c1 − c2σ(t+1)w
√
log d and thus i 6∈ S(t+1)j,pot .
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2. For every i ∈ S(t)j,sure, suppose wlog 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 is positive. Then, either 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 > Ω(b(t) log log log d)
in such a case we still have 〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉 ≥
√
c1 + c2σ
(t+1)
w
√
log d. Otherwise, if 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 ≤
Ω(b(t) log log log d) then by substituting Lemma C.6 and Lemma C.9 into (C.9), we have (using
σ0 ≤ 1poly(d) and λ ≤ log dd )
〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉 ≥ (1− ηλ)〈w(t)i ,Mj〉+
20Cη
d
≥ 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉+
√
c1 + c2(σ
(t+1)
w − σ(t)w )
√
log d
so by induction we also have 〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉 ≥
√
c1 + c2σ
(t+1)
w
√
log d. Combining this with
S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t+1)j,pot , we conclude that i ∈ S(t+1)j,sure.
3. To check S(t+1)ept = [m], we need to verify four things:
• 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ (c1 − c2)(σ(t)w )2 log d for at most O(1) many j ∈ [d].
This is so because S(0)ept = [m] and S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t+1)j,pot .
• 〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉2 ≥ 2(σ(t+1)w )2
√
log d for at most 2−
√
log dd many j ∈ [d].
This can be derived from (C.10) in the same way.
• |〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ σ
(t+1)
w
log d for at least Ω(
d
log d) many j ∈ [d].
This can be derived from (C.10) in the same way.
• ‖w(t)i ‖22 ≤ 2(σ(t)w )2d
For every i ∈ [m], suppose wlog 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 is positive. Then, by substituting Lemma C.7
and Lemma C.9 into (C.9), we have
〈w(t+1)i − w(t)i ,Mj〉 ≤ O(
η
d
)
Applying this formula for t+ 1 times, we derive that
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ O
(η(t+ 1)
d
)
+ |〈w(0)i ,Mj〉| (C.11)
and therefore applying this together with (C.10),
‖w(t+1)i ‖22 =
∑
j : i∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉|2 +
∑
j : i 6∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉|2
¬≤ 1.5‖w(0)i ‖22 +O(1) ·
(η(t+ 1)
d
)2
+ d · (η(t+ 1)
d
)2 · e−Ω(log1/4 d) ≤ 2(σ(t+1)w )2d
(Above, inequality ¬ uses that there are at most O(1) indices j ∈ [d] such that i ∈ S(0)j,pot.)
4. Finally, to check S(t+1)ept+ = [m] for t ≥ Ta = Θ(dσ0 log
2.5 d
η ), we first derive that
σ(t+1)w = σ0 + Θ(
η
d
√
log d
) · (t+ 1) ≥ σ0 · Ω(log2 d) .
• For every i 6∈ S(t+1)j,pot , (C.10) gives
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ |〈w(0)i ,Mj〉|+
e−Ω(log
1/4 d)
d
· η(t+ 1)
≤ O(σ0
√
log d) +
e−Ω(log
1/4 d)
d
· η(t+ 1) ≤ O( σ
(t+1)
w
log1.5 d
)
36
In particular, this together with S(0)ept = [m] ensures that for every i ∈ [m],
∣∣∣〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉∣∣∣ ≥
σ
(t+1)
w
log d for at most O(1) many j ∈ [d].
• For any i ∈ S(0)j,pot, using (C.11) we have
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ |〈w(0)i ,Mj〉|+O(
η(t+ 1)
d
) ≤ O(σ0
√
log d) +O(
η(t+ 1)
d
) = Θ(σ(t+1)w
√
log d)
(C.12)
Using this together with the previous item, as well as |S(0)j,pot| ≤ O(1), we have ‖w(t+1)i ‖2 ≤
O( (σ
(t+1)
w )
2d
log3 d
).
Putting them together we have S(t+1)ept+ = [m] for every t ≥ Ta.
5. After t = Tb iterations, we have σ
(t)
w = Θ(σ0 +
η
d
√
log d
· Tb), for every i 6∈ S(0)j,pot, by Lemma C.8
and Lemma C.9
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ |〈w(Ta)i ,Mj〉|+
O(k/d) · √log d
d
· η(Tb − Ta) ≤ O(σ(t)w ·
k log d
d
)
Combining this with (C.11), we immediately have
‖w(t)i ‖2 =
∑
j : i∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉|2 +
∑
j : i 6∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉|2
≤ (σ(t)w )2 ·O(
k2 log2 d
d
+ log d)
This implies S(t)ept++ = [m] and S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t)j,pot+ at this iteration t.

C.4 Phase II: Signal Growth After Winning Lottery
In phase II we make the following parameter choices.
• In Phase II, we pick b(t) = √c1σ(t)w
√
log d and σ
(t)
ρ = σ
(t)
w · (log log log d)
3√
log d
We grow b(t+1) = b(t) + Cηd as before for each iteration, but stop growing b
(t) when it reaches
a threshold b(t) = βΞ22.
We first introduce a notation on a (high-probability) version of the coordinate Lipscthiz conti-
nuity.
Definition C.10 (coordinate Lipschitzness). At every iteration t, for every j ∈ [d], we de-
fine Lt,j > e
−Ω(log2 d) to be the smallest value such that w.p. at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d) over the
choice of {zj′}j′ 6=j and ξ, for every z ∈ [−1, 1] and z = (z1, · · · , zj−1, z, zj+1, · · · , zd), z′ =
(z1, · · · , zj−1, 0, zj+1, · · · , zd), x = Mz + ξ and x′ = Mz′ + ξ:∣∣ft(x)− ft(x′)∣∣ ≤ Lt,j |z| .
C.4.1 Growth Lemmas
In this subsection, we provide new growth lemmas Lemma C.11, Lemma C.12, Lemma C.13, Lemma C.14
that are specific to Phase II, to replace the user of the old growth lemmas Lemma C.6, Lemma C.7,
Lemma C.8, Lemma C.9 from Phase I.
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Lemma C.11 (signal growth II). Suppose we S(t)ept+ = S(t)ept++ = [m]. Then, for every j ∈ [d], every
i ∈ S(t)j,sure, the following holds:
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
]
= Θ
(
1
d
)
±O
(
Lt,j
d
+
√
kσ
(t)
ρ log d
d
+
√
k
βd3/2
)
Proof of Lemma C.11. First, without loss of generality, assuming that sign(〈w(t)i ,Mj〉) = sign(w?j ) =
1. Let us define z′ = (z1, · · · , zj−1, 0, zj+1, · · · , zd) and x′ = Mz′ + ξ. Define
ft,i(w
(t);x, ρ)
def
=
∑
j 6=i
(
ReLU(〈w(t)j , x〉+ ρj + b(t)j )− ReLU(−〈w(t)j , x〉+ ρj + b(t)j )
)
+
(
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x〉+ b(t)i )− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x〉+ b(t)i )
)
`′t,i(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
def
=
d
ds
[log(1 + es)] |s=−yft,i(w(t);x,ρ)
Now, since e
s
1+es is an O(1)-Lipschitz function in s, we know that w.p. at least 1− e−Ω(log
2 d)
|`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)− `′t,i(w(t);x′, y, ρ)| = O(Lt,j · |zj |+ σ(t)ρ log d)
and this implies that∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y(`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)− `′t,i(w(t);x′, y, ρ))1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)zj]
∣∣∣∣
≤ O
(
Lt,j E[z2j ] + σ(t)ρ log d · E[|zj |]
)
+ e−Ω(log
2 d)
= O
(
Lt,j
d
+
σ
(t)
ρ log d ·
√
k
d
)
+ e−Ω(log
2 d)
so we only need to bound Ex,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
]
.
Let us first focus on the case that |zj | = 1. As before, since j ∈ S(t)j,sure, we have 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 ≥
b(t)
√
1 + c2c1 so applying Lemma C.5,
Pr[〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi ≥ b(t) | zj = 1] ≥ 1− 2Γt = 1− o(1)
Pr[〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi ≥ b(t) | zj = −1] ≤ 2Γt = o(1)
This means
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj | |zj | = 1
]
≥ 1
2
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ) | zj = 1
]
− o(1)
Now recall y(zj , z) = sign(w
?
j zj + 〈w?, z〉).
• When |〈w?, z〉| > |w?j |, then we know that y(zj , z) and y(zj ,−z) have different signs, but
`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ) = `′t,i(w
(t);−x′,−y, ρ) remains the same if we flip z to −z. By symmetry, we
have
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ)
∣∣∣ zj = 1 ∧ |〈w?, z〉| > |w?j |] = 0
• Suppose otherwise |〈w?, z〉| ≤ |w?j |. Since |w?j | = Θ(1), by Lemma H.1, this event happens
with at least constant probability. When it happens, we have y(zj , z) = y(zj ,−z) = +1, but
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`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ) + `′t,i(w
(t);−x′, y, ρ) = 1. Therefore,
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ)
∣∣∣ zj = 1 ∧ |〈w?, z〉| ≤ |w?j |] ≥ 12
Together, we have
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj | |zj | = 1
]
= Ω(1) (C.13)
Next, conditioning on |zj | = s for some 0 < s < 1, we can apply Lemma C.4 with Y =
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ) on s = sign(zj), α = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉zj , S1 = z, S2 =
∑
j′ 6=j〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉zj′ and ρ = ρi.
Since `′t(w(t);x′, y, ρ) ≥ 0, we can conclude that Y is a monotone non-decreasing function of in s.
One can verify that L = O(s) using Lemma H.1. Moreover, since i ∈ S(t)ept++, we have E[S
2
2 ](
σ
(t)
ρ
)2 ≤ 1dβ2 .
Let us denote by
∆s := E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
sign(zj) | |zj | = s
]
so according to Lemma C.4 we have
Ω
(
1
β
√
d
)
≤ ∆s = O
(
1
β
√
d
+ s
)
This implies, using E[|zj |] ≤
√
k
d , that
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj · 1|zj |<1
]
≤ E[∆zj · |zj | · 1|zj |<1] ≤ O
(
E[|zj |]
β
√
d
+
1
d
)
≤ O
( √
k
βd1.5
+
1
d
)
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(w
(t);x′, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj · 1|zj |<1
]
≥ E[∆zj |zj | · 1|zj |<1] ≥ −Ω
(
E[|zj |]
β
√
d
)
≥ −Ω
( √
k
βd1.5
)
Combining this with (C.13), and using Pr[|zj | = 1] ≥ Ω(1/d) finishes the proof. 
Similarly, we have the following Lemma
Lemma C.12 (maximum growth II). Suppose we S(t)ept+ = S(t)ept++ = [m]. Then, for every j ∈ [d],
every i ∈ [m], the following holds:∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)zj]
∣∣∣∣ = O
(
1 + Lt,j
d
+
√
kσ
(t)
ρ log d
d
+
√
k
βd3/2
)
Lemma C.13 (non-signal growth II). Suppose we S(t)ept+ = S(t)ept++ = [m]. Then, for every j ∈ [d],
every i /∈ S(t)j,pot and i ∈ [m], the following holds:∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)zj]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Γt ·O
(
log d+ Lt,j
d
+
√
kσ
(t)
ρ log d
d
)
Proof of Lemma C.13. In the same notation as the proof of Lemma C.11, we have∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y(`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)− `′t,i(x′, y))1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)zj]
∣∣∣∣
≤ O
(
Lt,j E[z2j · 1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) ] + σ
(t)
ρ log d · E[|zj | · 1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) ]
)
+ e−Ω(log
2 d)
≤ ΓtO
(
Lt,j
d
+
σ
(t)
ρ log d ·
√
k
d
)
+ e−Ω(log
2 d)
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where the last inequality uses Lemma C.5 and the fact i 6∈ S(t)j,pot (which, as before, implies if we
choose α = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 · z then α2 ≤ (c1 − c2)(σ(t)w )2 log d ≤
(
b(t)
4
)2
).
Thus, we only need to bound
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(x
′, y)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
]
.
Conditioning on |zj | = s for some 0 < s ≤ 1, we can apply Lemma C.4 again with Y = y`′t,i(x′, y)
on s = sign(zj), α = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉zj , S1 = z, S2 =
∑
j′ 6=j〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉zj′ and ρ = ρi. This time, we use
Γy =
1
d10
and Ly ≤ O(z · log1/4 d). Define
∆s := E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t,i(x
′, y)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
sign(zj) | |zj | = s
]
Since α < b
(t)
4 , Lemma C.4 tells us
|∆s| ≤
(
e−Ω(b
2/σ2ρ) + Γt
)(
O(
α
σρ
) + Ly
)
+ Γy ≤ O(Γt log d) · z
and therefore∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y`′t,i(x′, y)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)zj]
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣E[∆zj |zj |]∣∣ ≤ O(Γt log d) · E[z2j ] = O(Γt log dd )
Combining this with (C.13), and using Pr[|zj | = 1] ≥ Ω(1/d) finishes the proof. 
Finally, we derive a more fine-grind bound for the noise:
Lemma C.14 (noise growth II). Suppose we S(t)ept+ = S(t)ept++ = [m]. Then, for every j ∈ [d],
(a) for every j ∈ [d],∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)〈ξ,Mj〉]
∣∣∣∣ = O
(
Γt
dσ
(t)
ρ
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|σ2x +
ΓtLt,jσ
2
x
d
+ e−Ω(log
2 d)
)
(b) suppose also S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t)j,pot+ for every j ∈ [d], then∑
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)〈ξ,Mj〉]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ O(k3Ξ42d2 σ2x + e−Ω(log2 d)
)
Proof of Lemma C.14. We can first decompose the noise ξ into
ξ = (I−MjM>j )ξ + 〈Mj , ξ〉Mj =: ξ′j + 〈Mj , ξ〉Mj .
Let us define x′j = Mz + ξ
′
j .
• On one hand we have with probability at least 1 − Γt, |〈w(t)i , x′j〉| ≤ b
(t)
10 (using a variant of
Lemma C.5). Using the randomness of 〈ξ,Mj〉 and ρi we also have with probability at least
1− e−Ω(log2 d) it satisfies |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 · 〈Mj , ξ〉|+ |ρi| ≤ b
(t)
10 . Therefore, with probability at least
1− Γt − e−Ω(log2 d), we have 1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) = 1〈w(t)i ,x′j〉+ρi≥b(t) .
• Otherwise, in the event that |〈w(t)i , x′j〉| ≥ b
(t)
10 , using the randomness of ρi, we have that
Pr
ρi
[
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
6= 1〈w(t)i ,x′j〉+ρi≥b(t)
]
≤ O
E
[∣∣∣〈ξ,Mj〉〈w(t)i ,Mj〉∣∣∣]
σ
(t)
ρ

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Together, we have∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
− 1〈w(t)i ,x′j〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
〈ξ,Mj〉
]∣∣∣∣
≤ O
ΓtE
[∣∣∣〈ξ,Mj〉2〈w(t)i ,Mj〉∣∣∣]
σ
(t)
ρ
 = O( Γt
dσ
(t)
ρ
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|σ2x
)
(C.14)
Using the coordinate Lipscthizness, we also have∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ
[
y(`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)− `′t(x′j , y))1〈w(t)i ,x′j〉+ρi≥b(t)〈ξ,Mj〉
]∣∣∣∣
≤ Lt,j E[〈ξ,Mj〉2] Pr[〈w(t)i , x′j〉+ ρi ≥ b(t)] = O
(
ΓtLt,jσ
2
x
d
)
(C.15)
Finally, we have Ex,y,ρ
[
y`′t(x′j , y)1〈w(t)i ,x′j〉+ρi≥b(t)
〈ξ,Mj〉
]
= 0. We can thus combine (C.14) and
(C.15) to complete the proof of Lemma C.14a.
Next, we want to prove Lemma C.14b. We have: denote
qi′ = (1〈w(t)
i′ ,Mz〉+ρi′+b
(t)
i′ ≥−|b(t)|/10
+ 1−〈w(t)
i′ ,Mz〉+ρi′+b
(t)
i′ ≥−|b(t)|/10
Since w.p. at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d), |〈w(t)i′ , ξ〉| ≤ |b
(t)|
10 , in this case, we know that∑
j∈[d]
|`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)− `′t(x′j , y)||〈ξ,Mj〉|
≤
∑
j∈[d]
〈Mj , ξ〉2 ·
∑
i′∈[m]
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| · (1〈w(t)
i′ ,x〉+ρi′+b
(t)
i′ ≥0
+ 1−〈w(t)
i′ ,x〉+ρi′+b
(t)
i′ ≥0
)
≤
∑
j∈[d]
〈Mj , ξ〉2 ·
∑
i′∈[m]
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| · qi′
Note also we have:∑
j∈[d]
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| ≤ O(1) · ‖w(t)i′ ‖2 +
∑
j : i′ 6∈Sj,pot+
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉|
≤ O(1) · σ
(t)
w
β
+ d · k
dβ
b(t) ≤ 2k
β
· b(t)
By Lemma C.16, we have that∑
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ [y(`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)− `′t(x′j , y))1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)〈ξ,Mj〉]
∣∣∣∣
≤ e−Ω(log2 d) +
∑
j∈[d]
E
x,y,ρ
[
|(`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)− `′t(x′j , y))||〈ξ,Mj〉|1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
]
≤ e−Ω(log2 d) +
∑
j∈[d]
E
x,y,ρ
[
|(`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)− `′t(x′j , y))||〈ξ,Mj〉|qi
]
≤ e−Ω(log2 d) +
∑
j∈[d]
E
x,y,ρ
〈Mj , ξ〉2 · ∑
i′∈[m]
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| · qi′qi
 · · · taking expectation w.r.t. ξ first.
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≤ e−Ω(log2 d) +O
(
σ2x
d
)
·
∑
j∈[d]
E
x,y,ρ
 ∑
i′∈[m]
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| · qi′qi

≤ O
(
σ2x
d
)
·O
(
k
β
b(t) · kΞ2
)
·O
(
k
d
)
+ e−Ω(log
2 d) ≤ O
(
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x + e
−Ω(log2 d)
)
(C.16)
Next, similar to the (C.14), we also have∑
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣ Ex,y,ρ
[
y`′t(x
′
j , y)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
− 1〈w(t)i ,x′j〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
〈ξ,Mj〉
]∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
j∈[d]
O
(
Γt
dσ
(t)
ρ
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|σ2x
)
≤ O
(
k
d2σ
(t)
ρ
σ2x
)
·
∑
j∈[d]
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ O
(
k2 log d
d2β
σ2x
)
(C.17)
Combining (C.16) and (C.17) we finish the proof of Lemma C.14b.

C.4.2 Growth Coupling
We also have the following lemma which says, essentially, that all those neurons i ∈ [m] satisfying
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ 2
√
kb(t) for the same j, grows roughly in the same direction that is independent of i.
Lemma C.15 (growth coupling). Suppose at iteration t, S(t)ept+ = [m]. Then, for every j ∈ [d],
every i ∈ [m] such that |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ 2
√
kb(t), we have:
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
zj
]
= E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)zj
]
±O
(
k3/2
d2
)
Proof of Lemma C.15. We first focus on the case when 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ 2
√
kb(t) is positive, and the
reverse case is analogous. Conditional on |zj | = s > 0, we know that s ≥ 1√k . Thus, when
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ 2
√
kb(t), |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉s| ≥ 2b(t). Now, using S(t)ept+ = [m] and Lemma C.5, we can
conclude that
• when zj > 0, Pr[〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi ≥ b(t) | zj = s] ≥ 1−O
(
k
d
)
;
• when zj < 0, Pr[〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi ≥ b(t) | zj = −s] ≤ O
(
k
d
)
.
Thus, we can obtain
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
]
= E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)zj1zj>0
]
±O
(
k
d
)
× E |zj |
= E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)zj1zj>0
]
±O
(
k3/2
d2
)
In the symmetric case, we also have
E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
zj
]
= E
x,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)zj1zj<0
]
±O
(
k3/2
d2
)

C.4.3 Activation Probabilities
Lemma C.16 (activation after ept+). Suppose S(t)ept+ = [m] and S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t)j,pot+ for every j ∈ [d].
Then, with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d),
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•
∣∣∣{i ∈ [m] s.t. |〈w(t)i , x〉| ≥ b(t)10 }∣∣∣ ≤ O(kΞ2) .
•
∣∣∣∣〈w(t)i ,∑j∈[d] : i 6∈S(t)j,pot+ Mjzj + ξ
〉∣∣∣∣ ≤ b(t)10 for every i ∈ [m].
Proof. For every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [d] with i 6∈ S(t)j,pot+, we have |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ kdβ b(t). Therefore, by
Bernstein’s inequality (similar to Lemma C.3b), we know with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d),
for every i ∈ [m], ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
〈
w
(t)
i ,
∑
j∈[d] : i 6∈S(t)j,pot+
Mjzj + ξ
〉∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
b(t)
10
(C.18)
With probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d) it satisfies ∑j∈[d] 1zj 6=0 ≤ O(k) (since each zj 6= 0 with
probability at most O(kd )). Therefore, denoting by Λ =
⋃
j∈[d] : zj 6=0 S
(t)
j,pot+, we have |Λ| ≤ O(kΞ2)
(since every |S(t)j,pot+| ≤ Ξ2). Now, for any i ∈ [m] \ Λ, inequality (C.18) immediately gives∣∣∣〈w(t)i , x〉∣∣∣ ≤ b(t)10 .
Therefore, the number of i ∈ [m] satisfying
∣∣∣〈w(t)i , x〉∣∣∣ ≥ b(t)10 cannot be more than O(kΞ2). 
C.4.4 Coordinate Lipscthizness Bound
Lemma C.17 (coordinate Lipschitzness). For every j ∈ [d], let us define γ(t)j =
∑
i∈S(t)j,pot+
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|.
Then, suppose S(t)ept+ = [m] and suppose S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t)j,pot+, we have
Lt,j ≤ γ(t)j +O
(
k√
d
)
≤ γ(t)j +O
(
1
Ξ32
)
Proof of Lemma C.17. Clearly we have
Lt,j ≤
∑
i∈S(0)j,pot+
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|+
∑
i 6∈S(0)j,pot+
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| · (1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥0.9b(t)i + 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥0.9b(t)i )
By Lemma C.16 and the randomness of ρi, we know with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d), the
number of activate neurons i 6∈ S(t)j,pot+—meaning 〈w(t)i , x〉+ρi ≥ 0.9b(t)i or −〈w(t)i , x〉+ρi ≥ 0.9b(t)i —
is at most O(kΞ2). On the other hand, when i /∈ S(t)j,pot+, we know that
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤
k
dβ
b(t) ≤ kΞ
2
2
d
Therefore, together, the total contribution from these active neurons with i /∈ S(t)j,pot+ is at most
kΞ22
d ·O(kΞ2) < O(
k2Ξ32
d ) < O
(
1
Ξ32
)
. This completes the proof. 
C.4.5 Regularization
Following the same argument as (C.9) from phase I, we know at any iteration t, as long as S(t)ept+ =
[m],
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〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉 = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉(1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖2)±
η
poly(d)
+ E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
m∑
i=1
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
· (zj + 〈ξ,Mj〉)] . (C.19)
In this and the next subsection, we shall repeatedly apply growth lemmas to (C.19). Before
doing so, let us note σ
(t)
ρ = o(b(t) log d) ≤ o(βΞ22 log d), so using our parameter choice of β and using
k ≤ d1−c0 ,
√
kσ
(t)
ρ log d
d
+
√
k
βd3/2
= o
(√
kβΞ22 log
2 d
d
)
+
√
k
βd3/2
= o(
1
d
) (C.20)
This means, when applying the aforementioned growth lemmas Lemma C.11, Lemma C.12, Lemma C.13,
the additional terms
√
kσ
(t)
ρ log d
d and
√
k
βd3/2
are negligible.
We also have the following regularity lemma:
Lemma C.18 (regularity). For every T ≤ dO(log d)/η, suppose S(t)ept+ = S(t)ept++ = [m] and S(0)j,pot ⊇
S(t)j,pot+ hold for every t ≤ T and j ∈ [d]. Then, we have for every t ≤ T , with probability at least
1− e−Ω(log2 d),
∀j ∈ [d], ∀i ∈ [m] : Lt,j ≤ O(Ξ22), ‖w(t)i ‖2 ≤ O(Ξ22), |ft(x)| ≤ O(Ξ22 log d) .
Proof of Lemma C.18. By substituting Lemma C.12, Lemma C.14a and (C.20) into (C.19), we
have for every j ∈ [d]:
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|(1− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖2) + ηO
(
1 + Lt,j
d
)
≤ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|
(
1− ηλ|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|
)
+ ηO
(
1 + Lt,j
d
)
Summing up over all i ∈ S(0)j,pot, and using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality together with |S(0)j,pot| ≤ Ξ2,
we have
∑
i∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤
∑
i∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| −
ηλ
Ξ2
 ∑
i∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|

2
+ ηO
(
1 + Lt,j
d
)
· Ξ2
Combining this with Lt,j ≤
∑
i∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|+O( 1Ξ32 ) from Lemma C.17 and our choice λ ≥
1
d ,
we have (for every j ∈ [d] and t ≤ T ),∑
i∈S(0)j,pot
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ O(Ξ22)
This also implies Lt,j ≤ O(Ξ22) as well as
‖w(t)i ‖2 =
∑
j : i∈S(t)j,pot+
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|2 +
∑
j : i 6∈S(t)j,pot+
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|2 ≤ O(Ξ42) +O(
k2
dβ2
(b(t))2) ≤ O(Ξ42) .
Finally, for the objective value, we wish use Lt,j ≤ O(Ξ22) and apply a high-probability Bernstein
variant of the McDiarmid’s inequality (see Lemma H.3).
Specifically, consider random z, ξ, ρ. For notation simplicity, let us write ξ =
∑
j∈[d] Mjξj for
i.i.d. random ξj ∼ N (0, σ
2
x
d ).
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Now, for every j ∈ [m], suppose we change zj to z′j and ξj to ξ′j with the same distribution.
Then, with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d),
|ft(z, ξ, ρ)− ft(z−j , z′j , ξ−j , ξ′j , ρ)| ≤ Lt,j · (|zj |+ |z′j |+ |ξj |+ |ξ′j |)
This implies with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d),
E
zj ,z′j
|ft(z, ξ, ρ)− ft(z−j , z′j , ξ, ρ)|2 ≤ O(L2t,j) ·
1
d
Therefore, we can apply Lemma H.3 to derive that with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d),
|ft(x, ρ)− E
z,ξ
[ft(x, ρ)]| ≤ O(Ξ22 log d)
Finally, noticing that for every ρ, by symmetry Ez,ξ[ft(x, ρ)] = 0. This finishes the bound on the
objective value. 
We also prove this Lemma, which gives a lower bound on the loss:
Lemma C.19 (loss lower bound). In every iteration t, define Lmax := maxj∈[d]{Lt,j} and suppose
Lmax ≤ O(Ξ22). Then we have:
E
x,ρ
[`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)] = Ω
(
min
{
1,
1
L2max log
2 d
})
Proof of Lemma C.19. Let α ∈ [ 1
(Ξ2)5
, 1
]
be a fixed value to be chosen later, and S0 ⊆ [d] be an
arbitrary subset of size |S0| = αd. Consider a randomly sampled vector z and let x = Mz + ξ be
the corresponding input. We construct another z′ that is generated from the following process
1. Let Sre,z ⊆ S0 be the set consisting of all i ∈ S0 with |zi| = Θ
(
1√
k
)
.
2. For all i /∈ Sre,z, pick z′i = zi.
3. For all i ∈ Sre,z, pick z′i = zi or z′i = −zi each with probability 0.5, independently at random.
Obviously, z′ has the same distribution as z. Now, let us define x′ = Mz′ + ξ, y′ = sign(〈w?, z′〉).
Since |S0| = αd, recalling the distribution property that Pr
[
|zi| = Θ
(
1√
k
)]
= Ω
(
k
d
)
, we know
with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d) over the choice of z, |Sre,z| = Θ(αk). We call this event
E1(z).
Let us denote by bi =
z′i
zi
∈ {−1, 1} for every i ∈ Sre,z. We can therefore write ft(w(t);x′, ρ) =
f(z, b, ξ, ρ) to emphasize that the randomness comes from z, b, ξ, ρ. Using the definition of coordi-
nate Lipscthizness, we know with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over z, ξ, ρ, it satisfies
∀k ∈ Sre,z,∀b ∈ {−1, 1}Sre,z , ∀b′k ∈ {−1,+1} : |f(z, b, ξ, ρ)− f(z, (b−k, bk), ξ, ρ)| ≤ O
(
Lmax√
k
)
Let E2(z, ξ, ρ) denote the event where the above statement holds.
Now, conditioning on E1(z) and E2(z, ξ, ρ) both hold, we can apply standard MiDiarmid’s in-
equality (see Lemma H.2) over the randomness of b, and derive that with probability at least
1− e−Ω(log2 d) over b, ∣∣∣∣f(z, b, ξ, ρ)− Eb [f(z, b, ξ, ρ)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ O (Lmax√α log d)
Let E3(b||z, ξ, ρ) denote the (conditional) event where the above statement holds.
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In sum, by combining E1, E2, E3, we know with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over z, z′, ξ, ρ,
it satisfies ∣∣∣∣ft(w(t);x′, ρ)− Ez′ [ft(w(t);x′, ρ) | z, ξ, ρ]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ O (Lmax√α log d) .
As a simple corollary, if we generate another copy z′′ in the same way as z′, and denote by
x′′ = Mz′′ + ξ, then with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over z, z′, z′′, ξ, ρ, it satisfies∣∣∣ft(w(t);x′, ρ)− ft(w(t);x′′, ρ)∣∣∣ ≤ O (Lmax√α log d) . (C.21)
Now, let us denote by y′ = sign(〈w?, z′〉) and y′′ = sign(〈w?, z′′〉) and compare them. Let us
write
A =
∑
i∈[d]\Sre,z
w?i zi , B =
∑
i∈Sre,z
w?i z
′
i , C =
∑
i∈Sre,z
w?i z
′′
i .
Thus, we have y′ = sign(A+B) and y′′ = sign(A+ C).
First using a minor variant of Lemma H.1b, we have17
Pr
[
A ∈ [0,√α]] ≥ Ω(√α)
Denote this event by E4(z).
Next, conditioning on any fixed z which satisfies E1(z) and E4(z), we know that B and C
become independent, each controlled by |Sre,z| = Θ(αk) random Bernoulli variables. Therefore, we
can apply a Wasserstein distance version of the central limit theorem (that can be derived from
[104], full statement see [6, Appendix A.2]) to derive that, for a Gaussian variable g ∼ (0, V 2) where
V 2 =
∑
j∈Sre,z(zj)
2 = Θ(α), the Wasserstein distance:
W2 (B, g) ≤ O
(
log k√
k
)
and W2 (C, g) ≤ O
(
log k√
k
)
This means with probability at least Ω(1), it satisfies B ∈ [0,√α] and C ≤ −5√α.
To sum up, we know with probability at least Ω(
√
α), it satisfies A,B ∈ [0,√α] and C ≤ −5√α.
This means y′ 6= y′′, or in symbols,
Pr[y′ 6= y′′] ≥ Ω(√α) . (C.22)
Finally, conditioning on both (C.21) and (C.22) happen, we know that
• either sign(ft(w(t);x′, ρ)) = sign(ft(w(t);x′′, ρ), in which case `′t(w(t);x′, y′, ρ)+`′(w(t);x′′, y′′, ρ) ≥
1
2 ,
• or |ft(w(t);x′, ρ)| ≤ O (Lmax
√
α log d) and |ft(w(t);x′′, ρ)| ≤ O (Lmax
√
α log d), in which case
if we choose α = min{12 , 1L2max log2 d}, then we have |ft(w
(t);x′, ρ)|, |ft(w(t);x′′, ρ)| ≤ O(1) and
therefore `′t(w(t);x′, y′, ρ) + `′t(w(t);x′′, y′′, ρ) ≥ Ω(1).
To sum up, we have
E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)] =
1
2
E
z,z′,z′′,ξ,ρ
[`′t(w
(t);x′, y′, ρ) + `′t(w
(t);x′′, y′′, ρ)]
≥ Ω(√α) = Ω
(
min{1, 1
L2max log
2 d
}
)
. 
17To be precise, we can do so since we still have at least (1− α)d ≥ d
2
coordinates.
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C.4.6 Proof of Theorem C.2
Proof of Theorem C.2. We first prove that for every t ≥ Tb,
S(t)j,pot ⊆ S(t)j,pot+ ⊆ S(0)j,pot (C.23)
Note from the definitions the relationship S(t)j,pot ⊆ S(t)j,pot+ always holds, so we only need to prove
the second inclusion.
Suppose (C.23) holds until iteration t. Then, for every i 6∈ S(0)j,pot, let us apply Lemma C.13,
Lemma C.14a together with (C.20) and Lt,j ≤ O(Ξ22) (using Lemma C.18) to (C.19). We get
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|(1− ηλ) +O
(
ηkΞ22
d2
)
Therefore, for those t that are sufficiently large so that b(t+1) = βΞ22, we have (using λ ≥ 1d)
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ O
(
ηkΞ22
d2
)
· 1
ηλ
= O
(
kΞ22
d · dλ
)
≤ k
dβ
b(t+1)
and for those t that are still small so that b(t+1) = Θ(η(t+1)d ), we have
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ O
(
ηkΞ22
d2
· (t+ 1)
)
 k
dβ
b(t+1)
Together, this means i 6∈ S(t+1)j,pot+ so (C.23) holds for all t ≥ Tb and T ≤ dO(log d)/η.
Phase II.1. We will construct a threshold Te and prove inductively for all t ∈ [Tb, Te]. Initially
at t = Tb, by Lemma C.17 we have Lt,j = o(1). As long as Lt,j = o(1) holds for all j ∈ [d], we have
• for every i ∈ [m], substituting Lemma C.12, Lemma C.14a and (C.20) into (C.19),
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|+O
(η
d
)
≤ · · · ≤ O
(η
d
· t
)
• for every i 6∈ S(t)j,pot, substituting Lemma C.13, Lemma C.14a and (C.20) into (C.19),
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|+O
(
ηk log d
d2
)
≤ · · · ≤ O
(
ηk log d
d2
· t
)
Since for each i, the number of j satisfying i ∈ S(t)j,pot is at most O(1) (using S(t)j,pot ⊆ S(0)j,pot and
S(0)ept = [m]), we have
‖w(t+1)i ‖ ≤ O(
η
d
· t) (C.24)
These bounds together mean several things:
• Lt,j = o(1) for all j ∈ [d] and t ∈ [Tb, Te] with Te = Θ
(
d
ηΞ2 log d
)
.
Indeed, (C.24) gives |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ O( 1Ξ2 log d), but the number of j satisfying i ∈ S
(t)
j,pot is at
most O(1). So we can apply Lemma C.17 to get Lt,j = o(1).
• S(t)ept++ = [m] for all t ∈ [Tb, Te].
Indeed,
– for those t that are small so that σ
(t)
w = Θ(
η
d
√
log d
t), we have (C.24) implies ‖w(t)i ‖ ≤
O(
√
log d · σ(t)w ) σ
(t)
w
β ; and
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– for those t that are large so that σ
(t)
w = Θ(
βΞ22√
log d
), we have (C.24) implies ‖w(t)i ‖ ≤
O( 1Ξ2 log d)
σ
(t)
w
β .
Together we have i ∈ S(t)ept++.
• S(t)ept+ = [m] for all t ∈ [Tb, Te].
This is a direct corollary of S(t)ept++ = [m] together with the property that the number of j
satisfying i ∈ S(t)j,pot+ is at most O(1).
Next, let us consider any j ∈ [d] with i ∈ S(0)j,sure. At any iteration t ∈ [Tb, Te], substituting
Lemma C.11, Lemma C.14a, (C.24), and (C.20) into (C.19),
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≥ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|(1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖2) + Ω
(η
d
)
≥ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|(1− 2ηλ) + Ω
(η
d
)
This means two things:
• The value |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| keeps increasing as t increases, until it reaches Θ(ηd · 1ηλ) = Θ( 1dλ) and
at that point it may decrease but will not fall below Θ( 1dλ). This ensures i ∈ S
(t)
j,sure.
• At t = Te, we must have i ∈ S(t)j,sure+ because
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ Ω(
η
d
Te) ≥ Ω
(
1
Ξ2 log d
)
≥ Ω
(
1
Ξ2 log d
)
· (b
(t))2
β2Ξ42
≥ Ω
(
1
kβ2Ξ52 log d
)
· 4k(b(t))2 ≥ 4k(b(t))2
To sum up, at iteration t = Te, we have
• for i ∈ S(0)j,sure, |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ Ω
(
1
Ξ2 log d
)
;
• for i ∈ S(0)j,pot, |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ O( 1Ξ2 log d)
• for i 6∈ S(0)j,pot, |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ O( kdΞ2 )
Phase II.2. We first make a quick observation that
• S(t)ept+ = S(t)ept++ = [m] for all t ≥ Te.
Indeed, from iteration t = Te on, we have b
(t) = βΞ22. Using Lemma C.18 we have for every
i ∈ [m], ‖w(t)i ‖ ≤ O(Ξ22) ≤ σ
(t)
w
β . Thus, S
(t)
ept++ = [m] holds for all t ≥ Te. As for S(t)ept+ = [m], it
is a simple corollary of S(t)ept++ = [m] together with the property that the number of j satisfying
i ∈ S(t)j,pot+ is at most O(1).
Next, we claim for every i ∈ S(Te)j,sure+ and every t ≥ Te, it must hold that
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥
1
C ′
(
max
i′∈[m]
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉|
)
and i ∈ S(t)j,sure+ (C.25)
for some sufficiently large constant C ′ > 1. We prove by induction. Suppose (C.25) holds for t and
we consider t+ 1. By the definition of i ∈ S(t)j,sure+, we know |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ 2
√
kb(t). Now, consider
every other i′ ∈ [m] \ {i}
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• if |〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| < 2C ′|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|, then after one iteration we still have |〈w(t+1)i′ ,Mj〉| < C ′|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉|.
• if |〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| > 2C ′|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|, then we have
‖w(t)i ‖2 = |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|2 +
∑
j′ 6=j
|〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉|2 ≤ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|2 + (d− 1) ·
k2
d2β2
(b(t))2
≤ 10|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|2 ≤
10
2C ′
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉|2 ≤ ‖w(t)i′ ‖2 (C.26)
Therefore, applying Lemma C.15 and Lemma C.14a (for i and i′), and using β ≤ 1√
k
, we have
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| = |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|(1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖2) + η Ex,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)zj
]
±O
(
ηk1.5
d2
)
|〈w(t+1)i′ ,Mj〉| = |〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉|(1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i′ ‖2) + η Ex,y,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)zj
]
±O
(
ηk1.5
d2
)
Taking the difference and using (C.26), we have
|〈w(t+1)i′ ,Mj〉| − |〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≤
(
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| − |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|
)
(1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖2) +O
(
ηk1.5
d2
)
≤
(
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| − |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|
)
− Ω(ηλ(
√
kb(t))3) +O
(
ηk1.5
d2
)
≤
(
|〈w(t)i′ ,Mj〉| − |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|
)
thus we continue to have |〈w(t+1)i′ ,Mj〉| ≤ C ′|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉|.
Putting these together we show that the first half of (C.25) holds at t+ 1.
As for why i ∈ S(t+1)j,sure+, we consider two cases.
• If |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ 4
√
kb(t), then in one iteration we should still have |〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≥ 2
√
kb(t) =
2
√
kb(t+1).
• If |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ 4
√
kb(t), then by the first half of (C.25) together with Lemma C.17, we know
the Lipscthizness Lt,j ≤ O(
√
kb(t) ·Ξ2)+O
(
1
Ξ32
)
≤ o(1). In this case, we also have (see (C.26))
‖w(t)i ‖2 ≤ O(k(b(t))2) = o(1). Applying Lemma C.11 and Lemma C.14a again we have
|〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉| ≥ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|(1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖2) + Ω
(η
d
)
≥ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|(1− 2ηλ) + Ω
(η
d
)
≥ |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|
Putting both cases together we have i ∈ S(t+1)j,sure+ so the second half of (C.25) holds at t+ 1.

D Clean Accuracy Convergence Analysis
In this section we show the upper bound on how the clean training of a two-layer neural network
can learn the labeling function from N training samples {xi, yi}Ni=1 up to small generalization error.
49
Theorem D.1. Suppose the high-probability initialization event in Lemma B.2 holds, and suppose
η, σ0 ∈ (0, 1poly(d)) and N ≥ poly(d). With probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log
2 d), for any T ≥ Ω(dΞ62η )
and T ≤ dO(log d)/η, if we run the algorithm for Tcc = Te + T iterations, we have
1
T
Te+T−1∑
t=Te
E
x,y,ρ
Objt(w
(t);x, y, ρ) ≤ o(1)
In other words, at least 99% of the iterations t = Te, Te + 1, . . . , Te + T − 1 will have population
risk o(1) and clean population accuracy ≥ 1− o(1).
Remark D.2. With additional efforts, one can also prove that Theorem D.1 holds with high proba-
bility 1− e−Ω(log2 d) for all T in the prescribed range. We do not prove it here since it is not beyond
the scope of this paper.
D.1 Proof of Theorem D.1: Convergence Theorem
Our convergence analysis will rely on the following (what we call) coupling function which is the
first-order approximation of the neural network.
Definition D.3 (coupling). At every iteration t, we define a linear function in µ
gt(µ;x, ρ)
def
=
m∑
i=1
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
· (〈µi, x〉+ ρi − b(t))− 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) · (−〈µi, x〉+ ρi − b
(t))
)
and it equals the output of the real network at point µ = w(t) both on zero and first order:
gt(w
(t);x, ρ) = ft(w
(t);x, ρ) and ∇µgt(µ;x, ρ)
∣∣
µ=w(t)
= ∇wft(w;x, ρ)
∣∣
w=w(t)
In the analysis, we shall also identify a special choice µ? defined as follows.
Definition D.4. Recall S(0)1,sure, . . . ,S(0)d,sure ⊆ [m] are disjoint, so we construct µ?1, . . . , µ?m by
µ?i
def
=
 α
(
w?j
|S(0)j,sure|
)
Mj , i ∈ S(0)j,sure for some j ∈ [d];
~0, otherwise.
Above, α = o(1) is a parameter to be chosen later. One can easily check (using Lemma B.2) that
Claim D.5.
∑
i∈[m] ‖µ?i ‖2 ≤ O(α
2
Ξ1
d) and
∑
i∈[m] ‖µ?i ‖3 ≤ O(α
3
Ξ21
d)
More interestingly, our so-constructed µ? satisfies (to be proved in Section D.2)
Lemma D.6. Suppose S(t)ept+ = S(t)ept++ = [m], S(0)j,pot ⊇ S(t)j,pot+ and S(0)j,sure ⊆ S(t)j,sure+ for every
j ∈ [d]. Then,
(a) with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over x, ρ, gt(µ?;x, ρ) = α〈w?, z〉 ±O( 1Ξ22 )
(b) Ex,y=y(x),ρ
[
log
(
1 + e−y·gt(µ?;x,ρ)
)] ≤ O ( 1
α2
+ 1
Ξ22
)
We are now ready to prove Theorem D.1. Since w
(t+1)
i = w
(t)
i − η∇wiO˜bjt(w(t)), we have the
identity
η〈∇O˜bjt(w(t)), w(t) − µ?〉 =
η2
2
‖∇O˜bjt(w(t))‖2F +
1
2
‖w(t) − µ?‖2F −
1
2
‖w(t+1) − µ?‖2F
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Applying Lemma A.2, we know that by letting Objt(w
(t)) = Ex,y,ρ Objt(w(t);x, y, ρ), it satisfies
η〈∇Objt(w(t)), w(t) − µ?〉 ≤ η2 · poly(d) +
1
2
‖w(t) − µ?‖2F −
1
2
‖w(t+1) − µ?‖2F +
η
poly(d)
Let us define a pseudo objective
Obj′t(µ)
def
= E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
log(1 + e−y·gt(µ;x,ρ))
]
+ λ
∑
i∈[m]
Reg(µi) ,
which is a convex function in µ because gt(µ;x, ρ) is linear in µ. We have, for every t ≥ Te,
〈∇Objt(w(t)), w(t) − µ?〉 ¬= 〈∇Obj′t(w(t)), w(t) − µ?〉
≥ Obj′t(w(t))−Obj′t(µ?) = Objt(w(t))−Obj′t(µ?)
­≥ Objt(w(t))− λ
∑
i∈[m]
(‖µ?i ‖3
3
+
‖µ?i ‖2
2
)
−O
(
1
α2
+
1
Ξ22
)
®≥ Objt(w(t))−O
(
α3 log d
Ξ21
+
α2 log d
Ξ1
+
1
α2
+
1
Ξ22
)
≥ Objt(w(t))−O
(√
log d√
Ξ1
)
Above, ¬ uses the definition of gt, ­ uses Lemma D.6b (and Theorem C.2 for the prerequisite for
Lemma D.6b), and ® uses Claim D.5 for the bound on ‖µ?i ‖2 and ‖µ?i ‖3.
Putting these together, we have
η
(
Objt(w
(t))−O
(√
log d√
Ξ1
))
≤ η2 · poly(d) + 1
2
‖w(t) − µ?‖2F −
1
2
‖w(t+1) − µ?‖2F +
η
poly(d)
Therefore, after telescoping for t = Te, Te + 1, . . . , Te + T − 1, and using η ≤ 1poly(d) , we have
1
T
Te+T−1∑
t=Te
(
Objt(w
(t))−O
(√
log d√
Ξ1
))
≤ O(‖w
(Te) − µ?‖2F )
ηT
≤ O(Ξ
4
2m)
ηT
Finally, we calculate
‖w(Te)‖2F ≤
∑
i∈⋃j S(0)j,pot
‖w(Te)i ‖22 +
∑
i 6∈⋃j S(0)j,pot
‖w(Te)i ‖22
≤ dΞ2 ·O(Ξ42) +m ·O(
k2
d2
Ξ42) ≤ O(dΞ52)
and this finishes the proof. 
D.2 Proof of Claim D.6: Main Coupling
The proof of Lemma D.6a comes from Claim D.7 and Claim D.8 below. In the two claims, we split
gt(µ
?;x) = gt,1 + gt,4 into two terms, and bound them separately. Define
gt,1(µ
?;x, ρ) =
∑
j∈[d]
α · w?j
|S(0)j,sure|
∑
i∈S(0)j,sure
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
· zj
gt,4(x, ρ) =
∑
i∈[m]
(
(ρi − b(t))1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) + (b
(t) − ρi)1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
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Claim D.7. Prx,ρ[gt,1(µ
?;x, ρ) = α〈w?, z〉] ≥ 1− e−Ω(log2 d)
Proof of Claim D.7. Recall for each i ∈ S(0)j,sure,
• it satisfies i ∈ S(t)j,sure+ so |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≥ 2
√
kb(t);
• it also implies i 6∈ S(t)j′,pot+ for any j′ 6= j, so |〈w(t)i ,Mj′〉| ≤ kdβ b(t);
• recall ρi ∼ N (0, (σ(t)ρ )2) for σ(t)ρ = Θ(b(t) · (log log log d)
3
log d ).
• recall 〈w(t)i , ξ〉 is a variable with variance at most O(‖w
(t)
i ‖2σ2x
d ) for σx = O(1).
Applying Lemma C.16, we know with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) it satisfies∣∣∣〈w(t)i ,∑j′ 6=j Mj′zj′ + ξ〉∣∣∣+ |ρi| ≤ b(t)2 = βΞ222 (D.1)
and when this happens it satisfies, whenever zj 6= 0,
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
= 1
Summing up over all i ∈ S(0)j,sure and j ∈ [d], we have with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log
2 d) over
x, ρ: gt,1(µ
?;x) = α〈w?, z〉. 
Claim D.8. Prx,ρ[|gt,4(x, ρ)| ≤ O( 1Ξ22 )] ≥ 1− e
−Ω(log2 d)
Proof of Claim D.8. Let us write ξ =
∑
j∈[d] Mjξj where each ξj is i.i.d. Let us write
gt,4(x, ρ) =
∑
i∈[m]
gt,4,i(x, ρi)
for gt,4,i(x, ρi)
def
=
(
(ρi − b(t))1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) + (b
(t) − ρi)1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)
We note that gt,4(x, ρ) is a random variable that depends on independent variables
ξ1, . . . , ξd, z1, . . . , zd, ρ1, . . . , ρm ,
so we also want to write it as gt,4(z, ξ, ρ) and gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi).
We can without loss of generality assume as if |ρi| ≤ b(t)10 and |ξj | ≤ b
(t)
Ξ102
:= B always hold, both
of which happen with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d). In the rest of the proof we condition on
this happens. By symmetry we have
∀ρ : E
ξ,z
[gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)] = 0 .
We wish to apply a high-probability version of the McDiarmid’s inequality (see Lemma H.3) to
bound gt,4. In order to do so, we need to check the sensitivity of gt,4(x, ρ) regarding every random
variable.
• For every zj , suppose we perturb it to an arbitrary z′j ∈ [−1, 1]. We also write z′ = (z−j , z′j)
and x′ = Mz′ + ξ.
– Now, for every i ∈ S(t)j,pot+, we have the naive bound
|gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi)− gt,4,i(z′, ξ, ρi)| ≤ 2b(t) · 1zj 6=z′j
and there are at most |S(t)j,pot+| ≤ Ξ2 such neurons i.
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– For every i 6∈ S(t)j,pot+, we have |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ kdβ b(t). Define event
Ei =
|〈w(t)i ,∑
j′ 6=j
Mj′zj′ + ξ〉| ≥ b
(t)
2

∗ When event Ei does not happen, we have 1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) = 1〈w(t)i ,x′〉+ρi≥b(t) , and thus
gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi) = gt,4,i(z
′, ξ, ρi) .
∗ When Ei happens, using the randomness of ρi, we have
Pr
ρi
[
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
6= 1〈w(t)i ,x′〉+ρi≥b(t)
]
≤ O
(
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| · |zj − z′j |
σ
(t)
ρ
)
≤ O
(
k log d
dβ
)
· |zj − z′j |
and thus
|gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi)− gt,4,i(z′, ξ, ρi)| =
{
0, w.p. ≥ 1−O
(
k log d
dβ |zj − z′j |
)
over ρi;
O(b(t)), otherwise.
Note with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d), the number of i ∈ [m] with Ei holds is at most
O(kΞ2) (using Lemma C.16). Therefore, by applying Chernoff bound, we know
|gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)− gt,4(z′, ξ, ρ)| ≤ O(b(t)) ·
(
k log d
dβ
|zj − z′j | · kΞ2 + Ξ2
)
This means two things that both hold with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over z−j , ξ, ρ:
– For all zj , z
′
j , |gt,4(x, ρ)− gt,4(x′, ρ)| ≤ O(b(t)) ·
(
k log d
dβ · kΞ2 + Ξ2
)
≤ O(√kb(t)) < o( 1
Ξ22
)
– Ezj ,z′j |gt,4(x, ρ)−gt,4(x′, ρ)|2 ≤ O
(
(b(t))2
) ·Ezj ,z′j ((k log ddβ · kΞ2)2 |zj − z′j |2 + Ξ221zj 6=z′j) ≤
O
((
k4Ξ22 log
2 d
d2β2
1
d + Ξ
2
2
k
d
)
(b(t))2
)
< o( 1
dΞ42
)
• For every ξj , suppose we perturb it to ξ′j ∈ [−B,B]. We write ξ′ = ξ + Mj(ξ′j − ξj) and
x′ = Mz + ξ′.
– Now, for every i ∈ S(t)j,pot+, with probability at least 1−e−Ω(log
2 d) we have |〈w(t)i ,
∑
j′ 6=j Mj′ξj′〉| ≤
b(t)
10 . Therefore, if it also happens that |〈w
(t)
i ,Mz〉| ≤ b
(t)
10 , then gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi) = gt,4,i(z, ξ
′, ρi).
In other words, we have
|gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi)− gt,4,i(z′, ξ, ρi)| ≤ 2b(t) · 1|〈w(t)i ,Mz〉|≥ b(t)10 .
Summing up over i ∈ S(t)j,pot+, and taking expectation in z, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ez
∑
i∈S(t)j,pot+
gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi)− gt,4,i(z′, ξ, ρi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2b(t)·Ez
 ∑
i∈S(t)j,pot+
1|〈w(t)i ,Mz〉|≥ b
(t)
10
 ≤ O(b(t)kΞ2
d
)
where the last inequality uses a variant of Lemma C.5 and |S(t)j,pot+| ≤ Ξ2.
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– For every i 6∈ S(t)j,pot+, we have |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ kdβ b(t). Define event
Ei =
|〈w(t)i ,Mz + ∑
j′ 6=j
Mj′ξj′〉| ≥ b
(t)
2

∗ When event Ei does not happen, we have 1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) = 1〈w(t)i ,x′〉+ρi≥b(t) , and thus
gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi) = gt,4,i(z
′, ξ, ρi) .
∗ When Ei happens, using the randomness of ρi, we have
Pr
ρi
[
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
6= 1〈w(t)i ,x′〉+ρi≥b(t)
]
≤ O
(
|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| · |ξj − ξ′j |
σ
(t)
ρ
)
≤ O
(
k log d
dβ
)
· |ξj − ξ′j |
and thus
|gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi)− gt,4,i(z, ξ′, ρi)| =
{
0, w.p. ≥ 1−O
(
k log d
dβ |ξj − ξ′j |
)
over ρi;
O(b(t)), otherwise.
Note with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d), the number of i ∈ [m] with Ei holds is at
most O(kΞ2) (using a minor variant of Lemma C.16). Therefore, by applying Chernoff
bound, we know with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over z, ξ−j , ρ
|
∑
i 6∈S(t)j,pot+
gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi)− gt,4,i(z, ξ′, ρi)| ≤ O(b(t)) ·
(
k log d
dβ
|ξj − ξ′j | · kΞ2
)
Taking expectation over z, we have with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over ξ−j , ρ:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ez
∑
i 6∈S(t)j,pot+
gt,4,i(z, ξ, ρi)− gt,4,i(z, ξ′, ρi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O(b(t)) ·
(√
k log d√
d
|ξj − ξ′j | · kΞ2
)
Putting the two cases together, we have with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over ξ−j , ρ:∣∣∣E
z
gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)− E
z
gt,4(z, ξ
′, ρ)
∣∣∣ ≤ O(b(t)) ·O(k log d
dβ
|ξj − ξ′j | · kΞ2 +
kΞ2
d
)
This means two things that both hold with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over ξ−j , ρ:
– For all ξj , ξ
′
j , |Ez gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)− Ez gt,4(z, ξ′, ρ)| ≤ O(b(t)) ·
(
k log d
dβ B · kΞ2 + kΞ2d
)
 o( 1
Ξ22
)
– Eξj ,ξ′j |Ez gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)−Ez gt,4(z, ξ′, ρ)|2 ≤ O
(
(b(t))2
)·Ezj ,z′j ((k log ddβ · kΞ2)2 |ξj − ξ′j |2 + k2d2 Ξ22) ≤
O
((
k4Ξ22 log
2 d
d2β2
1
d +
k2
d2
Ξ22
)
(b(t))2
)
 o( 1
dΞ42
)
We are now ready to apply the high-probability version of the McDiarmid’s inequality (see
Lemma H.3). We apply it twice. In the first time, we use the perturbation on z to derive that,
with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over z, ξ, ρ:
|gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)− E
z
gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)| ≤ O( 1
Ξ22
)
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In the second time, we use the perturbation on ξ to derive that, with probability at least 1 −
e−Ω(log
2 d) over ξ, ρ,
|E
z
gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)− E
z,ξ
gt,4(z, ξ, ρ)| ≤ O( 1
Ξ22
)
Finally, noticing that Ez,ξ gt,4(z, ξ, ρ) = 0 for every ρ, we finish the proof. 
This finishes the proof of Lemma D.6a. We are only left to prove Lemma D.6b.
By Lipscthiz continuity of the log(1 + e−x) function, we know with probability at least 1 −
e−Ω(log
2 d),
log
(
1 + e−y(x)·gt(µ
?;x)
)
= log
(
1 + e−y(x)·α〈w
?,z〉)±O( 1
Ξ22
) = log
(
1 + e−α|〈w
?,z〉|)±O( 1
Ξ22
)
Taking expectation (and using the exponential tail) we have
E
[
log
(
1 + e−y(x)·gt(µ
?;x)
)]
= E
[
log
(
1 + e−α|〈w
?,z〉|)]±O( 1
Ξ22
)
Note if we take expectation over z, we have
E
z
[log
(
1 + e−α|〈w
?,z〉|)] ≤ ∫
t≥0
log
(
1 + e−αt) ·Pr[|〈w?, z〉| ≤ t]dt
¬≤ O(1) ·
∫
t≥0
e−αt · (t+ 1√
k
) ≤ O( 1
α2
+
1√
k
)
where ¬ uses Lemma H.1a. This finishes the proof of Lemma D.6b. 
E Why Clean Training is Non-Robust
In this section we shall show that clean training will not achieve robustness against `2 perturbation
of size τ = Ω
(
d0.4999
k2
)
as long as k = Ω˜(d0.3334). Recall ‖M‖1 =
∑
j∈[d] ‖Mj‖∞.
Theorem E.1 (clean training is non-robust). Suppose the high-probability initialization event
in Lemma B.2 holds. Suppose k > d(1−c0)/3 and consider any iteration t ≥ Ω( 1
ηλΞ22
) and t ≤
dO(log d)/η. With probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d) the following holds. If we perturb every input
x by δ = −yΞ102 (Mw?)/k2, then the accuracy drops below e−Ω(log
2 d):
Pr
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
sign
(
ft(x− δ)
)
= y
]
≤ e−Ω(log2 d) ,
Pr
x,y=y(x)
[
sign
(
E
ρ
[ft(x− δ)]
)
= y
]
≤ e−Ω(log2 d) .
Note that
‖δ‖2 ≤ Ξ
10
2
√
d
k2
and ‖δ‖∞ ≤ Ξ
10
2 ‖M‖1
k2
.
The proof of Theorem E.1 relies on the following main lemma (to be proved in Section E.1). It
says that towards the end of clean training, neurons w
(t)
i have a (small) common direction in Mw
?.
Lemma E.2 (non-robust). For any iteration t ≥ Ω( 1
ηλΞ22
), let subset S = ∪j∈[d]S(0)j,sure, then∑
i∈S
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 = Ω
(
kd
Ξ72
)
and ∀i ∈ [m] : 〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 ≥ −O
(
1
λ
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
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With the help of Lemma E.2, one can calculate that by perturbing input in this direction
−y·Mw?, the output label of the network can change dramatically. This is the proof of Theorem E.1
and details can be found in Section E.2.
E.1 Proof of Lemma E.2: Common Direction Among Neurons
Before proving Lemma E.2, let us first present Claim E.3.
Claim E.3. We have
〈w(t+1)i ,Mw?〉 ≥ 〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)−O
(
η
k2
d1.5
σ2x +
η
poly(d)
)
+ η E
x,ρ
[
`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
|〈w?, z〉|
]
Proof of Claim E.3. Let us recall from (C.19) that
〈w(t+1)i ,Mj〉 = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)±
η
poly(d)
+ η E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)(
zj + 〈ξ,Mj〉
)]
and therefore
〈w(t+1)i ,
∑
j∈[d]
w?jMj〉 ≥ 〈w(t)i ,
∑
j∈[d]
w?jMj〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)−
η
poly(d)
+ η E
x,ρ
[
y`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)〈w?, z〉]
−O(η) ·
∑
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣Ex,ρ [y`′t(w(t);x, y, ρ)(1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t) + 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t))〈ξ,Mj〉]
∣∣∣∣
Applying Lemma C.14b and using y〈w∗, z〉 = |〈w∗, z〉| and ‖w(t)i ‖ ≤ O(Ξ22) (see Lemma C.18), we
have
〈w(t+1)i ,
∑
j∈[d]
w?jMj〉 ≥ 〈w(t)i ,
∑
j∈[d]
w?jMj〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)−O
(
η
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x +
η
poly(d)
)
+ η E
x,ρ
[
`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)
(
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
+ 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
)|〈w?, z〉|]
≥ 〈w(t)i ,
∑
j∈[d]
w?jMj〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)−O
(
η
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x +
η
poly(d)
)
+ η E
x,ρ
[
`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
|〈w?, z〉|
]
.

Proof of Lemma E.2. Recall Claim E.3 says that∑
i∈S
〈w(t+1)i ,Mw?〉 ≥
∑
i∈S
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)−O
(
η|S|k
3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
+ η E
x,ρ
[
`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)|〈w?, z〉|
∑
i∈S
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(t)
]
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Using S(0)j,sure ⊆ S(t)j,sure+, and a similar analysis to Lemma C.16, we know with probability at least
1− e−Ω(log2 d) it satisfies ∑i∈S 1〈w(s)i ,x〉+ρi≥b(s) ≥ Ω(k). Therefore, the above inequality gives∑
i∈S
〈w(t+1)i ,Mw?〉 ≥
∑
i∈S
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)−O
(
η|S|k
3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
+ Ω(ηk) · E
x,ρ
[
`′t(w
(t);x, y, ρ)|〈w?, z〉|
]
Now, using small ball probability Lemma H.1a we have
Pr
[
|〈w∗, z〉| ≤ 0.01E[`′s(w(t);x, y, ρ)]
]
≤ 1
2
E[`′s(w(t);x, y, ρ)] +O(
1√
k
) .
Therefore, let us abbreviate by writing `′s = `′s(w(t);x, y, ρ), then
E
[
`′s(w
(t);x, y, ρ) · |〈w∗, z〉|
]
≥ E
[
`′s · |〈w∗, z〉|
∣∣∣ |〈w∗, z〉| ≥ 0.01E[`′s]] ·Pr [|〈w∗, z〉| ≥ 0.01E[`′s]]
≥ 0.01E[`′s] · E
[
`′s
∣∣∣ |〈w∗, z〉| ≥ 0.01E[`′s]] ·Pr [|〈w∗, z〉| ≥ 0.01E[`′s]]
= 0.01E[`′s] ·
(
E
[
`′s
]− E [`′s ∣∣∣ |〈w∗, z〉| < 0.01E[`′s]] ·Pr [|〈w∗, z〉| < 0.01E[`′s]])
≥ 0.01E[`′s] ·
(
E
[
`′s
]−Pr [|〈w∗, z〉| < 0.01E[`′s]])
≥ 0.01E[`′s] ·
(
1
2
E
[
`′s
]−O( 1√
k
)
)
¬≥ 1
Ξ52
where the last inequality ¬ uses Lemma C.18 and Lemma C.19.
Therefore, using |S| ≤ dΞ2, we have∑
i∈S
〈w(t+1)i ,Mw?〉 ≥
∑
i∈S
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)−O
(
η|S|k
3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
+ Ω(
ηk
Ξ52
)
≥
∑
i∈S
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 · (1−O(ηλΞ22)) + Ω(
ηk
Ξ52
)
so we conclude for every t ≥ Ω( 1
ηλΞ22
) it satisfies∑
i∈S
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 ≥ Ω
(
kd
Ξ72
)
.
As for any arbitrary i ∈ [m], we have
〈w(t+1)i ,Mw?〉 ≥ 〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 · (1− ηλ− ηλ‖w(t)i ‖)−O
(
η
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
≥ · · · ≥ −O
(
1
λ
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
. 
E.2 Proof of Theorem E.1
Proof of Theorem E.1. For every i ∈ S(t)j,sure+, we know with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log
2 d), it
satisfies that
1〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥10b(t)
= 1w?j zj>0 and 1−〈w(t)i ,x〉+ρi≥10b(t)
= 1w?j zj<0
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Therefore, setting δ = δ0Mw
? for some δ0 ∈ (0, β√d), we have |〈w
(t)
i , δ〉| ≤ δ0Ξ22
√
d ≤ b(t)∑
i∈S
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x− δ〉+ ρi − b(t))− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x− δ〉+ ρi − b(t))
=
∑
i∈S
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t))− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t))−
∑
i∈S
(
1w?jizji>0
+ 1w?jizji<0
)〈w(t)i , δ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
♣
where ji ∈ [d] is the unique index such that i ∈ S(t)ji,sure+. We can rewrite the decrement
♣ = δ0
∑
j∈[d]
(
1w?j zj>0 + 1w?j zj<0
) ∑
i∈S(t)j,sure+
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉
Using |∑
i∈S(t)j,sure+
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉| ≤ Ξ32
√
d and
(
1w?j zj>0 + 1w?j zj<0
)
= 1 with probability Θ(kd ), we
can apply Bernstein’s inequality and derive
Pr
[
|♣ − E
z
[♣]| > δ0 · Ξ32
√
kd log d
]
≤ e−Ω(log2 d)
Also using
(
1w?j zj>0 + 1w?j zj<0
)
= 1 with probability Θ(kd ), we can derive using Lemma E.2 that
E
z
[♣] ≥ δ0 ·
(
Ω(
k
d
)
∑
i∈S
〈w(t)i ,Mw?〉 −O(kΞ2) ·
k2
λd1.5
σ2x
)
≥ δ0 ·
(
Ω(
k2
Ξ72
)−O(kΞ2) · 1
λ
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
≥ δ0 · Ω( k
2
Ξ72
)
Combining the above equations andusing k > d(1−c0)/3, we have with probability at least 1 −
e−Ω(log
2 d),
♣ ≥ δ0 · Ω
(
k2
Ξ72
)
For the remainder terms, we using |〈w(t)i , δ〉| ≤ δ0Ξ22
√
d ≤ b(t)/2, we have∑
i∈[m]\S
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x− δ〉+ ρi − b(t))− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x− δ〉+ ρi − b(t))
≤
∑
i∈[m]\S
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t))− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t))−
∑
i∈[m]\S
1|〈w(t)i ,x〉|+|ρi|> b
(t)
2
min
{
0, 〈w(t)i , δ〉
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
♠
Using Lemma E.2 and Lemma C.16 we have with probability at least 1− eΩ(log2 d),
♠ ≥ −δ0 ·O
(
1
λ
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
·
∑
i∈[m]\S
1|〈w(t)i ,x〉|+|ρi|> b
(t)
2
≥ −δ0 ·O
(
1
λ
k3Ξ42
d2
σ2x
)
·O(kΞ2) ≥ −♣
2
.
Putting together the bounds for ♣ and ♠ we have
ft(x− δ) =
∑
i∈[m]
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x− δ〉+ ρi − b(t))− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x− δ〉+ ρi − b(t))
≤
∑
i∈[m]
ReLU(〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t))− ReLU(−〈w(t)i , x〉+ ρi − b(t))−
♣
2
≤ ft(x)− δ0 · Ω
(
k2
Ξ72
)
In other words, choosing δ0 =
Ξ102
k2
, then combining with |ft(x)| ≤ O(Ξ22 log d) from Lemma C.18,
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we immediately have ft(x− δ) < 0.
Using an analogous proof, one can also show that ft(x + δ) > 0. Therefore, if we choose a
perturb direction −δ0yMw∗ = −yδ, we have
Pr
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
sign
(
ft(x− δ0yMw∗)
)
= y
]
≤ e−Ω(log2 d) .
This means the robust accuracy is below e−Ω(log
2 d). Finally, using ‖Mw∗‖2 ≤ O(
√
d) and ‖Mw∗‖∞ ≤
O(
∑
j∈[d] ‖Mj‖∞) = O(‖M‖1) finishes the proof.
Note that a similar proof as above also shows
Pr
x,y=y(x)
[
sign
(
E
ρ
[ft(x− δ0yMw∗)]
)
= y
]
≤ e−Ω(log2 d) . 
F Robust Training Through Local Feature Purification
Suppose we run clean training for Tf ≥ Ω(dΞ
6
2
η ) iterations following Theorem D.1. From this itera-
tion on, let us perform T more steps of robust training.
During the robust training phase, let us consider an arbitrary (norm-bounded) adversarial
perturbation algorithm A. Recall from Definition 4.1 that, given the current network f (which
includes hidden weights {wi}, output weights {ai}, bias {bi} and smoothing parameter σρ), an
input x, a label y, and some internal random string r, the perturbation algorithm A outputs a
vector satisfying
‖A(f, x, y, r)‖p ≤ τ .
for some `p norm. Our two main theorems below apply to all such perturbation algorithms A
(including the Fast Gradient Method, FGM).
Theorem F.1 (`2-adversarial training). In the same setting as Theorem D.1, suppose we first
run Tf iterations of clean training with Ω(
dΞ62
η ) ≤ Tf ≤ dO(logd)/η and obtain
Objclean = E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
ObjTf (w
(Tf);x, y, ρ)
] ≤ o(1) .
Next, suppose σx ≤ min{O(1), d2(1−2c0)k5.5 } and k2.5 < d1−2c0/ log d. Starting from iteration Tf ,
suppose we perform robust training for additional T = Tg = Θ(
k2Ξ42m log d
ηd ) ≤ O( k
2
d1−2c0 ) iterations,
against some `2 perturbation algorithm A with radius τ
def
= 1√
k·dc0 . With probability ≥ 1−e−Ω(log
2 d),
1
T
Tf+T−1∑
t=Tf
E
x,y=y(x),δ=A(ft,x,y,r),ρ
[
Objt(w
(t);x+ δ, y, ρ)
] ≤ Objclean + o(1)
Corollary F.2. In Theorem F.1, if A is Fast Gradient Method (FGM) with `2 radius τ , and
E
x,y=y(x),δ=A(ft,x,y),ρ
[
Objt(w
(t);x+ δ, y, ρ)
] ≤ o(1)
for some t ∈ [Tf , Tf + Tg]. Then,
Pr
x,y=y(x)
[
∃δ ∈ Rd, ‖δ‖2 ≤ τ : sign(E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x+ δ, ρ)) 6= y
]
≤ o(1) .
Corollary F.3. Consider for instance σx = 0, c0 = 0.00001, and sufficiently large d > 1.
• For k ∈ [d0.0001, d0.3999], robust training gives 99.9% accuracy against `2 perturbation ≥ 1k0.5·d0.0001 .
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• For k ≥ d0.3334, clean training gives 0.01% accuracy against `2 perturbation radius ≤ d0.5001k2 .
• For k ∈ [d0.3334, d0.3999], robust training provably beats clean training in `2 robust accuracy.
Theorem F.4 (`∞-adversarial training). In the same setting as Theorem D.1, suppose we first
run Tf iterations of clean training with Ω(
dΞ62
η ) ≤ Tf ≤ dO(logd)/η and obtain
Objclean = E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
ObjTf (w
(Tf);x, y, ρ)
] ≤ o(1) .
Next, suppose σx ≤ O(1) and k2.5 < d1−2c0/ log d. Starting from iteration Tf , suppose we perform
robust training for additional T = Tg = Θ(
k2Ξ42m log d
ηd ) ≤ O( k
2
d1−2c0 ) iterations, against some `∞
perturbation algorithm A of radius τ
def
= 1
k1.75·‖M‖∞·dc0 . Then, with probability ≥ 1− e−Ω(log
2 d),
1
T
Tf+T−1∑
t=Tf
E
x,y=y(x),δ=A(ft,x,y,r),ρ
[
Objt(w
(t);x+ δ, y, ρ)
] ≤ Objclean + o(1)
Corollary F.5. In Theorem F.4, if A is Fast Gradient Method (FGM) with `∞ radius τ , and
E
x,y=y(x),δ=A(ft,x,y),ρ
[
Objt(w
(t);x+ δ, y, ρ)
] ≤ o(1)
for some t ∈ [Tf , Tf + Tg]. Then,
Pr
x,y=y(x)
[
∃δ ∈ Rd, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ τ : sign(E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x+ δ, ρ)) 6= y
]
≤ o(1) .
Corollary F.6.
• For k ∈ [d0.0001, d0.3999], robust training gives 99.9% accuracy against `∞ perturbation ≥
1
k1.75·d0.0001·‖M‖∞ .
• For k ≥ d0.3334, clean training gives 0.01% accuracy against `∞ perturbation ≤ d
0.0001‖M‖1
k2
.
• For k ∈ [d0.3334, d0.3999] and when ‖M‖∞, ‖M‖1 ≤ d0.1248, robust training provably beats clean
training in `∞ robust accuracy.
Remark F.7. With additional efforts, one can also prove that Theorem F.1 and Theorem F.4 holds
with high probability for all T in the range T = Θ(Tg). We do not prove it here since it is not
beyond the scope of this paper.
F.1 Some Notations
We first note some simple structural properties that are corollaries of Theorem C.2.
Proposition F.8. At iteration t = Tf , for every neuron i ∈ [m], we can write
w
(t)
i
def
= gi + ui
def
=
∑
j∈Si
αi,jMr + ui
where Si ⊆ {j ∈ [d] | i ∈ S(0)j,pot} with |Si| = O(1), |αi,j | ≤ O(Ξ22) and maxj∈[d]{|〈ui,Mj〉|} = kΞ
2
2
d .
Proof. We can let αi,j = 〈w(t)i ,Mj〉 and let ui be the remaining part. We have |Si| ≤ O(1) because
S(0)ept = [m]. We have |αi,j | = |〈w(t)i ,Mj〉| ≤ ‖w(t)i ‖ ≤ O(Ξ22). We also have
max
j∈[d]
{|〈ui,Mj〉|} = max
j∈[d] : i 6∈S(0)j,pot+
{|〈w(t)i ,Mj〉|} ≤
k
dβ
b(t) ≤ kΞ
2
2
d
. 
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We next introduce an important notation that shall be used throughout the proofs of this section.
Definition F.9. For every t ≥ Tf , we write w(t)i = gi + v(t)i by defining v(t)i def= w(t)i − gi.
F.2 Robust Coupling
Definition F.10 (robust coupling). At every iteration t, recalling w
(t)
i = gi + v
(t)
i , we define a
linear function in µ
gt(µ;x, x0, ρ) =
m∑
i=1
(
1〈gi+v(t)i ,x0〉+ρi≥b(t)
· (〈gi + µi, x〉+ ρi − b(t))
−1−〈gi+v(t)i ,x0〉+ρi≥b(t) · (−〈gi + µi, x〉+ ρi − b
(t))
)
and it equals the output of the real network at point µ = v(t) both on its zero and first order:
gt(µ;x+ δ, x+ δ, ρ)
∣∣
µ=v(t)
= ft(w;x+ δ, ρ)
∣∣
w=w(t)
∇µgt(µ;x+ δ, x+ δ, ρ)
∣∣
µ=v(t)
= ∇wft(w;x+ δ, ρ)
∣∣
w=w(t)
We shall show in this section that, recalling w(t) = g + v(t), then
gt(v
(t);x+ δ, x, ρ) ≈ ft(w(t);x+ δ, ρ)
gt(0;x+ δ, x, ρ) ≈ ft(w(Tf), x, ρ)
However, as regarding how close they are, it depends on whether we have an `2 bound or `∞ bound
on δ, so we shall prove the two cases separately in Section F.2.1 and F.2.2.
It is perhaps worth nothing that the “closeness” of the above terms depend on two things,
• One is regarding how small ∑i∈[m] ‖v(t)i ‖22 is, and this shall later be automatically guaranteed
via implicit regularization of first-order methods.
• The other is regarding how small ‖v(t)i ‖2 or ‖v(t)i ‖1 is for every individual neuron i ∈ [m]. This
is a bit non-trivial to prove, and we shall spend the entire Section F.3 to deal with this.
F.2.1 Robust Coupling for `2 Perturbation
Lemma F.11. Suppose at iteration t,
∑
i∈[m] ‖v(t)i ‖22 ≤ r2m for some r ≤ 1, and suppose maxi∈[m] ‖v(t)i ‖2 ≤
r′. Then for any vector δ ∈ Rd that can depend on x (but not on ρ) with ‖δ‖2 ≤ τ for some
τ ≤ o( b
Ξ22+r
′ ), we have
E
x,ρ
[∣∣gt(v(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(t);x+ δ, ρ)∣∣] ≤ O(τ2) · (Ξ52
σρ
+
(Ξ22 + r
′)2r2m
db2σρ
)
As a corollary, in the event of r ≤ O
(
kΞ22√
d
)
and r′ ≤ 1 and using m = d1+c0, we have
E
x,ρ
[∣∣gt(v(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(t);x+ δ, ρ)∣∣] ≤ O(τ2) · (Ξ52
σρ
+
k3.5
d1−2c0
)
Proof of Lemma F.11. Let us abbreviate the notations by setting vi = v
(t)
i and b = b
(t).
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To upper bound |gt(v(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(t);x+ δ, ρ)| it suffices to upper bound |V1 − V2| for
V1 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi + vi, x+ δ〉+ ρi − b)1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b
V2 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi + vi, x+ δ〉+ ρi − b)1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
(and one also needs to take into account the reverse part, whose proof is analogous).
We first make some calculations. Using the definition of gi, we have Prx[〈gi, x〉 ≥ |b|/10] ≤ O
(
k
d
)
for every i ∈ [m]. Thus, we can easily calculate that18
E
x
∑
i∈[m]
〈vi, δ〉21〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10
 ≤ τ2 ∑
i∈[m]
‖vi‖2 E
x
[
1〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10
]
= O
(
τ2 · r2m · k
d
)
(F.1)
E
x
∑
i∈[m]
(〈vi, δ〉2 + 〈gi, δ〉2)1〈vi,x〉≥|b|/10
 ≤ τ2 ·O(Ξ42 + (r′)2) ∑
i∈[m]
E
x
[
1〈vi,x〉≥|b|/10
]
≤ τ2 ·O((Ξ22 + r′)2) ·
∑
i∈[m]
O
(
E
x
〈vi, x〉2
b2
)
= O
(
τ2(Ξ22 + r
′)2 · r
2m
db2
)
(F.2)
∑
i∈[m]
〈gi, δ〉21〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10 ≤
∑
i∈[m]
〈gi, δ〉2 ≤ τ2
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈[m]
gig
>
i
∥∥∥∥∥∥
spectral−norm
≤ O(τ2Ξ52)
(F.3)
Now, for every i ∈ [m],
• Case 1, |〈vi, x〉| ≤ b10 and |〈gi, x〉| ≤ b10 both happen. In this case, it must satisfy |〈gi+vi, δ〉| ≤
(‖gi‖+‖vi‖) ·τ ≤ O(Ξ22 +r′) ·τ ≤ b10 . . Also, with probability at least 1−e−Ω(log
2 d), it satisfies
|ρi| ≤ b10 . To sum up, with high probability we have
1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b = 1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b = 0
• Case 2, either |〈vi, x〉| > b10 or |〈gi, x〉| > b10 . In this case, to satisfy 1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b 6=
1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b, one must have |〈gi + vi, x + δ〉 − b + ρi| ≤ |〈vi, δ〉| + |〈gi, δ〉|. Also, using the
randomness of ρi, we have
Pr
ρi
[
1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b 6= 1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
] ≤ O( |〈vi, δ〉|+ |〈gi, δ〉|
σρ
)
Together, we have
E
x,ρ,δ
[|V1 − V2|] ≤ E
x,δ,ρ
∑
i∈[m]
(|〈vi, δ〉|+ |〈gi, δ〉|) ∣∣1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b − 1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b∣∣

18Here, the spectral norm bound of
∑
i∈[m] gig
>
i holds for the following reason. Each gi is a sparse vector supported
only on |Si| = O(1) coordinates, and thus gig>i  Di holds for a diagonal matrix Di that where [Di]j,j = ‖gi‖2 ≤
O(Ξ42) for j ∈ Si and [Di]j,j = 0 otherwise. Now, using the fact that |S(0)j,pot| ≤ Ξ2, we immediately have that
D1 + · · ·+ Dm  O(Ξ52) · Id×d.
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≤ O(1) · E
x,δ,ρ
∑
i∈[m]
〈vi, δ〉2 + 〈gi, δ〉2
σρ
(
1〈vi,x〉≥|b|/10 + 1〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10
)+ 1
poly(d)
(F.4)
≤ O(τ2) ·
(
Ξ52
σρ
+
kr2m
dσρ
+
(Ξ22 + r
′)2r2m
db2σρ
)
≤ O(τ2) ·
(
Ξ52
σρ
+
(Ξ22 + r
′)2r2m
db2σρ
)
. 
Lemma F.12. Suppose at iteration t, maxi∈[m],j∈[d]{|〈ui,Mj〉|} ≤ r√d and
∑
i∈[m] ‖v(t)i ‖22 ≤ r2m
with r ≤ 1. Then for any vector δ ∈ Rd that can depend on x (but not on ρ) with ‖δ‖2 ≤ τ , we
have
E
x,ρ
[|gt(0;x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(Tf), x, ρ)|] ≤ O
(
mr2
dσρ
+ kΞ2
r log d√
d
+ τΞ32
√
kΞ2 +
r2m
db2
)
As a corollary, in the event of r ≤ O
(
kΞ22√
d
)
and using m = d1+c0, we have
E
x,ρ
[|gt(0;x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(Tf), x, ρ)|] ≤ O
(
k2.5
d1−2c0
+ τ ·
√
kΞ72
)
Proof of Lemma F.12. To upper bound |gt(0;x + δ, x, ρ) − ft(v(Tf), x)| it suffices to upper bound
|V3 − V4| for
V3 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi, x+ δ〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
V4 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi + ui, x〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi+ui,x〉+ρi≥b
(and one also needs to take into account the reverse part, whose proof is analogous).
Let us first define
V5 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi, x〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
Let us define s =
∑
i∈[m] 1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b. By the properties that (1) gi is only supported on Si
with |Si| ≤ O(1), (2) for each j ∈ [d] at most Ξ2 of the gi are supported on i, and (3) ‖gi‖2 ≤ O(Ξ22),
we can obtain
E
x,ρ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈[m]
gi1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ O(Ξ32) Ex,ρ[
√
s] ≤ O(Ξ32)
√
E
x,ρ
[s]
At the same time, we know
E
x,ρ
[s] ≤ E
x,ρ
∑
i∈[m]
1〈gi,x〉≥ b4 + 1〈vi,x〉≥ b4
+ 1
poly(d)
≤ O(kΞ2) +O
∑
i∈[m]
E[〈vi, x〉2]
b2

≤ O
(
kΞ2 + r
2m · 1
db2
)
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Putting them together, we have
E
x,ρ
|V3 − V5| ≤ τ · E
x,ρ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈[m]
gi1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ O
(
τΞ32
√
kΞ2 +
r2m
db2
)
(F.5)
Next, let us define
V6 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi, x〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi,x〉+ρi≥b
Using a similar analysis to (F.4), we have
E
x,ρ
|V5 − V6| ≤ E
x,ρ
∑
i∈[m]
|〈gi, x〉 − b+ ρi| ·
∣∣1〈gi,x〉+ρi≥b − 1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b∣∣
≤ E
x,ρ
∑
i∈[m]
|〈vi, x〉|E[|1〈gi,x〉+ρi≥b − 1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b|]
≤ O
(
E
x,ρ
〈vi, x〉2
σρ
)
≤ O
(
r2m
dσρ
)
(F.6)
Finally, we also have
E
x,ρ
|V6 − V4| = E
x,ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi + ui, x〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi+ui,x〉+ρi≥b − (〈gi, x〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi,x〉+ρi≥b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ E
x,ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
〈ui, x〉1〈gi+ui,x〉+ρi≥b
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ Ex,ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi, x〉 − b+ ρi)
(
1〈gi+ui,x〉+ρi≥b − 1〈gi,x〉+ρi≥b
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
¬≤ E
x,ρ
∑
i∈[m]
|〈ui, x〉|1〈gi+ui,x〉+ρi≥b +O
(
mr2
dσρ
)
­≤ E
x,ρ
∑
i∈[m]
|〈ui, x〉|
(
1〈gi,x〉≥b/4 + 1〈ui,x〉≥b/4
)
+O
(
mr2
dσρ
)
+
1
poly(d)
Above, inequality ¬ is due to a similar analysis as (F.6), and inequality ­ is because |ρi| ≤ b/4
with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d). Next, let us recall 〈ui,Mj〉 ≤ r√d and thus, by Bernstein’s
inequality, with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d),
|〈ui, x〉| ≤ O
(
r log2 d√
d
)
 b
4
.
Putting this back we have
E
x,ρ
|V6 − V4| ≤ O
(
mr2
dσρ
+ kΞ2
r log d√
d
)
Combining the bounds on |V6 − V4|, |V3 − V5|, and |V5 − V6| finishes the proof. 
F.2.2 Robust Coupling for `∞ Perturbation
Lemma F.13. Suppose at iteration t,
∑
i∈[m] ‖v(t)i ‖22 ≤ r2m for some r ≤ 1, and suppose maxi∈[m] ‖v(t)i ‖1 ≤
r′. Then for any vector δ ∈ Rd that can depend on x (but not on ρ) with ‖δ‖∞ ≤ τ for some
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τ ≤ o( b
Ξ22+r
′ ), we have
E
x,ρ
[∣∣gt(v(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(t);x+ δ, ρ)∣∣] ≤ O(τ2) · (kΞ52
σρ
+
(Ξ22 + r
′)2r2m
db2σρ
+
(r′)2kΞ2
σρ
)
As a corollary, in the event of r ≤ O
(
kΞ22√
d
)
and r′ ≤ O(kΞ22 · ‖M‖∞) and using m = d1+c0, we
have
E
x,ρ
[∣∣gt(v(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(t);x+ δ, ρ)∣∣] ≤ O(τ2) · k3.5dc0 · ‖M‖2∞
Proof of Lemma F.13. The proof is analogous to Lemma F.11 so we only highly the differences. In
fact, we only need to change (F.1), (F.2) and (F.3) with the following calculations.
Using the definition of gi, we have Prx[〈gi, x〉 ≥ |b|/10] ≤ O
(
k
d
)
for every i ∈ [m] as well as∑
i∈[m] Ex[1〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10] ≤ O (kΞ2). Thus, we can easily calculate that19
E
x
∑
i∈[m]
〈vi, δ〉21〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10
 ≤ τ2 ∑
i∈[m]
(r′)2 E
x
[
1〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10
]
= O
(
τ2 · (r′)2 · kΞ2
)
E
x
∑
i∈[m]
(〈vi, δ〉2 + 〈gi, δ〉2)1〈vi,x〉≥|b|/10
 ≤ τ2 ·O(Ξ42 + (r′)2) ∑
i∈[m]
E
x
[
1〈vi,x〉≥|b|/10
]
≤ τ2 ·O((Ξ22 + r′)2) ·
∑
i∈[m]
O
(
E
x
〈vi, x〉2
b2
)
= O
(
τ2(Ξ22 + r
′)2 · r
2m
db2
)
E
x
∑
i∈[m]
〈gi, δ〉21〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10
 ≤ O(τ2Ξ42) ∑
i∈[m]
E
x
[
1〈gi,x〉≥|b|/10
] ≤ O(τ2kΞ52)
Putting those into the rest of the proof (to replace (F.1), (F.2) and (F.3)) finishes the proof. 
Lemma F.14. Suppose at iteration t, maxi∈[m],j∈[d]{|〈ui,Mj〉|} ≤ r√d and
∑
i∈[m] ‖v(t)i ‖22 ≤ r2m
with r ≤ 1. Then for any vector δ ∈ Rd that can depend on x (but not on ρ) with ‖δ‖∞ ≤ τ , we
have
E
x,ρ
[|gt(0;x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(Tf);x, ρ)|] ≤ O
(
mr2
dσρ
+ kΞ2
r log d√
d
+ τΞ32
(
kΞ2 +
r2m
db2
))
As a corollary, in the event of r ≤ O
(
kΞ22√
d
)
and using m = d1+c0, we have
E
x,ρ
[|gt(0;x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(Tf);x, ρ)|] ≤ O
(
k2.5
d1−2c0
+ τ · kΞ42
)
Proof of Lemma F.14. The proof is analogous to Lemma F.12 so we only highly the differences.
19Here, the spectral norm bound of
∑
i∈[m] gig
>
i holds for the following reason. Each gi is a sparse vector supported
only on |Si| = O(1) coordinates, and thus gig>i  Di holds for a diagonal matrix Di that where [Di]j,j = ‖gi‖2 ≤
O(Ξ42) for j ∈ Si and [Di]j,j = 0 otherwise. Now, using the fact that |S(0)j,pot| ≤ Ξ2, we immediately have that
D1 + · · ·+ Dm  O(Ξ52) · Id×d.
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Recall we have defined
V3 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi, x+ δ〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
V4 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi + ui, x〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi+ui,x〉+ρi≥b
V5 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi, x〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
V6 :=
∑
i∈[m]
(〈gi, x〉 − b+ ρi)1〈gi,x〉+ρi≥b
The bounds on E |V5−V6| and E |V6−V4| state exactly the same comparing to Lemma F.12 (because
they do not have δ involved). Let us now recalculate the difference |V3 − V5|.
Let us define s =
∑
i∈[m] 1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b. By the properties that (1) gi is only supported on Si
with |Si| ≤ O(1), (2) for each j ∈ [d] at most Ξ2 of the gi are supported on i, and (3) ‖gi‖2 ≤ O(Ξ22),
we can obtain
E
x,ρ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈[m]
gi1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ O(Ξ32) Ex,ρ[s]
At the same time, we know
E
x,ρ
[s] ≤ E
x,ρ
∑
i∈[m]
1〈gi,x〉≥ b4 + 1〈vi,x〉≥ b4
+ 1
poly(d)
≤ O(kΞ2) +O
∑
i∈[m]
E[〈vi, x〉2]
b2

≤ O
(
kΞ2 + r
2m · 1
db2
)
Putting them together, we have
E
x,ρ,δ
|V3 − V5| ≤ τ · E
x,ρ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈[m]
gi1〈gi+vi,x〉+ρi≥b
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ O
(
τΞ32
(
kΞ2 +
r2m
db2
))
Using this new bound on E[V3 − V5] to replace the old one (F.5), the rest of the proof follows. 
F.3 Individual Neuron Growth Lemma
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this section is to upper bound maxi∈[m] ‖v(Tf+T )i ‖2 (if it is `2
perturbation) or maxi∈[m] ‖v(Tf+T )i ‖1 (if it is `∞ perturbation) during the course of robust training.
We have two subsections to deal with the two cases.
F.3.1 Growth Lemma for `2 Perturbation
We first bound ‖v(t)i ‖2 during `2 robust training.
Lemma F.15 (movement bound). Suppose at iteration t, maxi∈[m] ‖vi‖2 ≤ r′. Let ` ∈ [−1, 1] be
any random variable that can depend on x, ρ, and δ ∈ Rd be any random vector that can depend on
x with ‖δ‖2 ≤ τ . Then, for every i ∈ [m],∥∥∥∥ Ex,y=y(x),ρ [`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b(x+ δ)]
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ O
((
k
d
+
(r′)2 log d
db2
)
τ +
√
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
(√
k√
d
+ σx log d
)
+
r′
db
)
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As a corollary, suppose we run robust training from iteration Tf to Tf + T with Tη ≤ o(db),
τ ≤ 1√
k log d
and σx ≤ o( d2b2(Tη)2√k log d), then
max
i∈[m]
‖v(Tf+T )i ‖2 ≤ O
(
kΞ22√
d
+ Tη ·
√
k
d
)
≤ o(1)
Proof of Lemma F.15. First of all we can reuse the analysis of (F.4) and derive that
Pr[〈gi + vi, x+ δ〉+ ρi ≥ b] ≤ 1
poly(d)
+ Pr[〈gi, x〉 ≥ |b|/10] + Pr[〈vi, x〉 ≥ |b|/10]
≤ O
(
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
)
=: κ
This immediately gives
‖E [`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥bδ] ‖2 ≤ τ · E [1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b] ≤ κτ .
Next, in order to bound the norm of φ
def
= E
[
`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥bx
]
, we first inner product it with Mj
for each j ∈ [d]. This gives
|〈φ,Mj〉| =
∣∣E [`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b〈x,Mj〉]∣∣
≤ E[(1〈gi,x〉≥b/10 + 1〈vi,x〉≥b/10) · |〈x,Mj〉|] +
1
poly(d)
≤ E[(1〈gi,x〉≥b/10 + 1〈vi,x−Mjzj〉≥b/20 + 1〈vi,Mj〉zj≥b/20) · |〈x,Mj〉|] +
1
poly(d)
(F.7)
We bound the three terms separately.
• For the first term,
E[1〈gi,x〉≥b/10 · |〈x,Mj〉|] ≤ E[1〈gi,x〉≥b/10 · (|zj |+O(
log d√
d
))] ≤ E[1〈gi,x〉≥b/10 · |zj |] +O(
k log d
d1.5
))
Using the property of gi we have 1〈gi,x〉≥b/10 ≤
∑
j′∈Si 1zj′ 6=0 for |Si| ≤ O(1) and therefore
E[1〈gi,x〉≥b/10 · |zj |] ≤ E
∑
j′∈Si
1zj′ 6=0 · |zj |
 = { √k/d, if j ∈ Si;
k1.5/d2, if j 6∈ Si.
Therefore, we have ∑
j∈[d]
(
E[1〈gi,x〉≥b/10 · |〈x,Mj〉|]
)2 ≤ O( k
d2
)
(F.8)
• For the second term,
E
[
1〈vi,x−Mjzj〉≥b/20 · |〈x,Mj〉|
]
= E
[
1〈vi,x−Mjzj〉≥b/20 · |zj + 〈Mj , ξ〉|
]
≤ E
[
1〈vi,x−Mjzj〉≥b/20
]
·O
(
E[|zj |] + log d√
d
σx
)
≤ O
(
E
[〈vi, x−Mjzj〉2]
b2
)
·O
(√
k
d
+
log d√
d
σx
)
≤ O
(
(r′)2
db2
)
·O
(√
k
d
+
log d√
d
σx
)
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and therefore∑
j∈[d]
(
E
[
1〈vi,x−Mjzj〉≥b/20 · |〈x,Mj〉|
])2 ≤ O((r′)4
d2b4
)
·
(
k
d
+ σ2x log
2 d
)
(F.9)
• For the third term,
E[1〈vi,Mj〉zj≥b/20 · |〈x,Mj〉|] ≤ E
[
1〈vi,Mj〉zj≥b/20 ·
(
|zi|+O( log d√
d
)
)]
≤ E
[( |〈vi,Mj〉zj |
b
· |zi|+ |〈vi,Mj〉zj |
b
·O( log d√
d
)
)]
≤ |〈vi,Mj〉| ·O
(
1
db
+
√
k log d
bd1.5
)
≤ |〈vi,Mj〉| ·O
(
1
db
)
and therefore ∑
j∈[d]
(
E[1〈vi,Mj〉zj≥b/20 · |〈x,Mj〉|]
)2 ≤ O((r′)2
d2b2
)
(F.10)
Putting (F.7), (F.8), (F.9), (F.10) these together, we have
‖φ‖2 ≤
∑
j∈[d]
|〈φ,Mj〉|2 ≤ O
(
k
d2
+
(r′)4
d2b4
(
k
d
+ σ2x log
2 d
)
+
(r′)2
d2b2
)
Summing everything up, we have∥∥∥∥ Ex,y=y(x),ρ [`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b(x+ δ)]
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ O
((
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
)
τ +
√
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
(√
k√
d
+ σx log d
)
+
r′
db
)
Now, suppose we run robust training for t = Tf , Tf + 1, . . . , Tf + T − 1 and suppose for all of them
we have ‖v(T )i ‖2 ≤ r′ satisfied. Then, using the gradient update formula (see e.g. (C.19))
‖v(Tf+T )i ‖2 ≤ ‖v(Tf)i ‖2 + Tη ·O
((
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
)
τ +
√
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
(√
k√
d
+ σx log d
)
+
r′
db
)
This means, in order to show ‖v(Tf+T )i ‖2 ≤ r′ we can choose any r′ > 0 satisfying
O(
kΞ22√
d
) + Tη ·O
((
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
)
τ +
√
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
(√
k√
d
+ σx log d
)
+
r′
db
)
≤ r′ .
Using the assumption of Tη ≤ o(db) (which also implies (Tη)2 ≤ o(d2.5b2k )), τ ≤ 1√k log d (which also
implies τ ≤ o( d2b2
(Tη)2
√
k log d
)), and σx ≤ o( d2b2(Tη)2√k log d), we can choose
r′ ≤ O(kΞ
2
2√
d
) + Tη ·O
(√
k
d
)
.

F.3.2 Growth Lemma for `∞ Perturbation
We now bound ‖v(t)i ‖1 during `∞ robust training. Recall ‖M‖∞ def= maxj∈[d] ‖Mj‖1.
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Lemma F.16 (movement bound). Suppose at iteration t, maxi∈[m] ‖vi‖1 ≤ r′. Let ` ∈ [−1, 1] be
any random variable that can depend on x, ρ, and δ ∈ Rd be any random vector that can depend on
x with ‖δ‖∞ ≤ τ . Then, for every i ∈ [m],
‖E [`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b(x+ δ)] ‖1 ≤ O(kd + (r′)2db2
)
· (τd+ ‖M‖∞ log d)
As a corollary, suppose we run robust training from iteration Tf to Tf + T with Tη ≤ db2‖M‖2∞kΞ32
and τ ≤ o( b2
Tη·kΞ22‖M‖∞
)
, then
max
i∈[m]
‖v(Tf+T )i ‖1 ≤ O(kΞ22 · ‖M‖∞)
Proof of Lemma F.16. Similar to the proof of Lemma F.15, and using ‖vi‖2 ≤ ‖vi‖1 ≤ r′, we have
Pr[〈gi + vi, x+ δ〉+ ρi ≥ b] ≤ 1
poly(d)
+ Pr[〈gi, x〉 ≥ |b|/10] + Pr[〈vi, x〉 ≥ |b|/10]
≤ O
(
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
)
=: κ
This implies
‖E [`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥bδ] ‖1 ≤ κ · τd
On the other hand, let us look at h := E
[
`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥bx
]
and set u = sign(h) ∈ {−1, 1}d. We
have
‖h‖1 = E
[
`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b〈x, u〉
]
Since with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log d) it satisfies |〈x, u〉| = O(maxj∈[d] ‖Mj‖1 log d), we can
conclude that ‖h‖1 = O(κ‖M‖∞ log d). Together we have∥∥E [`1〈gi+vi,x+δ〉+ρi≥b(x+ δ)]∥∥1 ≤ O(kd + (r′)2db2
)
· (τd+ ‖M‖∞ log d)
Now, suppose we run robust training for t = Tf , Tf + 1, . . . , Tf + T − 1 and suppose for all of them
we have ‖v(T )i ‖1 ≤ r′ satisfied. Then, using the gradient update formula (see e.g. (C.19))
‖v(Tf+T )i ‖1 ≤ ‖v(Tf)i ‖1 + Tη ·O
(
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
)
· (τd+ ‖M‖∞ log d)
Recalling |〈v(Tf)i ,Mj〉| ≤ kΞ
2
2
d from (F.8), we have∥∥∥v(Tf)i ∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈[d]
〈v(Tf)i ,Mj〉 ·Mj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ kΞ22 · ‖M‖∞
This means, to prove that
∥∥∥v(Tf)i ∥∥∥
1
≤ r′, we can choose any r′ satisfying
kΞ22 · ‖M‖∞ + Tη ·O
(
k
d
+
(r′)2
db2
)
· (τd+ ‖M‖∞ log d) ≤ r′
and using the assumption of Tη ≤ db2‖M‖2∞kΞ32 (which implies Tη ≤ O(d)), and τ ≤ o
(
b2
Tη·kΞ22‖M‖∞
)
(which implies τ ≤ 1ηT ), we can choose
r′ ≤ 2kΞ22 · ‖M‖∞ + Tη ·O (τk) ≤ O(kΞ22 · ‖M‖∞) . 
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F.4 Robust Convergence
We are now ready to prove the main convergence theorem (that is, Theorem F.1 and F.4) for robust
learning. Let us first calculate a simple bound:
Claim F.17.
∣∣∣∑i∈[m] Reg(gi)−Reg(w(Tf)i )∣∣∣ ≤ O(k√dΞ42)
Proof. Recalling ‖gi‖2 ≤ O(Ξ22) and ‖ui‖ ≤ O(kΞ
2
2√
d
) from Proposition F.8, we have
∣∣‖gi‖3 − ‖gi + ui‖3∣∣ ≤ O (‖ui‖ · (‖ui‖2 + ‖gi‖2)) ≤ O(kΞ42√
d
) . 
F.4.1 Robust Convergence for `2 Perturbation
Proof of Theorem F.1. Since w
(t+1)
i = w
(t)
i − η∇wi ˜RobObjt(w(t)), we have the identity
η〈∇ ˜RobObjt(w(t)), w(t) − g〉 =
η2
2
‖∇ ˜RobObjt(w(t))‖2F +
1
2
‖w(t) − g‖2F −
1
2
‖w(t+1) − g‖2F
Applying (a variant of) Lemma A.2 (which requires us to use the Lipscthiz continuity assumption
on A, see Definition 4.1), we know that by letting
RobObjt(w) = E
x,y=y(x),δ,ρ
[
Objt(w;x+ δ, y, ρ)
]
,
it satisfies
η〈∇RobObjt(w(t)), w(t) − g〉 ≤ η2 · poly(d) +
1
2
‖w(t) − g‖2F −
1
2
‖w(t+1) − g‖2F +
η
poly(d)
(F.11)
Let us also define the clean objective and the pseudo objective as follows:
Objt(w) = E
x,y=y(x),ρ
[
Objt(w;x, y, ρ)
]
RobObj′t(µ) = E
x,y=y(x),δ,ρ
[
log(1 + e−y·gt(µ;x+δ,x,ρ))
]
+ λ
∑
i∈[m]
Reg(gi + µi) ,
which is a convex function in µ because gt(µ;x+ δ, x, ρ) is linear in µ.
Now, we inductively prove that at every iteration t ∈ [Tf , Tf + T ], it satisfies∑
i∈[m]
‖v(t)i ‖22 ≤ r2m for r = Θ
(
kΞ22√
d
)
(F.12)
max
i∈[m]
‖v(t)i ‖2 ≤ r′ for r′ = 1 (F.13)
In the base case t = Tf this is obvious due to Proposition F.8. Next, suppose (F.12) and (F.13)
hold at iteration t. Using the notation w
(t)
i = gi + v
(t) and the Lipscthiz continuity of log(1 + et),
we have20
E[|RobObj′t(v(t))−RobObjt(w(t))|] ≤ E
[∣∣gt(v(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(t), x+ δ)∣∣]
≤ O(τ2) ·
(
Ξ52
σρ
+
k3.5
d1−2c0
)
(using Lemma F.11)
20Note to apply Lemma F.11 we also need to check τ ≤ o( b
Ξ22+r
′ ) but this is automatically satisfied under our
parameter choice τ ≤ 1√
k·dc0 .
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≤ O
(
1
log d
)
(using τ ≤ 1√
k·dc0 )
E[|RobObj′t(0)−Objt(w(Tf))|] ≤ E[|gt(0;x+ δ, x)− ft(w(Tf), x)|] + λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
Reg(w
(Tf)
i )−Reg(gi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ O
(
k2.5
d1−2c0
+ τ
√
kΞ72
)
+O
(
kΞ42 log d√
d
)
(using Lemma F.12 and Claim F.17)
≤ O
(
1
log d
+ τ
√
kΞ72
)
(using k2.5 < d1−2c0/ log d)
≤ O
(
1
log d
)
(using τ ≤ 1√
k·dc0 )
Therefore, we can bound the left hand side of (F.11) as follows:
〈∇RobObjt(w(t)), w(t) − g〉 = 〈∇RobObj′t(v(t)), v(t)〉
≥ RobObj′t(v(t))−RobObj′t(0) ≥ RobObjt(w(t))−Objt(w(Tf))−O
(
1
log d
)
.
Putting this back to (F.11) and telescoping for t = Tf , Tf + 1, . . . , Tf + T0 − 1 for any T0 ≤ T , we
have
1
T0
Tf+T0−1∑
t=Tf
(
RobObjt(w
(t))−Objt(w(Tf))−O
(
1
log d
))
≤ 1
2ηT0
‖w(Tf) − g‖2F −
1
2ηT0
‖w(Tf+T0) − g‖2F ≤
1
ηT0
·O
(
k2Ξ42
d
m
)
− 1
2ηT0
‖w(Tf+T0) − g‖2F
(F.14)
Inequality (F.14) now implies that∑
i∈[m]
‖v(Tf+T0)i ‖2 = ‖w(Tf+T0) − g‖2F ≤ O
(
k2Ξ42
d
m
)
so (F.12) holds at iteration t = Tf + T0. We can then also apply Lemma F.15 which ensures (F.13)
holds at iteration t = Tf + T0.
Finally, let us go back to (F.14) and choose T0 = T = Θ(
k2Ξ42m log d
ηd ). It implies
1
T
Tf+T−1∑
t=Tf
(
RobObjt(w
(t))−Objt(w(Tf))−O
(
1
log d
))
≤ O( 1
log d
)
Note that our final choice of T also ensures that the pre-requisite Tη ≤ o(db) and τ, σx ≤
o( d
2b2
(Tη)2
√
k log d
) of Lemma F.15 hold. 
F.4.2 Robust Convergence for `∞ Perturbation
Proof of Theorem F.4. The proof is nearly identical to that of Theorem F.1. In particular, we want
to inductively prove that at every iteration t ∈ [Tf , Tf + T ], it satisfies∑
i∈[m]
‖v(t)i ‖22 ≤ r2m for r = Θ
(
kΞ22√
d
)
(F.15)
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max
i∈[m]
‖v(t)i ‖1 ≤ r′ for r′ = Θ(kΞ22 · ‖M‖∞) (F.16)
We also need to redo the following calculations:21
E[|RobObj′t(v(t))−RobObjt(w(t))|] ≤ E
[∣∣gt(v(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− ft(w(t), x+ δ)∣∣]
≤ O(τ2) · k3.5dc0 · ‖M‖2∞ (using Lemma F.13)
≤ O
(
1
log d
)
(using τ ≤ 1
k1.75·‖M‖∞·dc0 )
E[|RobObj′t(0)−Objt(w(Tf))|] ≤ E[|gt(0;x+ δ, x)− ft(w(Tf), x)|] + λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
Reg(w
(Tf)
i )−Reg(gi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ O
(
k2.5
d1−2c0
+ τ · kΞ42
)
+O
(
kΞ42 log d√
d
)
(using Lemma F.14 and Claim F.17)
≤ O
(
1
log d
+ τ
√
kΞ72
)
(using k2.5 < d1−2c0/ log d)
≤ O
(
1
log d
)
(using τ ≤ 1
k1.75·‖M‖∞·dc0 )

F.5 Fast Gradient Method (FGM) Robust Training
Let us prove Corollary F.2 only for the `2 case, and the other `∞ case Corollary F.5 is completely
analogous.
Proof of Corollary F.2. At any iteration t ∈ [Tf , Tf + Tg], consider any perturbation vector δ ∈ Rd
which may depend on x but not on ρ, with ‖δ‖2 ≤ τ .
Recall from Lemma F.11 that
E
x
[∣∣E
ρ
gt(v
(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x+ δ, ρ)
∣∣] ≤ O(τ2) · (Ξ52
σρ
+
k3.5
d1−2c0
)
≤ O
(
1
log2 d
)
This means for at least 1−O( 1log d) probability mass of inputs x, we have∣∣E
ρ
gt(v
(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x+ δ, ρ)
∣∣ ≤ O( 1
log d
)
For those choices of x, using the fact that gt is linear in δ, we also have
E
ρ
gt(v
(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x, ρ)
= E
ρ
gt(v
(t);x+ δ, x, ρ)− E
ρ
gt(v
(t);x, x, ρ) = 〈∇x E
ρ
gt(v
(t);x, x, ρ), δ〉
= 〈∇x E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x, ρ), δ〉
21Note to apply Lemma F.13 we also need to check τ ≤ o( b
Ξ22+r
′ ) but this is automatically satisfied under our
parameter choice for τ .
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Putting them together we have[
−y(x)E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x+ δ, ρ)
]
=
[
−y(x)E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x, ρ)− 〈y(x)∇x E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x, ρ), δ〉
]
±O
(
1
log d
)
(F.17)
≤
[
−y(x)E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x, ρ)− 〈y(x)∇x E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x, ρ), δ?〉
]
+O
(
1
log d
)
(F.18)
where δ? = A(ft, x, y) is the perturbation obtained by the fast gradient method with `2 radius τ .
This means two things.
On the other hand, by applying Markov’s inequality and Jensen’s inequality to Ex,y=y(x),ρ
[
Objt(w
(t);x+
δ?, y, ρ)
] ≤ o(1), we know for at least 1− o(1) probability mass of the choices of x, it satisfies
log(1 + e−y(x)Eρ ft(w
(t);x+δ?,ρ)) ≤ o(1)
=⇒ −y(x)E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x+ δ?, ρ) ≤ −10
Therefore, for all of those x (with total mass ≥ 1 − o(1)) satisfying both, we can first apply
(F.17) (with δ = δ?) to derive
−y(x)E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x, ρ)− 〈y(x)∇x E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x, ρ), δ?〉 ≤ −9
Applying (F.18) then we obtain (for any δ)
−y(x)E
ρ
ft(w
(t);x+ δ, ρ) ≤ −8
This means, the output of the network ft is robust at point x against any perturbation δ with
radius τ . We finish the proof of Corollary F.2. 
G NTK Lower Bound For `∞ Perturbation
Recall from Definition 5.5 that the feature mapping of the neural tangent kernel for our two-layer
network f is
Φ(x) =
(
xE
ρi
(
1〈wi,x〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x〉+ρi≥bi
))m
i=1
Therefore, given weights {vi}i∈[m], the NTK function p(x) is given as
p(x) =
∑
i∈[m]
〈x, vi〉 E
ρi∼N (0,σ2ρi )
(
1〈wi,x〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x〉+ρi≥bi
)
To make our lower bound stronger, in this section, we consider the simplest input distribution
with M = I and σx = 0 (so ξ ≡ 0). Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem G.1. Suppose w1, . . . , wm ∈ Rd are i.i.d. sampled from N (0, I) with m ≤ dC for some
constant C > 1; and suppose ρi ∼ N (0, σ2ρi) with |σρi | ≤ do(1) and |bi| ≤ do(1). Then, there exists
constant c6 > 0 so that, with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d), choosing τ = 1dc6 , then for any
k ∈ [d c6100 , d0.5− c6100 ] and sufficiently large d.
Pr
x,y=y(x)
[
∃δ ∈ Rd, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ τ : sign(p(x+ δ)) 6= y
]
≥ 1− o(1)
2
.
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G.1 Proof of Theorem G.1
We first note the following:
Claim G.2. Suppose at point z ∈ Rd, some function p(z) gives the correct label y(z) = sign(〈w?, z〉)
against any `∞ perturbation of radius τ . Then, letting ζ ∼ N (0, τ2log8 dId×d) be a random vector,
and δ ∈ Rd be any vector with ‖δ‖∞ ≤ τ/2, it satisfies
E
ζ
[p(z + δ + ζ)] · sign(〈w?, z〉) ≥ −e−Ω(log2 d) max
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}i∈[m]
Proof of Claim G.2. With probability at least 1 − e−Ω(log2 d) it satisfies ‖ζ + δ‖∞ ≤ τ . When this
happens, we must have p(z + δ + ζ) · sign(〈w?, z〉) ≥ 0. 
Therefore, for the analysis purpose (by sacrificing `∞ norm radius from τ to τ/2), we can
imagine as if the input is randomly perturbed by ζ. This serves for the purpose of smoothing the
NTK function p(·), which originally has indicator functions in it so may be trickier to analyze.
Next, we define MW (x)
def
= maxi∈[m] |〈wi, x〉|. One can carefully apply the Taylor expansion
of the smoothed indicator function (using the randomness of ζ), to derive the following claim.
(Detailed proof in Section G.4.)
Claim G.3. Consider any NTK function p(x) with parameters ‖wi‖2 ≥
√
d
2 , ‖wi‖∞ ≤ log2 d,
ρi ∼ N (0, σ2ρi) with |σρi | ≤ do(1) and |bi| ≤ do(1). Suppose τ ∈ [ 1d1/5 , 1], then there exists coefficients{ci,r, c′i,r, c′′i }i∈[m],r≥0 with
• each |ci,r|, |c′i,r| ≤ O (1),
• each |c′i,r| ≤ |ci,r| ·O(d−0.1r),
• each |ci,r| ≥ Ω
(
1
d2
)
for every odd constant r ≥ 1
• each |c′′i | ≤ O(d−1/4).
so that, for every z with ‖z‖1 ≤ d1/4 and every δ with ‖δ‖∞ ≤ τ/2 and MW (δ) ≤ τd1/4, we have:
E
ζ∼N (0, τ2
log8 d
Id×d)
[p(z + δ + ζ)]
=
∑
r≥0
‖vi‖2
c′′i + ∑
i∈[m]
(
ci,r〈 vi‖vi‖2 , z + δ〉+ c
′
i,r〈
wi
‖wi‖2 , z + δ〉
)(〈wi, z + δ〉
τ‖wi‖2
)r
Using the above formula, we can write
E
ζ
[p(x+ ζ)] = CONST +
∑
r≥0
Tr+1(x
⊗r+1)
for Tr+1(x
⊗r+1) def=
∑
i∈[m]
‖vi‖2
〈
ci,r
vi
‖vi‖2 + c
′
i,r
wi
‖wi‖2 , x
〉( 〈wi, x〉
τ‖wi‖2
)r
Using |ci,r| ≥ Ω
(
1
d2
)
for odd constant r ≥ 1, and |c′i,r| ≤ O(d−0.1) · |ci,r|, by applying Lemma G.4,22
we know that when r = 3C + 3 (say wlog. 3C + 3 is odd),
‖T3C+4‖F = Ω
(
1
d3
max
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}
)
(G.1)
22Specifically, one should substitute ‖vi‖2
(
ci,r
vi
‖vi‖2 + c
′
i,r
wi
‖wi‖2
)
as the new vi when applying Lemma G.4.
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Also, for a parameter q =
√
d, let us apply Lemma G.5 to derive
λr
def
= max
δ∈Rd:‖δ‖∞≤τ,MW (δ)≤τ√q
∣∣Tr(δ⊗r)∣∣ ≥ Ω( 1
(τ)r
‖Tr‖F
)
(G.2)
Let R ≥ 3C + 3 be a constant to be chosen later, λmax = maxr<R{λr}, and let δmax be the choice
of δ which maximizes the value of λmax.
Consider the high probability event that MW (z) = O˜(1), then using MW (δmax) ≤ τ√q, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
r≥R
Tr+1((z + δmax)
⊗r+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
r≥R
∑
i∈[m]
ci,r〈vi, z + δmax〉
(〈wi, z + δmax〉
τ‖wi‖2
)r∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ d4mmax
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}i∈[m]
∑
r≥R
(
O˜(1) + τ
√
q
τ
√
d
)r
≤ d5mmax
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}i∈[m]
∑
r≥R
(
O(1)
d1/4
)r
When R ≥ 10000(C + 1), we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
r≥R
Tr+1((z + δmax)
⊗r+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
maxi∈[m]{‖vi‖2}i∈[m]
d100C
)
(G.3)
Next, for every s ∈ [1/2, 1], let us define
q<R(z, s) := CONST +
∑
r<R
Tr+1((z + sδmax)
⊗r+1)
• On one hand, by applying Lemma G.5 twice for each r, we know for every set of vectors
z1, · · · , zq with ‖zi‖∞ ≤ 1,MW (zi) = O˜(1) and supp(zi) ∩ supp(zj) = ∅ for i 6= j, it satisfies∑
j∈[q]
(|q<R(zj , s)− q<R(0, s)|+ |q<R(−zj , s)− q<R(0, s)|) ≤
∑
r<R
O˜
(
λmax
τ r
)
≤ O˜
(
λmax
τR
)
This means by Markov’s inequality, for at least (1 − 1log d) fraction of the indices j ∈ [q],
denoting them by Λ ⊆ [q], it satisfies
|q<R(zj , s)− q<R(0, s)|+ |q<R(−zj , s)− q<R(0, s)| ≤ 1
q
O˜
(
λmax
τR
)
• On the other hand, by Claim G.7, we know that there is an s ∈ [1/2, 1] such that
|q<R(0, s)| ≥ Ω (λmax)
Without loss of generality, suppose q<R(0, s) is positive and q<R(0, s) ≥ Ω (λmax).
Combining the two, when τ100000(C+1) ≥ 1d , we derive that for those j ∈ Λ,
q<R(zj , s) ≥ Ω (λmax) and q<R(−zj , s) ≥ Ω (λmax)
Thus, combining with (G.1), (G.2) and (G.3), we have for those j ∈ Λ,
E
ζ
[p(zj + sδmax + ζ)] = CONST +
∑
r≥0
Tr+1((zj + sδmax)
⊗r+1) ≥ Ω
(
1
d4
max
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}
)
E
ζ
[p(−zj + sδmax + ζ)] = CONST +
∑
r≥0
Tr+1((−zj + sδmax)⊗r+1) ≥ Ω
(
1
d4
max
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}
)
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but according to Claim G.2 (see end of this section), this means the NTK function p(·) outputs the
wrong label either zj or for −zj . Therefore, among those 2q data points z1, . . . , zq,−z1, . . . ,−zq, at
least 50% · (1− o(1)) of them must be wrong under `2 perturbation with radius τ .
Finally, recall when z is generated from the data distribution, with high probability z ∈ Rd
is O(k)-sparse. Therefore, we can divide (nearly) all possible choices of z into q =
√
d  O(d/k)
groups, in a way that when we generate z1, . . . , zq from those groups, they have disjoint support
and they together match the overall distribution. Using this argument one can prove that, for at
least 50% · (1 − o(1)) of the probability mass of z from the data distribution, the prediction must
be wrong under `2 perturbation with radius τ .
This finishes the proof of Theorem G.1 
G.2 Tensor Lower Bound
Next, for each degree-r homogenous part of the polynomial expansion of Claim G.3, we can write
it as a tensor and lower bound its Frobenius norm as follows.
Lemma G.4. Suppose w1, . . . , wm ∈ Rd are i.i.d. sampled from N (0, I) with m ≤ dC for some
constant C > 0. Let v1, . . . , vm ∈ Rd be arbitrary vectors that can depend on the randomness of
w1, . . . , wm. Let us denote by Tr+1 the symmetric tensor Rd×(r+1) → R such that
Tr+1(x
⊗r+1) =
∑
i∈[m]
〈vi, x〉
(〈wi, x〉
‖wi‖2
)r
We have as long as r ≥ 3C, then w.p. ≥ 1− e−Ω(log2 d) over the randomness of {wi}i∈[m], for every
{vi}i∈[m] we have
‖Tr+1‖F ≥ Ω
(
1√
d
max
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}
)
Proof of Lemma G.4. Consider any fixed j ∈ [m], and some γ ∈ [−1, 1] to be chosen later.
Let us define x =
wj
2‖wj‖2 + γ
vj
2‖vj‖2 which satisfies ‖x‖2 ≤ 1. We have
Tr+1(x
⊗r+1) =
∑
i∈[m]
〈vi, x〉
(〈wi, x〉
‖wi‖2
)r
=
∑
i∈[m]\{j}
〈vi, x〉
(〈wi, x〉
‖wi‖2
)r
+
(
γ
2
‖vj‖2 + 〈vj , wj〉
2‖wj‖2
)(
1
2
+ γ
〈wj , vj〉
2‖vj‖2‖wj‖2
)r
Note that for every j 6= i, with probability at least 1− e−Ω(log2 d),∣∣∣∣〈wi, x〉‖wi‖2
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ 〈wi, wj〉2‖wi‖2‖wj‖2 + γ 〈wi, vj〉2‖vj‖2‖wi‖2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ O( log d√d + γ
)
.
This implies that as long as |γ| ≤ 1√
d
,
|Tr+1(x⊗r+1)| ≥ 1
3r
∣∣∣∣γ2‖vj‖2 + 〈vj , wj〉2‖wj‖2
∣∣∣∣− (O(log d)√d
)r
m ·max
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}
Since the above lower bound holds for every |γ| ≤ 1√
d
and every j ∈ [d], we immediately know
max
‖x‖2≤1
{
Tr+1(x
⊗r+1)
} ≥ Ω( 1√
d
max
i∈[m]
{‖vi‖2}
)
This implies our bound on the Frobenius norm as well. 
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G.3 Tensor Perturbation
We present the following critical lemma, which serves as the major step to prove the non-robustness
of Neural Tangent Kernel:
Lemma G.5 (Tensor difference). For every m = poly(d), every set of vectors W = {wi}i∈[m] with
each ‖wi‖2 = O(
√
d), for every constant r > 0, every q ∈ [0, d], every symmetric tensor T of degree
r: Rd×r → R, for every τ > 0,
1. The following is true
λ := max
δ∈Rd:‖δ‖∞≤τ,MW (δ)≤τ√q
∣∣T (δ⊗r)∣∣ ≥ Ω( 1
(τ)r
‖T‖F
)
2. For every vectors z1, · · · , zq ∈ Rd with ‖zi‖∞ ≤ 1,MW (zi) = O˜(1) and supp(zi)∩ supp(zj) = ∅
for i 6= j, for every y such that ‖y‖∞ ≤ τ and MW (y) ≤ τ√q, the following holds:∑
i∈[q]
∣∣T (y⊗r)− T ((y + zi)⊗r)∣∣ ≤ O˜( λ
τ r
)
Proof of Lemma G.5. For the first item, we can simply let δ ∼ N
(
0, τ
2
log2 d
)
. This choice of δ
satisfies ‖δ‖∞ ≤ τ and MW (δ) ≤ τ√q with high probability. Furthermore, by applying anti-
concentration of Gaussian polynomials (see for instance [5, Lemma I.1]), we know with at least
constant probability |T (δ⊗r)| ≥ Ω(‖T‖F )τr . This proves the first item.
To see the second item, we first note by tensor r-linearity and symmetry,∑
i∈[q]
∣∣T (y⊗r)− T ((y + zi)⊗r)∣∣ ≤ r∑
r′=1
(
r
r′
)∑
j∈[q]
|T (z⊗r′j , y⊗(r−r
′))|
and therefore we only need to bound the terms on the right hand side for any fixed r′ ∈ [r].
Define random variable {ξi,j}i∈[r′−1],j∈[q] where each ξi,j is i.i.d. uniformly at random chosen
from {−τ, τ}. Consider arbitrary fixed values γj ∈ {−1, 1} for j ∈ [q]. Let us define random
variables Z1, Z2, · · · , Zr′ ∈ Rd as:
∀i ∈ [r′ − 1] : Zi :=
∑
j∈[q]
ξi,jzj , Zr′ :=
∑
j∈[q]
γj
( ∏
i∈[r′−1]
ξi,j
)
zj
From these notions one can directly calculate that
E
ξ
[T (Z1, Z2, · · · , Zr′ , y⊗(r−r′))] = τ r′
∑
j∈[q]
γjT
(
z⊗r
′
j , y
⊗(r−r′))
On the other hand, we have ‖Zi‖∞ ≤ τ and moreover, using the randomness of ξi,j , we know w.h.p.
|MW (Zi)| = O˜(τ√q) for every i ∈ [q]. Hence, by Claim G.8, we know that
|E[T (Z1, Z2, · · · , Zr′ , y⊗(r−r′))]| = O˜(λ)
Putting them together, we have
∣∣∣∑i∈[q] γiT (z⊗r′i , y⊗(r−r′))∣∣∣ = O˜ ( λτr′ ), and since this holds for
every γi ∈ {−1, 1}, we conclude that:∑
i∈[q]
|T (z⊗r′i , y⊗(r−r
′))| = O˜
(
λ
τ r′
)
Putting this back to the binomial expansion finishes the proof. 
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G.4 Smoothed ReLU Taloy Series: Proof of Claim G.3
We first note the following Taylor expansion formula for smoothed ReLU.
Claim G.6 (smoothed ReLU). Let a ≥ 0 be any real and ρ ∼ N (0, σ2) for σ ≥ a. Then, for every
x ∈ [−a, a],
E
ρ
[ρ1ρ+x≥0] = σ
∞∑
i=0
c2i
(x
σ
)2i
and E
ρ
[1ρ+x≥0] =
1
2
+
∞∑
i=0
c′2i+1
(x
σ
)2i+1
where |c2i| = Θ
(
1
i!
)
, |c′2i+1| = Θ
(
1
(i+1)!
)
Proof of Claim G.6. We can directly calculate that
E [ρ1ρ+x≥0] =
1√
2piσ
∫
ρ≥−x
ρe−
ρ2
2σ2 dρ =
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2σ2 σ
so using Taylor expansion of e−
x2
2σ2 we prove the first equation. As for the second equation, we have
E [1ρ+x≥0] =
1√
2piσ
∫
ρ≥−x
e−
ρ2
2σ2 dρ
This implies that
d
dx
E [1ρ+x≥0] = − 1√
2piσ
e−
x2
2σ2
Using Taylor expansion and integrating once, we prove the second equation. 
We are now ready to prove Claim G.3.
Proof of Claim G.3. Specifically, for each i ∈ [m], denoting by x = z + δ, we wish to apply
Claim G.6 to
E
ρi,ζ
〈x+ ζ, vi〉
(
1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi
)
= E
ρi,ζ
〈x, vi〉
(
1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
♥
+ E
ρi,ζ
〈ζ, vi〉
(
1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
♦
Note that g
def
= 〈wi, ζ〉+ ρi ∼ N (0, σ2) for σ2 = τ2log16 d‖wi‖22 + σ2ρi ∈
[
τ2
log16 d
‖wi‖22, 2τ
2
log16 d
‖wi‖22
]
.
• We first deal with the ♥ part. Using Claim G.6, we have
E
ρi,ζ
〈x, vi〉1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi = 〈x, vi〉Eg 1〈wi,x〉−bi+g≥0 = 〈x, vi〉
(
1
2
+
∞∑
r=0
c′2r+1
(〈wi, x〉 − bi
σ
)2r+1)
for |c′2r+1| = Θ
(
1
(r+1)!
)
. Similarly, we also have
− E
ρi,ζ
〈x, vi〉1−〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi = 〈x, vi〉
(
−1
2
−
∞∑
r=0
c′2r+1
(−〈wi, x〉 − bi
σ
)2r+1)
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Putting them together, and using the fact that bi  d−0.2  σ, we can write
♥ = E
ρi,ζ
〈x, vi〉
[
1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi
]
= 〈x, vi〉
( ∞∑
r=0
c′2r+1
(〈wi, x〉 − bi
σ
)2r+1
− c′2r+1
(−〈wi, x〉 − bi
σ
)2r+1)
= 〈x, vi〉
∑
r≥0
c′′r
(〈wi, x〉
σ
)r
for |c′′2r| ≤ O
(
1
(r)!
)
for every r ≥ 0 and |c′′2r+1| ≥ Ω
(
1
(r+1)!
)
.
• Let us now focus on the ♦ part. Let v‖i be the part of vi that is parallel to wi. Then obviously
we have
E
ζ,ρi
〈ζ, vi〉1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi = Eζ,ρi〈ζ, v
‖
i 〉1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi =
‖v‖i ‖2
‖wi‖2 Eζ,ρi〈ζ, wi〉1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi
¬
=
‖v‖i ‖2
‖wi‖2 Eζ,ρi(〈ζ, wi〉+ ρi)1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi ± ‖v
‖
i ‖2 ·O(d−1/4)
Above, the last ¬ is due to σρi ≤ do(1) and ‖wi‖2 ≥ Ω(
√
d).
Next, we again treat g
def
= 〈ζ, wi〉+ ρi ∼ N (0, σ2) and apply Claim G.6. We have
E
ρi,ζ
(〈ζ, wi〉+ ρi)1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi = Eg g1〈wi,x〉−bi+g≥0 = σ
∞∑
r=0
c2r
(〈wi, x〉 − bi
σ
)2r
for |c2r| = Θ
(
1
r!
)
. Putting them together, and doing the same thing for the symmetric part,
we have
♦ = E
ρi,ζ
〈ζ, vi〉
(
1〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi − 1−〈wi,x+ζ〉+ρi≥bi
)
=
‖v‖i ‖2σ
‖wi‖2
∞∑
r=0
(
c2r
(〈wi, x〉 − bi
σ
)2r
− c2r
(−〈wi, x〉 − bi
σ
)2r)
± ‖v‖i ‖2 ·O(d−1/4)
¬
=
‖v‖i ‖2σ
‖wi‖2
∞∑
r=1
c′′′r
(〈wi, x〉
σ
)r
± ‖v‖i ‖2 ·O(d−1/4)
= ‖v‖i ‖2〈
wi
‖wi‖2 , x〉
∞∑
r=0
c′′′r+1
(〈wi, x〉
σ
)r
± ‖v‖i ‖2 ·O(d−1/4)
Above, using the property of bi  d−0.2  σ, equation ¬ holds for some |c′′′2r| ≤ O(d
−0.1
r! ) and
|c′′′2r+1| ≤ O( d
−0.1
(r+1)!).
Finally, putting the bounds for ♥ and ♦ together, and using τ‖wi‖2
log8 d
≤ σ ≤ τ‖wi‖2, we derive that
♥+♦ = ‖vi‖2 ·
∑
r≥0
(
c′′′′i,r〈x,
vi
‖vi‖2 〉+ c
′′′′′
i,r 〈x,
wi
‖wi‖2 〉
)( 〈wi, x〉
τ‖wi‖2
)r
± ‖vi‖2 ·O(d−1/4)
for |c′′′′i,r| ≤ O(1) for every r ≥ 0, c′′′′′r ≤ O(d−0.1r) · c′′′′r for every r ≥ 0, and |c′′′′i,r| ≥ Ω
(
1
d2
)
for every
odd constant r ≥ 1. This finishes the proof of Claim G.3. 
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G.5 Simple Lemmas
We have the following claim relating polynomial value with its coefficients:
Claim G.7 (low degree polynomial). Let p : R → R be a constant-degree polynomial p(x) =∑R
r=0 crx
r, then there exists x ∈ [1/2, 1] such that
|p(x)| ≥ Ω
(
max
r=0,1,2,··· ,R
|cr|
)
.
Proof of Claim G.7. Let us define q(x)
def
= p
(
x+ 12
)
and write accordingly q(x) =
∑R
r=0 c
′
rx
r. Using
the identity formula
∑R
r=0 c
′
rx
r =
∑R
r=0 cr(x+ 0.5)
r we can derive (recalling R is constant)
max
r=0,1,2,··· ,R
|c′r| ≤ O
(
max
r=0,1,2,··· ,R
|cr|
)
Conversely, by writing
∑R
r=0 c
′
r(x−0.5)r =
∑R
r=0 crx
r, we also have the other direction and therefore
max
r=0,1,2,··· ,R
|c′r| = Θ
(
max
r=0,1,2,··· ,R
|cr|
)
Now, notice that
∣∣ dr
dxr q(x) |x=0
∣∣ = Θ(|c′r|), so we can apply Markov brother’s inequality to derive
that
max
x∈[0,1/2]
|q(x)| ≥ Ω
(
max
r=0,1,2,··· ,R
|c′r|
)
.
This finishes the proof. 
Using this Claim, we also have the following claim about symmetric tensor:
Claim G.8 (symmetric tensor norms). For every constant r > 0, every fixed a1, a2 > 0, every
symmetric tensor T of degree r of the form T : Rd×r → R, let
λ1 := max
x:‖x‖∞≤a1,MW (x)≤a2
{|T (x⊗r)|}, λ2 := max{xi}i∈[r]:‖xi‖∞≤a1,MW (xi)≤a2
{|T (x1, x2, · · · , xr)|}
then we have:
λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ O(λ1)
Proof of Claim G.8. λ1 ≤ λ2 is obvious so let us prove the other direction. Define polynomial
p(s) = T
((
x1 + s
r+1x2 + s
(r+1)2x3 + · · ·+ s(r+1)r−1xr
)⊗r)
The coefficient of p(s) at degree
∑
r′∈[r](r+1)
r′−1 is Θ (T (x1, x2, · · · , xr)). Thus, applying Claim G.7
and appropriately scaling the operator, we complete the proof. 
H Appendix for Probability Theory
H.1 Small ball probability: The basic property
We also have the following property:
Lemma H.1 (small ball probability, 1-d case).
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(a) For every subset Λ ⊆ [d], every r, and every t > 0,
Pr
[
|∑j∈Λw?j · zj − r| ≤ t] ≤ O( t√|Λ|/d + 1√|Λ|k/d)
(b) For every subset Λ ⊆ [d] with |Λ| ≥ Ω(d), and every t > 0,
Pr
[
|∑j∈Λw?j · zj | ≤ t] ≥ Ω(t)−O( log k√
k
)
Proof of Lemma H.1. Recall we have Przj [zj 6= 0] ≥ Ω(kd ) for each j ∈ Λ. Let Λ′ ⊆ Λ be the subset
of such indices j with non-zero zj , so by our assumption we have |zj | ≥ 1√k for each j ∈ Λ′. By
Chernoff bound, with probability at least 1− e−Ω(|Λ|k/d), we know |Λ′| ≥ Ω(kd ) · |Λ|.
Conditioning on such Λ′, by the Littlewood-Offord problem (a.k.a. small ball probability theo-
rem, or anti-concentration for sum of Bernoulli variables, see [27]), we know
Pr
|∑
j∈Λ
w?j · zj − r| ≤ t
∣∣ E
 ≤ O(√kt+ 1√|Λ′| ) = O(
√
kt+ 1√|Λ|k/d)
As for the lower bound, let us denote by Λ′′ ⊆ Λ be the subset of such indices j with non-zero zj
and |zj | ≤ O( 1√k ). We know with high probability |Λ′′| ≥ Ω(k). Using E
[∣∣∑
j∈Λ\Λ′′ w
?
j ·zj
∣∣] ≤ O(1),
we can apply Markov’s inequality and get
Pr
∣∣ ∑
j∈Λ\Λ′′
w?j · zj
∣∣ ≤ B
 ≥ 0.6 for some constant B = O(1)
Now, for the sum over Λ′′, we can apply a Wasserstein distance version of the central limit theorem
(that can be derived from [104], full statement see [6, Appendix A.2]) to derive that, for a Gaussian
variable g ∼ (0, V 2) where V = ∑j∈Λ′′(w?j )2 E[(zj)2] ≥ Ω(1), the Wasserstein distance:
W2
∑
j∈Λ′′
w?j · zj , g
 ≤ O( log k√
k
)
Using the property of Gaussian variables and B = O(1), we have
Pr
g ∈
 ∑
j∈Λ\Λ′′
w?j · zj −
t
2
,
∑
j∈Λ\Λ′′
w?j · zj +
t
2
 ≥ Ω(t)
and using the above Wasserstein distance bound, we have
Pr
∑
j∈Λ′′
w?j · zj ∈
 ∑
j∈Λ\Λ′′
w?j · zj − t,
∑
j∈Λ\Λ′′
w?j · zj + t
 ≥ Ω(t)−O( log k√
k
)

H.2 McDiarmid’s Inequality and An Extension
We state the standard McDiarmid’s inequality,
Lemma H.2 (McDiarmid’s inequality). Consider independent random variables x1, · · · , xn ∈ X
and a mapping f : X n → R. If for all i ∈ [n] and for all y1, · · · , yn, y′i ∈ X , the function f satisfies
|f(y1, · · · , yi−1, yi, yi+1, · · · , yn)− f(y1, · · · , yi−1, y′i, yi+1, · · · , yn)| ≤ ci.
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Then
Pr[f(x1, · · · , xn)− E f ≥ t] ≥ exp( −2t
2∑n
i=1 c
2
i
),
Pr[f(x1, · · · , xn)− E f ≤ −t] ≥ exp( 2t
2∑n
i=1 c
2
i
).
We prove a more general version of McDiarmid’s inequality,
Lemma H.3 (McDiarmid extension). Let w1, . . . , wN be independent random variables and
f : (w1, . . . , wN ) 7→ [0, B]. Suppose it satisfies for every k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , N},
• with probability at least 1− p over w1, . . . , wN , it satisfies
∀w′′k :
∣∣f(w−k, wk)− f(w−k, w′′k)∣∣ ≤ c
• with probability at least 1− p over w1, . . . , wk−1, wk+1, . . . , wN , it satisfies
E
w′k,w
′′
k
[
(f(w−k, w′k)− f(w−k, w′′k))2
] ≤ V 2k
Then,
Pr
w1,...,wN
[∣∣∣∣f(w1, . . . , wN )− Ew2,...,wN [f(w1, . . . , wN ) | w1]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ t]
≤ O(N√p) + exp
(
−Ω(t2)
t(c+
√
pB) +
∑N
t=2(V
2
t +
√
pB2)2
)
.
Proof of Lemma H.3. For each t = 1, . . . , N − 1, we have with probability at least 1 − √p over
w1, . . . , wt, it satisfies
Pr
wt+1,...,wN
[∀w′′t+1 : ∣∣f(w≤t, wt+1, w>t+1)− f(w≤t, w′′t+1, w>t+1)∣∣ ≤ c] ≥ 1−√p .
We also have with probability at least 1−√p over w1, . . . , wt, it satisfies
Pr
wt+2,...,wN
[
E
w′t+1,w
′′
t+1
(
f(w≤t, w′t+1, w>t+1)− f(w≤t, w′′t+1, w>t+1)
)2 ≤ V 2t+1
]
≥ 1−√p .
We denote by K≤t the event (over w≤t = (w1, . . . , wt)) that the above two statements hold. We
know that Pr[w≤t ∈ K≤t] ≥ 1 − 2√p. For notational simplicity, we denote by K≤N the full set
over all possible (w1, . . . , wN ).
Define random variable Xt (which depends only on w1, . . . , wt) as
Xt := E
w>t
[f(~w) | w≤t]1(w≤1,...,w≤t)∈K≤1×···×K≤t ∈ [0, B]
For every t and fixed w1, . . . , wt−1.
• If (w≤1, . . . , w<t) 6∈ K≤1 × · · · ×K<t, then Xt = Xt−1 = 0.
• If (w≤1, . . . , w<t) ∈ K≤1 × · · · ×K<t,
– If w≤t 6∈ K≤t, then Xt −Xt−1 = 0−Xt−1 ≤ 0.
– If w≤t ∈ K≤t, then
Xt −Xt−1 = E
w>t
[f(w<t, wt, w>t) | w≤t]− E
w≥t
[f(w<t, wt, w>t) | w<t]
Recall the property w<t ∈ K<t, we know with probability at least 1 − √p over wt and
w>t, it satisfies
∀w′′t :
∣∣f(w<t, w′′t , w>t)− f(w<t, wt, w>t)∣∣ ≤ c
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Taking expectation over wt and w>t, we have
∀w′′t : Ew>t
[
f(w<t, w
′′
t , w>t)
]− E
w≥t
[f(w<t, wt, w>t)] ≤ (c+√pB)
This precisely means Xt −Xt−1 ≤ c+√pB.
– Using the property w<t ∈ K<t, we know with probability at least 1 − √p over w>t, it
satisfies
E
wt,w′′t
(
f(w<t, wt, w>t)− f(w<t, w′′t , w>t)
)2 ≤ V 2t
Taking expectation also over w>t, we have
E
wt,w′′t ,w>t
(
f(w<t, wt, w>t)− f(w<t, w′′t , w>t)
)2 ≤ V 2t +√pB2
=⇒ E
wt
(
E
w>t
[f(w<t, wt, w>t)]− E
w′′t ,w>t
[f(w<t, w
′′
t , w>t)]
)2
≤ V 2t +
√
pB2
Now observe that, since (w≤1, . . . , w<t) ∈ K≤1×· · ·×K<t, we haveXt−1 = Ew′′t ,w>t [f(w<t, w′′t , w>t)].
We also have that as long as w≤t ∈ K≤t, then Xt = Ew>t [f(w<t, wt, w>t)]. Putting these
together, and using the fact Pr[w≤t ∈ K≤t] ≥ 1− 2√p, we have
E
wk
[
(Xt+1 −Xt)2 | w<t
] ≤ V 2t + 3√pB2
In sum, we have just shown that for all choices of w1, . . . , wt−1,
Xt −Xt−1 ≤ (c+√pB) and E
wk
[
(Xt+1 −Xt)2 | w<t
] ≤ V 2t + 3√pB2
always holds. Note in addition we also have Ewt [Xt|w<t] ≤ Xt−1. Therefore, by applying martingale
concentration (with its one-sided and Bernstein form, see Lemma H.4),
Pr[XN −X1 > t] ≤ exp
(
−Ω(t2)
t(c+
√
pB) +
∑N
t=2(V
2
t +
√
pB2)2
)
Recalling
XN := f(~w)1(w≤1,...,w≤t)∈K≤1×···×K≤t
and we have XN = f(w1, . . . , wN ) with probability at least 1 − 2N√p (and XN = 0 with the
remaining probability). Also recalling
X1 := E
w2,...,wN
[f(~w) | w1]1w≤1
and we have X1 = Ew2,...,wN [f(~w) | w1] with probability at least 1 − 2
√
p (and X1 = 0 with the
remaining probability).
Together, we have the desired theorem.

Let us state, for completeness’ sake, a simple one-sided Bernstein form of martingale concen-
tration (that we do not know a good reference to it).
Lemma H.4. Suppose we have a submartingale sequence X0, X1, . . . , XN , satisfying:
• X0 = 0 and E[Xt | Xt−1] ≤ Xt,
• Xt −Xt−1 ≤ c always holds, and
• EXt [(Xt −Xt−1)2 | Xt−1] ≤ V 2t always holds.
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Then,
Pr[XN > t] ≤ e
−Ω( t2
tc+
∑
t V
2
t
)
Proof. Define potential function Ψt = e
η
2c
Xt for some η ∈ (0, 1) to be chosen later. We have
Ψt = Ψt−1 · e
η
2c
(Xt−Xt−1) ≤ Ψt−1 ·
(
1 +
(η(Xt −Xt−1)
2c
)
+
(η(Xt −Xt−1)
2c
)2)
where the inequality is due to ey ≤ 1+y+y2 which holds for all −∞ < y ≤ 0.5. Taking conditional
expectation, we have
E[Ψt | Xt−1] ≤ Ψt−1 ·
(
1 + η E
[Xt −Xt−1
2c
| Xt−1
]
+ η2 E
[(Xt −Xt−1
2c
)2 | Xt−1])
≤ Ψt−1 ·
(
1 + η2
V 2t
4c2
)
≤ Ψt−1 · eη
2 V
2
t
4c2 .
After telescoping, we have E[ΨN ] ≤ eη
2
∑
t V
2
t
4c2 , and therefore
Pr[XN > t] ≤ E[e
ηXN/(2c)]
eηt/(2c)
≤ eη2
∑
t V
2
t
4c2
−η t
2c
Choosing the optimal η ∈ (0, 1) gives us bound
Pr[XN > t] ≤ e
−Ω( t2
tc+
∑
t V
2
t
)

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